UMRABULO

POLICY CONFERENCE 2022 SPECIAL EDITION

POLICY CONFERENCE 2022
DISCUSSION DOCUMENTS

THE YEAR OF UNITY AND RENEWAL TO DEFEND AND ADVANCE SOUTH AFRICA'S DEMOCRATIC GAINS

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Foreword

President Cyril Ramaphosa

THESE POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS TO BE discussed at the ANC Policy Conference in preparation for the December Elective Conference, comes against the background of a challenging period. These Discussion Documents outline the ANC's strategic approach to policies and how it shapes and impacts our transformation agenda.

The ANC has designated, 2022 as the; *The year of unity and renewal to defend and advance South Africa's democratic gains.* In reflecting on this theme, these discussion documents reviews what our overall policy goals are, how we have continued to refine them and what remains to be done to ensure the overall strategy and tactics of the ANC advance the goals of the National Democratic Revolution. The policy proposals must produce concrete outcomes and state emphatically what these expected outcomes will be.

'Our focus has to be the improvement of the quality of lives of people, rather than an often narrow, internal party focus.'

2022 appears to be even more shift-shaping than 2020 that heralded the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic with its huge negative impacts. The economic slowdown that Covid induced, is now accompanied by higher rates of inflation globally. We are also in a cycle of steep increases in energy, food, fertiliser, etc. The outbreak of hostilities between Ukraine and Russia has made the world more turbulent, unpredictable and crisis-prone.

There is a new complex environment with different threats and challenges, not imaginable at the beginning of the year. This makes the future more unpredictable and the world more unstable. This event is as momentous as the dissolution of the Eastern Block, that signified the end of the Cold War. A new Cold War appears in the offing and will reshape the global political and economic environment for the foreseeable future. De-globalisation is setting in with strong nationalistic undertones in many parts of the globe, due to the double-edged nature of globalisation. This can be damaging for growth prospects, trade and other interactions between states. Many countries are already facing political and economic turbulence as a result of these disruptive events.

Our Movement equally face enormous challenges in this period, as witnessed by the decline in support with the 2021 local government elections. This mirrors the declining level of trust and credibility in us as leadership and cadres.

To counter these negative aspects, we have to intensify our efforts with the renewal process and revitalisation of ANC structures. We must remain steadfast on this journey of

renewal as we navigate the treacherous waters ahead, towards the 2024 election.

Our focus has to be the improvement of the quality of lives of people, rather than an often narrow, internal party focus. The new policy frameworks must be underpinned by a comprehensive Social Compact underpinned by a capable and ethical state, for us to succeed in our undertakings.

President OR Tambo cautioned prophetically in 1977 that the transformation process will be difficult. He said, "Comrades, you might think it is very difficult to wage a liberation struggle. Wait until you are in power. At that stage, you will realize that it is actually more difficult to keep the power than to wage a liberation war." The following Declaration should be our clarion call at this Policy Conference and the December Conference; "This 51st National Conference rises with an ANC that is united and more determined than ever to strengthen its role as the voice of the people of South Africa, an expression of the aspirations of all, and particularly of the poor". This should guide us as we finesse our policies to ensure our objectives are met and the ANC remain an **agent for change** as the leading force in our society.

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The Changing Balance of Forces around the South African Transformation Agenda

INTRODUCTION

1. A continuous discussion of the domestic and global Balance of Forces is a requisite for the successful prosecution of our struggle for a National Democratic order in South Africa.

2. We need to appreciate the objective conditions and subjective factors, the opportunities and threats which are likely to expedite or impede the advancement of our transformation agenda on an ongoing basis in order to device pertinent ways and means of achieving our goals.

3. The balance of forces discussion is not a presentation on the entirety of Strategy and Tactics of the ANC. It is a discussion which is primarily confined to the evaluation of the strength and weaknesses of our struggle at a particular historical period, its opportunities and threats (that is a SWOT analysis). The ANC S&T is a much broader conversation which addresses the character of our revolution, the contradictions it seeks to resolve and its motive forces, including the balance of forces and the immediate transformation program arising from that evaluation. It is in its totality the theory of our revolution, and tends to have a longer trajectory in its projections.

4. The Strategy and Tactics of the ANC as adopted at the 54th National Conference in 2017 remains largely current in its analysis of the balance of forces. However, there are developments which have significantly shifted the balance of forces since the last National Conference in 2017.

5. These events primarily include the breakout of the Covid-19 pandemic worldwide, and its unprecedented devastation on the global community and the world economy. The country also experienced a deterioration of national security and stability engendered by the orchestrated insurrectionary destabilisation plan of JULY 2021. Furthermore, the ANC witnessed reduced support at local government level in November 2021, with its aggregate national votes dipping below 50%. Lastly, we recently witnessed the breakout of large-scale war in Europe with Russia's invasion of Ukraine, impacting negatively on the global economy and international relations, and with major implications for geopolitics and geoeconomics forward.

6. In this discussion document, we commence with an analysis of domestic stakeholder-interests and how they affect social transformation in our country.

BACKGROUND
OUR IDEOLOGICAL LAUNCHING PAD

7. The conceptual understanding of the contradictions in our society from the

ANC's point of view, has always been premised on the perspective that our struggle was against colonialism of a special type in which the liberation of blacks in general, and Africans in particular, was its strategic intent. This is the premise from which the ANC anchored South Africa's transformation project.

8. The strategic breakthrough of 1994 made it possible for the ANC to commence work in earnest to realise the practical liberation of blacks and the building of a united, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist and prosperous society, through government developmental programs.

9. South Africa's constitution is a valuable heritage the liberation struggle has bequeathed generations to come. It is more than a mere legal framework for the governing of our public affairs. The National Constitution importantly also serves as a statement of socio-economic transformational goals too. This matter is dealt with later in this document.

10. The ANC constitutional principles for a democratic South Africa, was an act of astute and proactive revolutionary foresight which firmly anchored South Africa's course on the policy injunctions and traditions of our struggle.

11. The political and other generations of rights – including social, economic, gender and environmental rights – enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic, derive their origin from the demands of the 1955 Freedom Charter. The ideals of the Freedom Charter are therefore embedded in the country's Constitution

12. In its preamble, the constitution of the Republic of South Africa asserts that the people of South Africa, "recognises the injustices of our past; honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land," and calls on all South Africans to "heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights;" It further says we must, "lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations."

13. The national constitution therefore provides the broad framework for the attainment of objectives of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR). It describes the contours of a National Democratic Society, one that goes beyond the attainment of nationhood and formal political rights, by encompassing the achievement of socio-economic emancipation. It recognises the symbiotic relationship between the resolution of the antagonisms thrown up by national oppression and the fundamental problem of social injustice, economic deprivation and patriarchy.

14. The cumulative changes brought about by the attainment of universal suffrage in 1994 have, over the years, induced corresponding adjustments to the social structure of our country's communities, albeit to a limited degree in other respects such as the gap between the rich and poor. The progress and the weaknesses have also thrown up new challenges. All these developments continue to impact on the alignment and re-alignment of the objective interests of the motive forces of revolutionary change.

15. The reforms of the past 28 years have been life-changing to huge segments of our society and must be analysed and interpreted in a way that assists our strategic and tactical postures going forward. Whether further progress is made in this journey and, indeed, whether there are reversals, is a function

of the balance of forces and the capacity of the transformers both to shift and to respond to this balance. The next section reflects on the balance of forces in relation to the five pillars of struggle: the state, the economy, organisational work, ideological struggle and international work.

THE BALANCE OF FORCES AROUND THE 5 PILLARS OF STRUGGLE

THE STATE

16. Following the 1994 breakthrough, we forged a vibrant multi-party democracy based on a constitution that enjoys the allegiance and support of the overwhelming majority of South Africans. "We transformed state institutions and put in place formal instruments of accountability. We also created space for organs of civil society to thrive. What seems to be new, with major implications for state legitimacy is the deeply-entrenched corrupt practices driven by a few state employees, public representatives and the private sector, . . .which has directly affected service delivery", (see the Balance of Forces document, NGC 2015.)

17. It must however be noted that in 2015 the problem of corruption was correctly or incorrectly characterised as a challenge which involved "a few state employees, public representatives and the private sector leadership". However, thanks to the Commission on State Capture, we now know that the problem was much bigger than we thought. Extensive networks through which public servants, senior government officials and corporate executives have been involved in widespread looting of public finances, have now been exposed. Furthermore, the Commission has correctly opined that the problem of state capture and corruption is reasonably much more than the Commission was able to uncover because its terms of reference effectively limited the Commission's work to the national sphere of government. The challenges of criminal wrongdoing in the public sector at provincial and local government levels, including public enterprises, were not investigated.

18. A singular development which has strategically impacted the South African democratic state negatively, is the July 2021 organised acts of subversion in parts of the country. It has raised concern over the capacity of the state to defend its sovereignty against attempts to undermine and topple it through extraconstitutional means.

19. Since its inception, the South African democratic state has enjoyed overwhelming moral authority to the extent that the agenda to subvert it militarily by the extreme right-wing in the early days of the new order, eventually withered away. However, past threat assessments did not sufficiently underscore the fact that insurgency against the Democratic State could be orchestrated from within the National Liberation Movement itself, save for the observation in the 2017 Strategy and Tactics document that 'it cannot altogether be ruled out that the liberation movement itself can be so corrupted – in terms of its objectives, policies, value systems as well as composition and conduct of its leadership – that it becomes a bed of counter-revolutionary infestation'.

20. It is common knowledge today that at the core of the subversive anarchy and looting of July last year, there were purportedly disgruntled and aggrieved individuals, who included ANC members, over the decisions of the courts, in particular the Constitutional Court, on matters involving alleged transgressions by ANC members. Their agenda found resonance with individuals who were associated with wrong doing and acts of malfeasance. These organisers were prepared to do everything and anything to prevent the

execution of the decisions of the courts, thereby debilitating the authority of the country's constitution and its democratic order.

21. The orchestrators of the 2021 acts of subversion were unambiguous in their intention to remove a democratically established government by extra-constitutional means. They agitated for the dissolution of parliament. They also aimed at intimidating law enforcement services and to assault the judiciary in order to collapse the authority of the courts. They deliberately ignored the progressive role that the judiciary has played in advancing the various generations of human rights in the recent time.

22. The leaders of the 2021 instability project were also attacking the foundational principle of our democratic system, viz the principle of a "constitutional democracy" as against a "parliamentary democracy." Their rationale purportedly seeks to bring government closer to the poor, when in reality they represent crass populism which is bent on grabbing power by hoodwinking the masses. The debate on Parliamentary Democracy versus Constitutional Democracy, the pros and cons thereof, were broadly canvassed in the movement in 1994 when a political settlement was crafted.

23. Those who hold a view that the matter should be revisited have the right to be heard. It will however be wrong and a betrayal of the oath of membership of the ANC for any member in good standing to seek to be heard in such a counterproductive, regressive, and anti-progress manner.

24. Whereas in itself the reason this counterrevolutionary partial-insurrection failed highlights the fact that our constitutional democracy and its transformation agenda still enjoy broad support, the unconvincing performance of state security apparatus is nonetheless concerning. It is a recipe for the possible break-up of state authority, and the emergence of characteristics of a failed state.

25. This development calls for a speedy intervention to strike the appropriate balance between the security of citizens and that of the democratic state in our national security doctrine. This we must do to defend our revolutionary gains and to protect the agenda and power of the progressive majority.

26. Such revolutionary vigilance must equally recognise that underpinning the current insecurity and instability in South Africa are the dire economic conditions of huge segments of South Africa's poor, as a result of lack of economic opportunities and chronic joblessness. Poverty in South Africa's urban townships and informal settlements is today in the public face. This further underscores challenge the ANC has to win back the country's metro municipalities.

27. The question of South Africa's poor cannot be resolved without addressing their relationship to South Africa's economy. Over the past three decades they got increasingly pushed to the margins of economic life by several factors including the legacy of poor access to quality education and life skills in an environment where the state lost control over who has access in the domestic labour-market and business opportunities, as the country's borders were melting down.

28. The July partial insurrection however, has thrown up new possibilities and energies which can be harnessed to re-engage the masses. The stand taken by residents to protect business centres in their neighbourhoods at the height of the July unrest and the volunteers who came forward to clear rubble and clean destroyed business complexes should not go a begging. This ownership by communities of their own fate can help overcome the passive attitude

created post-1994 that every problem is government's responsibility. There are several community initiatives recently which have exposed the deficiencies of ANC branches to act as 'local fora for the resolution of people's problems'.

29. Several areas of government have been targeted by rogue and corrupt lumpen elements, especially at local government level. Several schemes and ruses are devised to realise wholesale looting of public coffers leading to paralysis of service delivery. Several municipalities are currently under administration by higher authorities partly because they've been collapsed by corruption-induced mismanagement. https://www.salga.org.za/Documents%20and%20Publications%20AR.html

30. However, since 1994 the legislative arm of the state at all levels of government contributed decisively to the transformation in South Africa, thanks to the decisive democratic majority of the ANC. However, the legislatures, which have served as genuine tribunes of the people in advancing transformation have been assailed by a streak of pseudo-militancy whose traction among some young people in particular is the rude, vulgar, theatrical and violent form of politics. This traction is made possible by the high levels of frustration among the core motive forces of change. This phenomenon can only be successfully defeated through visible hard work by ANC members in addressing the needs of the people. It is the only way to enhance the legitimacy of the democratic order. The failure visibly and progressively to address the people's aspirations can only encourage this counter-revolutionary culture to spill over to other mainstream societal institutions with devastating consequences for democracy and our constitutional values.

31. This counterrevolutionary tendency has already started to tilt the political power-balance in the country in favour of South Africa's traditionally conservative and right-wing political forces. It is a political tendency that brings together old-order apartheid political and ideological institutions and thrives on exploiting impatience with the pace of transformation to gang up against the ANC and realise an anti-transformation agenda. Behind these opportunistic political deals lies a world of systematic defence of the privileges of the apartheid order in a modified form, as well as corrupt rent-seeking schemes of the ultra-leftist. Opportunistically aligned with these forces is the drive by some self-declared 'leftist' political tendencies to pursue material self-aggrandisement combined with a pathological hatred of the ANC and attempts at widening its divisions.

THE ECONOMY

32. Just as the Covid-19 pandemic has tested the capacity of the state and the efficiency of government, it has also profiled opportunities to grow our capacity to realise a myriad of our developmental endeavours. As the Alliance Economic Recovery and Reconstruction perspective suggests, we need programmes which address unemployment, poverty and inequality taking advantage of the needs of the moment.

33. The capabilities developed over the past two years since the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, which involve scientific and evidence-based planning, swift targeted action in response to challenges, intergovernmental coordination and implementation, effective communication and coherent leadership capacity, must be consolidated into a new way of carrying out government solutions going forward.

34. The distribution of wealth and incomes in South Africa is largely still

characterised by the racial and gender demographics of the colonial past (Stats SA). In 2020, 7.8% of the South African population, (which happens to be white) constituted 64.7% of top management positions and 52.5% of senior management posts (Department of Labour – Commission for Employment Equity Annual Report, 2021). In Q3 of 2021, according to Stats SA, unemployment among Africans was at 38.6% compared to 9.2% among whites.

35. Low economic growth and a huge budget deficit are compounding the difficulties in realising the ideals enshrined in the RSA Constitution. While progress has been made in the two-and-half decades of freedom to extend basic services and reduce poverty, distribution of income and assets still reflects the fault-lines of apartheid colonialism "The issue of distribution of national income – the fundamental question of political economy – now occupies an important place in mainstream discourse." (Ibid, 2015 NGC).

36. As argued in the 2017 Strategy and Tactics document: 'Economically, compared to ten years ago, the balance of forces has shifted against the forces of change. The debt burden wears down the fiscus leaving little room for manoeuvre. As a society with a low savings rate, the country is … heavily dependent on foreign inflows'. In addition, attempts to stabilise the fiscal situation such as the VAT increase do have a negative social impact in the immediate. Energy insecurity has become a reality, with Eskom unable to turn around the situation; there has been a regression on some basic services like water, sanitation and roads; and between 2011 and 2015 poverty headcount actually worsened. After the progress in achieving the MDGs, we have regressed with reference to a number of Sustainable Development goals over the last few years.

37. The Covid-19 pandemic has resulted in severe contraction of world economies. There has been a huge surge in unemployment globally and on the continent in particular. South Africa's official unemployment rate at the beginning of 2022 stood at 35.5% as a consequence of the shrinkage of the economy. The investment rate has declined. Overall, poverty and inequality have worsened.

38. The economic reconstruction and recovery plan, as well as refinements being introduced, provide an opportunity to embark on a new growth path and achieve a sustainable economic future based on economic inclusion, high rates of employment and better levels of social equity. Sustainability also entails a just transition to a low carbon future, sensitive to urgent environmental imperatives and the impact of the transition on the working people.

THE MOTIVE FORCES AND ORGANS OF CIVIL SOCIETY

39. A holistic appreciation of the impact of ANC government policies on the country's social structure and, by implication, the alignment and realignment of the social forces for transformation over the past 28 years, is necessary. This will help establish whether there are any significant changes within the working people broadly and among those who own the means of production. This goes for any other strata of importance in relation to the goals of the revolution.

40. As has been consistently argued, the working class is the core motive force of the revolution. The importance of the working-class in our NDR was successfully long argued by none other than the inspirational leader of the South African working-class, General Secretary of the SACP, Moses Kotane, when he said in South Africa for the NDR to have meaning the struggle must

deliver the liberation of the Black Working Class.

41. Consisting of both employed and unemployed workers, this class constitutes the majority in South African society; it is central to the production process and other economic endeavours; it has historically evinced the most progressive levels of social consciousness; and it has shown high levels of capacity to organise and mobilise. The Strategy & Tactics of the ANC adopted by the 54th National Conference in 2017 provides the ANC perspective regarding the importance of the working-class today, (see para: 117 & 118) However even then, the question was asked, "More than twenty years into democracy, does this analysis still hold?

42. The macrosocial changes which have slowly occurred over the past almost three decades of ANC transformative policies and programs, compels us to commission a comprehensive enquiry into the changes in and around the SA Black working-class and the rural power as an important policy intervention. The changes in the nature of work, the de-industrialisation of the economy, and subjective factors that include fragmentation of the progressive trade union movement and the impact of union investments on leadership conduct – all these and other factors have undermined the leadership role that the working class is meant to play in the unfolding national democratic revolution.

43. While these weaknesses do not subtract from the objective position of the working class in society, they do impact on the depth and breadth of revolutionary consciousness within society generally and in the ANC in particular. The depth of participation of this class in ANC structures and activities is a matter that requires attention. It is an acknowledged reality that the organisation of ANC branch activities does not lend itself to convenient participation of employed workers. It is about time that the ANC considers a review of its linear approach towards establishing its primary structures, the ward-based branch model, especially in an environment where organised labour is no longer cohesive as before.

44. Research on the changes of South African's social structure in the recent period has tended to focus on the growth of the 'middle class' (strictly referred to as the middle strata) because of the belief that it is one of the indicators of the impact of economic policy. This is because the growth of the middle class is thought to create knock-on effects such as enhanced buying power, better education and skills in the economy which in turn attract investments and therefore create more job opportunities.

45. Regardless of the many ways of measuring the middle class population, all the methods social scientists employ point to a significant growth of these social strata, in particular the black component, in South Africa. Data suggest the black middle class more than doubled from 7% to 14% between 2004 and 2013, and by 2018 constituted between 48% to 52% of the national total of these strata. (Measuring South Africa's black middle class: Markus Korhonen: Stellenbosch University, 2018.).

46. This development deserves our attention in assessing the Balance of Forces for the following reasons:

    46.1 The driving force of our revolution, as it has always been emphasised, is the black section of South African society. Changes within this social base, the black majority, are bound to have a direct effect on the prospects and momentum of our revolution.

    46.2 The capacity and propensity of the middle class to influence the direction of social change and

upheavals is legendary in the history of human development and the world revolutionary movement in particular. Revolutionary vigilance requires that the ANC must always have keen interest in the dynamics of the South African middle class, especial the black segment of this community. A matter which is relevant to the leadership the ANC must exercise is, for instance, sensitivity to the need to organise ANC branches in a way that expedites the participation of the middle class. The organisation does not lend itself to significant participation of members of the middle class in its primary structures. Just as it is the case with the working-class, the Renewal of the ANC calls for a revision of our approach in building primary structures. The ANC must connect with the huge community of professionals our transformative policies have produced.

47. The middle class is not homogeneous. It consists of various sub-groups which differ significantly in their occupations, income bands and cultural traits. These sub-groups include intellectuals and other professionals, owners of small and micro enterprises (petty bourgeoisie), middle and low-level managers, and the political elite and large sections of the state bureaucracy.

48. On higher rungs of the social ladder (higher than the middle strata) are what can be characterised as the social elite – owners of medium and large enterprises and the most senior managers of these establishments. Among these are what can be characterised as the established capitalists (owners of monopoly and large companies most of which have their roots in the apartheid era), the bureaucratic bourgeoisie (for their reliance on the state as a site of accumulation), and the comprador bourgeoisie (who depend on, and act as agents of, the established capitalists).

THE DYNAMIC OF LUMPEN STRATA IN THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

49. The concept of a 'lumpen proletariat' emerged in the analysis of the emergent capitalist system in Europe. It was in reference to the "declassed", detached elements of the proletariat who resorted to lowly, anti-social, and criminal activities for their livelihoods. It is captured succinctly thus: 'Alongside decayed *roués* with dubious means of subsistence and of dubious origin, alongside ruined and adventurous offshoots of the bourgeoisie, were vagabonds, discharged soldiers, discharged jailbirds, escaped galley slaves, swindlers, mountebanks, *lazzaroni*, pickpockets, tricksters, gamblers, *maquereaus*, brothel keepers, porters, *literati*, organ grinders, ragpickers, knife grinders, tinkers, beggars – in short, the whole indefinite, disintegrated mass, thrown hither and thither, which the French call *la bohème*'. (*Karl Marx: The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. 1852*).

50. These are hustlers who pursue narrow material self-interests and offer their services to the highest bidder. They are what Marx referred to as the "refuse of all classes, easy to manipulate to support the capitalist system"

51. Arising from this, it stands to reason that, with high levels of unemployment and dynamic shifts in the social structure, South Africa would have such a social group in abundance. However, groups that lack principle, and that show a lack of social consciousness are not only located among the unemployed. Significant swathes of the parasitic bourgeoisie and middle strata constitute a veritable community of lumpen elements and they operate in various spheres of human endeavour – in the grey area between legality and

illegality or in fully-fledged criminal networks. Susceptible to mobilisation against the revolution, the lumpen tendency also find expression in the middle and upper strata in a complex process of post-colonial class formation in today's South Africa.

52. Who are some of these lumpen elements? Broadly, they can be found among:

    52.1 the parasitic bureaucratic bourgeoisie, some of whom seek to capture state institutions and repurpose them for their own accumulation

    52.2 sections of the political elite and bureaucracy who use their positions in state institutions for venal self-enrichment

    52.3 some leaders within the trade union movement who swindle unions or their investments arms

    52.4 troupes of religious leaders who use their institutions as platforms of spiritual deceit for purposes of larceny from devotees

    52.5 elements among student and youth leaders who take advantage of their positions for purposes of making money

    52.6 groups that demand 'empowerment cuts', outside of the law, in projects being carried out in various localities

    52.7 some leaders of local protest movements who use distressed communities' grievances to worm their way into political, bureaucratic or procurement opportunities.

53. All these and others constitute a lumpen element within South Africa's middle and upper strata. Their interests and activities intersect in various areas of social endeavour. They collaborate across social networks and professional spheres. What characterises them is illegitimate and illegal self-enrichment and a posture that sees ethical and capable state or civil society institutions as inimical to their crass materialistic interest.

54. Because of that self-interest, this lumpen element seeks to subvert everything progressive if it interferes with their selfish desires. They are driven by greed and their loyalty is easily purchased through material and other rewards. They eschew social solidarity and worship elitism. They seek to imbue communities with their value-system of crass materialism, individualism, corruption and criminality leading to social decadence. Yet at the same time, the more cunning among them profess a populist radicalism – often combined with narrow nationalism – that takes advantage of the slow progress in social transformation to legitimise their criminal enterprise.

55. As elaborated in the Strategy and Tactics and other documents of the ANC, monopoly capital and various elements of the erstwhile colonial bourgeoisie often act in a manner that undermines or slows down the process of transformation. Further, among these and the rest of the white middle strata, there are lumpen elements of various types some of whom have found common cause with their peers among the emergent black middle and upper strata.

56. The irony of the dynamics described above, pertaining to the lumpen elements of the emergent middle and upper strata, is that some of them position themselves publicly as sworn enemies of, and fighters against, the enduring colonial capitalist establishment. Yet, because they are driven by selfish personal interests, the cumulative effect of their conduct has the same effect (as that of the established capitalist class) of undermining or slowing down social transformation.

57. This is a novel phenomenon that requires constant interrogation and vigilance. It is broadly about the strategic question of managing class formation and value systems in an emergent post-colonial society. It also relates to the fundamental question: how and from where can counter-revolution congeal in the current phase of the National Democratic Revolution?

58. Historically, many of the lumpen proletariat took part in the revolt against the apartheid system. At times, their criminal activities threatened to undermine the moral high ground that the revolutionary movement sought to occupy. Many had hope about the future and were thus susceptible to personal reformation. In the context of the evolution of democracy and the process of social transformation, with its strengths and weaknesses, and the 'sins of incumbency', there is always a possibility of a coalescing of interests from among lumpen elements which may paralyse further movement forward.

59. At this juncture, the motive forces of change in South Africa are at their lowest ebb. Few if any of their formations have survived the syndrome of incumbency and factional wars which have gripped even the most vital force of this movement, organised labour. While there are multitudes of underlying factors behind this phenomenon, the lumpen tendency described above is central among them.

60. Lumpen tendencies are flourishing in many structures of civil society today. The battle-tested structures are increasingly high jacked by networks of self-serving individuals, and are buckling under the weight of reactionary societal values associated more with colonial capitalism.

61. These toxic elements have also targeted the ruling party and state structures for penetration, including at sub-national government levels. Renewal of the ANC as an agent for change demands that war be declared against lumpens. The party must weed out lumpen elements within its structures for its own survival. The ANC can no longer function without a strong, highly political and disciplined security structure to support its leadership organs.

62. Many of the individuals and social forces that were involved in the July 2021 partial insurrection, both at leadership and mass level, are part of the lumpen strata that has bourgeoned in our communities partly as a result of joblessness and poverty.

IDEOLOGICAL CONTESTATION: THE BATTLE OF IDEAS

63. The theatre of ideas is a vital centre for change because it talks to unceasing efforts to ensure that social values, views and opinions that enjoy hegemony are those which support change. These challenges define the very core of our transformation agenda and are therefore critical in appreciating the threats and obstacles on our way. As stated by former President Thabo Mbeki in his Nelson Mandela Lecture delivered in 2006:

"Within the context of the development of capitalism in our country, individual acquisition of wealth produced through the oppression and exploitation of the black majority, became the defining social value in the organisation of white society"

"Because the white minority was the dominant social force in our country, it entrenched in our society as a whole, including among the oppressed, the deep-seated understanding that personal wealth constituted the only measure of individual and social success. As we achieved our freedom in 1994, this had become the dominant social value affecting the entirety of our population"

"Inevitably as an established social norm, this manifested itself even in the democratic state machinery that had seemingly "seamlessly" replaced the apartheid state machinery. The new order born of the victory in 1994 inherited a well-entrenched value system that placed individual acquisition of wealth at the very centre of the value system of our society as a whole. Society assumed a tolerant or permissive attitude towards such crimes as theft and corruption, especially if these related to public property. This phenomenon which we considered as particularly South African, was in fact symptomatic of the capitalist system in all countries"

64. There are two tendencies at play in relation to the battle of ides. On the one hand, the broad strategic objectives of the ANC, now codified in the country's constitution, define the ideational framework within which South African society operates and the vision for which it aspires. On the other hand, because of poor performance as the governing party particularly in the recent period, the malfeasance of some of its leaders and the incoherence of its message, the ANC is faced with the harsh reality that the legendary dominance of ideas it enjoyed in South Africa before and during the democratic transition has drastically diminished.

65. Can a revolution triumph without a change in values, morals, and views in society? Is there such an experience? What accounts for the growing inhuman behaviour and conduct in our communities in the midst of a project of building a morally better society?

66. Today, whereas the ANC still remains the majority party in the overwhelming majority of South Africa's municipalities, even with the substantial loss of support in the last local government elections, the broad public's belief in the future under the ANC has taken a knock.

67. At an elementary level, for the battle of ideas to be won, as Amilcar Cabral, the leader of the PAIGC contended, the challenge starts with the credibility of leaders. The messengers must be one with what they preach for their message to resonate with society. It means that, for the ANC voice to regain pre-eminence, the leaders must be credible; otherwise the message will not to be heard. Secondly, the delivery of services or the lack of it can either impede or expedite the dominance of our ideas.

68. The other important challenge confronting the ANC is the reduced capacity to provide context to current developments in various spheres of life on an ongoing basis. This is with respect to both the production and dissemination of ideas. The party literally has no personnel to produce and publicise party views and opinions. The organisation is sorely absent in the space of ideas. Ongoing engagement with the intelligentsia particularly in institutions of higher learning, the media, and other centres which generate ideas needs urgent special attention.

69. The desire to have independent platforms through which the party can communicate its views to the broad public, be it electronic, print or visual has not borne fruit. This state of affairs is indeed untenable if the ANC must strive to be the leader of our society.

70. There is also, at a global level, a trend towards individualism and personal aggrandisement which is combined with manifestations of social inequality. This global trend, in part, accounts for the weakened social cohesion in South Africa to a point where the irrational signs of racism begin to rear their ugly head again. Consequently, social cohesion and hope within broader society is wearing thin.

71. The ANC has a historical obligation to defeat racism in all its forms, and to uphold non-racialism and non-sexism

within its ranks and broader society. In this regard, its performance in the recent years has lost its shine.

72. Misplaced and raw narrow nationalistic sentiments and ethnic chauvinism do not only scoff at the legendary vision of the founders of the oldest liberation movement on the continent, but strategically bedevil the mobilisation of the motive forces for the new phase of struggle. Added to this are continuing manifestations of gender oppression.

73. Two decades ago, we undertook to ensure that "our program to transform education is not only addressing access to and the quality of education, but also education as a socialisation institution for the transmission of new values" (ANC Strategy and Tactics 51st National Conference,2002). Education was viewed as a medium for the promotion of national identity, our constitutional democracy, non-racialism, non-sexism, human rights and our philosophy of an egalitarian society. It is evident that the greater part of this work remains to be implemented. These lofty ideals require urgent attention today more than ever before.

74. The discourse on liberation and social transformation is today cluttered with simplistic revolutionary-sounding phrases. On the one hand, a technical approach to 'social delivery' has taken root, tending to assume the form of patronage. On the other hand, demands and policies which are not immediately attainable are advanced as immediate objectives, creating popular expectations that only worsen impatience and social discord. This is combined with an ahistorical approach to the nature of the 1994 democratic breakthrough and revolutionary sounding slogans among some political forces outside of the ANC. As part of its renewal, the ANC has to pay full attention to ideological work that is founded on its vision and historical mission.

THE ANC AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE

75. The ANC Strategy and Tactics adopted at the 2017 National Conference asserts that "the ANC faces declining fortunes. Internal squabbles, money politics, corruption and poor performances in government, all conspire to undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of the broader public. Some progressive formations and individuals who historically have been part of the broad front of forces for change are challenging the movement on important current issues, particularly corruption."

76. As the saying goes, there can be no revolution without a revolutionary organisation. Every society which is going through change, must have agents who are the sponsors of that change and are repositories of its characteristics.

77. The ANC Strategy and Tactics explains this revolutionary tenet in the following way: "Leadership collectives should, as a whole, reflect the motive forces of change and the various centres of power. This should help burst the bubble of professional politics in these collectives: a bubble in which government functionaries and full-time ANC employees operate as if in an echo chamber, thus widening the social distance from the rest of society. The various terrains of social endeavour, gender, age, and other criteria must be taken into account. Leadership integrity also relates to criteria to qualify for such responsibility, including length and quality of service, as well as ideological, academic and ethical attributes. In this regard, lifestyle audits by structures in which the membership has confidence, is critical."

78. It further laments the fact that deviant conduct was becoming deeply entrenched in the ANC asserting that "arrogance, factionalism and corruption have been identified by large sections of society, including ANC supporters, as dominant tendencies

within the movement. Gate-keeping, money politics and fraud characterise most ANC electoral processes. Underhand practices increasingly define interactions between various spheres of government and the private sector; and private interests seek to capture and control not only state organs, but also the ANC itself."

79. At the end of the day, the ANC as "a strategic centre of power should command both legitimacy and authority, deriving from the quality of its collective ideas and the discipline of its members.

80. It should ensure its mandate is carried out by its members, wherever they are located. It should be able to monitor and evaluate the implementation of its policies. When and where there are weaknesses - whether these are a result of poor policies, weak implementation or poor leadership - it should be able to act decisively." (Strategy and Tactics, 2017).

81. To deal with these debilitating practices requires a genuine and sincere commitment to execute the National Conference resolution on renewal, re-engineering and unification of the ANC without fear or favour. In this context, the movement will need to find the right balance between pursuit of unity on the one hand, and renewal on the other. Some may argue that these objectives are not inconsistent with each other. But, given the lumpen tendencies described above, the fundamental issue about unity being based on principle, on promoting revolutionary values and ethics, and on selfless service to the people should inform the process of organisational regeneration. It should be expected that there will be opposition from within our ranks to the cause of renewal.

82. Therefore, central to this work is the obligation of the NEC to strengthen the capacity of the Independent Electoral Commission as a matter of urgency. Among the reasons for the poor performance of the ANC in the 2021 local government elections is the infighting emanating from allegations of interference and fraudulent selection processes. The need for a sufficiently capacitated permanent independent machinery which is sovereign from regional level upwards as ordered by conference, cannot be over-emphasised. Similarly, the Integrity Commission must be resourced and supported to be the decisive authority on ethics that it was meant to be.

THE OPPOSITION AND ELECTORAL POLITICS

83. In the early years of the transition, the trajectory of change in the broad polity of South Africa pointed to the moral superiority of the struggle to end racial oppression. The main protagonists of minority rule and white privilege, the National Party validated this by their courageous decision to fold up, and for some of them to join the ANC. Similarly, the overwhelming majority of political formations which existed in the former Bantustans joined the ANC.

84. Beyond that historical point, changes in South Africa's electoral politics suggested that our democracy was gradually moving away from the political party configurations defined by postures towards the fundamental issue of social transformation.

85. The phenomenon of political groups which broke away from the ANC since 1994 has resulted in an interesting outcome. Everything remaining the same, it would have been expected that splinter groups from the ANC who make it to parliament, because they all profess to subscribe to the broad historic mission of the ANC, would find common cause with the ANC on fundamental issues of transformation. To the contrary, almost all of them display extreme hostility towards the ANC. It is a question the ANC has a duty to interrogate and understand in order to play our

leadership role better, including exposing such tendencies to broader society.

86. The ANC registered a decline in its support during the November 2021 Local Government elections. Whereas the decline is in both rural and urban municipalities, the loss of six out of eight metros, the economic powerhouses the country, is devastating. Especially in Gauteng, the loss of all three metros has rendered ANC leadership of the Gauteng province almost hollow. The number of hung councils increased from 25 in 2016 to 70 in 2021. It is a development with dire consequences for the ability of the ANC to advance the transformation of the material conditions of life of marginalised communities. As said before, electoral performance in as society undergoing transformation such as our, is not for its own sake.

87. Current trajectories and modelling exercises project the ANC to dip below 50% in the 2024 national elections, for the first time since 1994. Among the reasons listed as causal factors of the November 2021dramatic decline is the depressed national mood due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the devastated economy and joblessness, increase in poverty and hunger, the July unrest social dislocation, distrust of government, enormous service delivery failures including water and electricity, corruption allegations, leadership conflicts, weak and non-existent party primary structures, and ANC financial problems.

88. The long list above consists of objective and subjective impediments. Our program over the next 24 months must foreground and prioritise those factors which it is up to us to eliminate. The 2019 national elections outcome, viewed against the 2016 results, provide sufficient evidence that the ANC itself has the remedy to its own morbidity.

89. The 2021 elections saw the biggest proliferation of small parties and independents. The elections were contested by a record 325 political parties and over 1,500 independent candidates. Two important implications for the balance of forces in this regard are, firstly, that the majority of independent candidates and service delivery forums mainly came out of ANC or ANC-aligned structures, underlining the ongoing haemorrhaging of the movement as a result of the intensification of individual interests among members. Secondly, the results show that the ANC did not lose votes to the next two largest parties, the DA and the EFF, and that turnout was poorest in the organisation's 'strongholds'. This does underline the possibility of the ANC reversing its electoral decline – a possibility that can only become reality if the efforts at organisational and societal renewal find practical expression.

90. The ANC remains the biggest party in many councils where it is not governing. However, the bitter reality is that it has been kept out of government by the growing phenomenon of small opposition parties ganging up to keep the ANC out of office. These coalitions which have less in common than a crowd of drunkards in a beer hall, are on a crusade to obliterate the defining goals of our national transformation project. Otherwise, they would not all declare the demise of the ANC as the only primary reason they exist. Their self-realisation in the palaces they now occupy under the pretext of fighting corruption, has more to do with their careerism, wheeling and dealing and patronage. We must work hard to unmask this truth to the people. The defence and consolidation of our democratic gains starts with organisational integrity and winning the battle of ideas.

GLOBAL BALANCE OF FORCES

91. In this section, we briefly reflect on the global balance of forces, in the main, to the extent that it impacts on the domestic prosecution of the struggle. This is taking into account the fact that the analysis contained in the 2017 Strategy and Tactics document does not require much elaboration.

92. The Policy Conference discussion paper on 'International Relations' prepared by the NEC Subcommittee on International Relation provides an account of ANC work on the international front, the challenges, interventions and recommendations on how to take our work forward. These initiatives are important in support of our endeavours on the domestic front. This global balance of forces section, must be read with the submission of the International Relations Committee.

93. Half-a-century ago at Morogoro, the ANC asserted the view that our struggle was part of the global movement in which more and more countries the world over, were moving from exploitative societies towards non-exploitative societies.

94. In the intervening period the world has witnessed events which have altered global affairs drastically. A new complex environment of international relations has emerged. This was acknowledged by the ANC back in 2002 at the 51st national conference when we said: "Our transition to democracy is taking place in a world in which the system of capitalism enjoys dominant sway over virtually the entire globe. But it is also a world in which the agenda of the working people and the developing nations can find creative expression in pursuit of a humane, just and equitable world order."

95. This is the context in which we are called upon to continue the prosecution of the struggle to transform our country. But, how broad is awareness about these challenges in South Africa today? Put differently, is the ANC still ideologically hegemonic in the way the broad public views the world? This is more than just about theoretical debates; but it relates keenly to the opportunities and dangers that our struggle faces at domestic level.

96. The twentieth century was remarkable for three major civilisation-shifting developments:

    96.1 the establishment of socialist orders in vast parts of the world;

    96.2 the liberation of formerly colonised countries, with the end of apartheid being the last major development; and

    96.3 the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the dismantling of socialism in many countries.

97. While Fukuyama's End of History may have trumpeted the dominance of capitalism over all other economic systems, critical developments in the early 21st century have shown up not only the weaknesses of the capitalist system but also ways in which it could be challenged and changed in a more progressive way. Some of the major defining moments in the evolving global environment are discussed under the following highlights, viz the rise of neoliberalism, the rise of China, the 4th Industrial Revolution, Inequality, Populism, Authoritarianism, and in conclusion the African dynamic.

THE RISE OF NEOLIBERALISM

98. Neoliberalism is a system, characterised in the main by advocacy of "strong private property rights, free markets and free trade" (Harvey 2) and the relegation of the role of the state to the periphery of economic activity and a secondary one relative to the markets.

99. The rise of neo-liberalism and its framing of globalisation was not without dire consequences particularly for the poor and developing countries upon which structural adjustment programmes were

imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

100. The dominance of neo-liberal ideological precepts brought about the influence of the "market society" as a product of globalisation. The dominance of the market created a distorted dominant value system and frame of ideological discourse which encouraged "greed, crass materialism and conspicuous consumption".

101. "A market society is a way of life in which market values seep into every aspect of human endeavour. It's a place where social relations are made over in the image of the market. The great missing debate in contemporary politics is about the role and reach of markets."

102. However, even within the bastions of capitalism, there has been a questioning of the foundations of that system. For example, the United States' Business Roundtable in its August 2019 statement, signed by 181 CEOs, pointed out that all previous statements had 'stated that corporations exist principally to serve their shareholders'. But in that statement it urged 'leading investors to support companies that build long-term value by investing in their employees and communities'. Critically, the central role of the state has been starkly shown in the all-round management of the Covid-19 pandemic, spanning health, multi-disciplinary research, economic stimuli and the ordering of social life.

CHINA BECOMES A GLOBAL ECONOMIC POWER

103. Within a period of roughly more than three decades China has emerged as a world economic giant. This is borne out by the following figures: In 2019 the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of China was estimated at 14.10 trillion U.S dollars. From 1979 until 2010, China's average annual GDP growth was 9.91%, reaching an historical high of 15.2% in 1984 and a record low of 3.8% in 1990.Such growth has enabled China, on average, to double its GDP every eight years and helped raise an estimated 800 million people out of poverty.

104. The US Congressional Research Service (CRS) of 25 June 2019 reiterated the country's concern that "China's growing global economic influence and the economic and trade policies it maintains have significant implications for the United States and hence are of major interest to Congress".

105. The growing hostility towards China as expressed in the US' so-called Asia Pivot, the designation of China as a strategic competitor by the European Union and trade wars have implication for the whole world and particularly the developing countries. How the US, the EU and Japan respond to the shift in global power balances towards developing Asia is one of the fundamental questions of our time. Any escalation of conflict "could have devastating effects on the world economy" (source?).

106. This is the context in which the recent outbreak of war between the Russian Federation and Ukraine must be viewed. This development has indeed precipitated a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous international conjuncture, VUCA, overnight. This conflict is bound to have far-reaching implications for the foreseeable future. Latent tensions of the 20th Century Cold War have been painfully reignited creating a cesspool which many countries, including our own, are unavoidably going to be dragged into.

107. The situation is complicated. There are unresolved historical issues of identity and nation formation between Russia and Ukraine. But there are also matters arising from the dissolution of the USSR in both countries relating to the so-called Peripheral Capitalist state of the former Eastern bloc countries and

the rosy future that is supposed to derive from their alignment with political, military and economic alliances of Western Europe and the Northern Atlantic. On the other hand, the unceasing expansion of NATO to the East in countries which were part of the Soviet Union has created unease in Russia, which argues that the security of countries should be treated as indivisible. That this sensitive matter could have been resolved in a rational manner long before the Russian incursion into Ukraine is acknowledged among many of the political and intellectual elites in the G7, NATO and allied countries.

108. The observation in the 2017 ANC Strategy and Tactics document bears reiteration: 'Selfish geo-political pursuits and the rise of the security-industrial complex threaten to worsen global tensions and plunge the world into a devastating inferno.' This is also reflected in the security doctrines of NATO and allied countries which seek to demonise, isolate and even physically confront China – somehow perceiving of its economic rise as an existential threat to their own countries.

109. There seems to be an ahistorical approach to geopolitics and economics and, even worse, a race-based denialism that ignores the fact that China was in fact the world's largest economy for a large part of the 19th century. These ebbs and flows in global dynamics should be managed rationally and maturely, rather than through strategic contortions that seek to freeze the current reality, which is characterised by the pre-eminence of the United States of America and its allies.

110. The implications of these developments to our national interests are that they make our policy stance to balance interests difficult. Similarly, a unified stance of the AU on these matters has proven difficult to achieve. There are indications already that the global economy is going to be negatively impacted by the war in Ukraine just as the world's economy tries to recover from Covid-19. There are expectations that one of the consequences of the war will be the acceleration of the transition to a low carbon economy across the globe. In addition, markets for our primary products may grow as countries seek alternative sources for Russian and Ukrainian exports. On the other hand, most world economies will choke from the substantial rise in the prices of many commodities.

111. Along with adopting a common non-aligned approach to these global dynamics, South Africa and the rest of the African continent need to exercise maximum vigilance to prevent a situation in which the continent becomes a playground of imperial ambitions of any of the global powers. Without an effective restraining dynamic of multipolarity and genuine multilateralism, Africa could once again find itself overtly and covertly subjected to the suffocating embrace of colonial and neo-colonial machinations.

THE 4TH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

112. The 4IR has come to dominate every facet of global society. We can no longer talk of it as imminent; we are in the midst of it. Klaus Schwab of the World Economic Forum, in his publication, The Fourth Industrial Revolution, underlines "hyper connectivity, data-science, Artificial Intelligence and robotics" as key drivers of productivity.

113. The 2017 Strategy and Tactics document characterises these developments in the following words: "Over the past three decades, the world has experienced an explosion of technological advances with massive potential to improve the human condition. Information and communications technology, bio-

technologies, genetics and the science of small particles (Nano-technology) have opened many frontiers of progress in health sciences, agriculture, space exploration and other sectors. Along with this, robotics, three-dimensional (3D) printing, the Internet of Things and artificial intelligence hold out the possibility of redefining, in a fundamental way, the nature of work. What overall impact the fusion of these advanced technologies in the physical, digital and biological spheres – the so-called fourth industrial revolution – will have on humanity's quality of life is still a matter of conjecture.

114. "In terms of their potential, these advances are a boon to humanity. But how they are owned, managed and let loose on society can have devastating consequences. The danger is that these successes of human civilisation are being appropriated by a few, in spite of the fact that many of them originated from, or were developed with the variegated support of, public institutions. They can be directed to benefit a small layer of society if not watched, with the mass of the people condemned as surplus to humanity. Many of the technological advances lend themselves to cynical military and intelligence applications."

INEQUALITY

115. The debates about the future of capitalism arise in the context, not so much of particularly heightened left-wing agitation, but growing concern on the part of politicians, academics and business leaders around the effects of deep and fundamental flaws in the global economic system. These include the effects of climate change, rising inequality as well as threats to the global systems of governance and trade.

116. According to Oxfam (2017), more global wealth is owned by the richest one-percent than the rest of humanity; and 'eight men now own the same amount of wealth as the poorest half of the world' (Oxfam: 2017). During the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, human development indicators in relation to poverty, health and education worsened for the global majority, while the net worth of billionaires went up, with a new one added every 17 hours (Oxfam); and 32 of the largest corporates saw profits rise by some US$109-billion (Forbes). In most developed economies, the working class has in the past two decades experienced stagnant incomes and a declining quality of life. Growing inequality is also to be found even in some of those countries that have extricated hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.

117. The work by Thomas Picketty in Capital in the Twenty First Century served to highlight not just poverty and underdevelopment, which had been our focus for much of the 20th century, but also the level of inequality and the socio-economic impacts thereof. He argues that there is nothing natural about inequality but that it is a 'social, political and historical' construct due to a number of factors such as tax systems, as well as political and economic factors.

POPULISM AND AUTHORITARIANISM

118. While populism and authoritarianism are bedfellows, it would be wrong to assume an equivalence between the two tendencies. Erica Frantz, in her book on authoritarianism, points out that of the 75% of regimes which became authoritarian between 2000 and 2010, most took the form of a personal leader who exploited populist rhetoric. Such leaders are often 'hyper-masculinist and patriarchal rulers'. (Jillian Schwedler and Kevan Harris: 2019)

119. Frantz points out that a large part of these regimes saw democracy being eaten out from within, as the larvae of

some wasps eat out host spiders. Amongst the features which authoritarian regimes display, include a narrow inner circle of trusted people; the installation of incompetent loyalists in positions of power; promotion of members of the family; and the creation of new security services loyal to the leader.

THE AFRICAN DIMENSION

120. The African continent is counted as one of the richest in the world in terms of its natural resources. These include diamonds, sugar, salt, gold, iron, cobalt, uranium, platinum group metals, copper, bauxite, silver, petroleum, cocoa beans, woods and tropical fruits. It goes without saying that because of its natural resources the African continent will continue to occupy a strategic position in the global socio-economic and political arena. Some of these minerals are bound to assume even greater prominence in the global transition to a low-carbon economy.

121. Historically, diplomatic, political, economic and trade relations that Africa enters into have largely been guided and informed by what is in the national interests of those countries with whom Africa chooses to enter into partnerships. Some developed countries have deliberately sponsored wars and promoted chaos in Africa for purposes of destabilisation and access to the continent's resources with poor regulation and on the cheap.

122. It is therefore in the best interests of the continent to promote intra-African trade which would be mutually beneficial to the member states. By implication, this means that Africa needs to develop a collective approach in terms of its relations with other regions of the world.

123. The continent also needs to take full advantage of its youthful population and ensure that the demographic dividend becomes a reality. According to the estimates of the United Nations, the population of Africa constitutes 16.72% of the world population. This makes Africa the second highest populated continent in the world after Asia with about 60% of the world population. Further, of the global number of young people between the ages of 15 and 24, about 20% are located in sub-Saharan Africa; and these are expected to increase faster than on any other continent, by about 89% between 2019 and 2050.

124. It goes without saying that, for the continent to advance – in terms of both its socio-economic development and it's standing in the global community – it needs urgently to resolve the remaining conflicts that continue to dog some of its regions.

125. Needless to say, the multidimensional costs of these conflicts are enormous. According to IANSA, Oxfam and Saferworld: "There are the obvious direct costs of armed violence – medical costs, military expenditure, the destruction of infrastructure, and the care for displaced people – which divert money from more productive uses."

126. In this context, it is correct that South Africa continues to put high on the agenda issues of economic integration, 'silencing the guns' and the advancement of women and youth.

127. Lest this is not fully appreciated: for South Africa, the emphasis on the Africa agenda is not a matter of solidarity or the convenience of contiguity. The positive attributes of the continent, outlined above, do stand South Africa in good stead to pursue higher rates of economic growth and development. A continental growth laggard in the current conjuncture, South Africa will increasingly rely on dynamics in the rest of Africa to lift itself up.

CONCLUSION

128. The attainment of democracy in 1994 fundamentally shifted the strategic balance of forces in South Africa in favour of the forces of national liberation and social transformation. This is underpinned by a democratic constitution with profound social content. This is an epochal achievement in centuries of South Africa's history.

129. Combined with this achievement is progress made in changing the lives of South Africans for the better in terms of access to basic services. Profound changes have taken place on such fronts as access to education, health services, water and sanitation as well as pursuit of gender equality.

130. Yet the breadth of access requires continuous improvement in relation to depth or quality of these services. Indeed, a major concern in the current period pertains to weaknesses and even reversals, especially at municipal level and the capacity of the state generally. Further, patriarchy still rears its ugly head, sometimes in the most abominable of ways as reflected in incidents of femicide and other forms of gender-based violence.

131. While much distance still needs to be traversed in breaking white dominance in critical sectors of the economy, the past twenty-five years have seen exponential growth of the black middle class and the steady entry of black entrepreneurs into various sectors of the economy. There have been profound changes in the class structure of South African society, especially within the Black community.

132. This process of post-colonial class formation has developed along with the emergence of lumpen elements littered across various areas of social endeavour, including the economy and the political sphere. These are dangerous forces that need to be confronted and defeated, if the revolution has to make progress.

133. All this is happening against the background of a contradictory global balance characterised by shifts in economic power and tendencies towards populism, authoritarianism and militarism. The conduct of the leadership, especially in countries that exercise immense global power, can tip humanity towards a conflagration.

134. The ANC remains, by definition, the vanguard of the National Democratic Revolution. Yet, as shown in recent elections, this status which has to be earned, depends on the movement's capacity to self-correct and implement programmes of organisational and societal renewal. The same applies to the Tripartite Alliance as a whole. This requires firmness in dealing with forces that seek to undermine and reverse the process of social change. As such, the pursuit of unity should be premised on the firm understanding that what is required is unity of principle and unity in action to take South Africa to a higher level of growth and development.

135. As experience since the 2017 National Conference has shown, this will be a titanic struggle.

136. "Transition is not a friendly game. It is a fierce struggle for the future and will bring about sharp divisions among us. We are living in transition times and you must know which shore it is you want to swim towards, because otherwise you will drown"- Immanuel Wallerstein

2

ANC Organisational Renewal: Progress and Challenges

"In a crisis, what was once unthinkable can suddenly become inevitable."
Rutger Bregman

INTRODUCTION

1. The 1994 transition meant a fundamental shift in how the ANC carried forward its mission, as it emerged as the governing party after the first non-racial democratic elections. For the first time in its history, it had the responsibility and opportunity to put into practice its policies of a different South Africa, envisaged in the African Claims of 1943, the Women's Charter of 1954, the Freedom Charter in 1955, the Harare Declaration (1988), Ready to Govern (1992), the Reconstruction and Development Programme of 1994; and a host of other policies it developed over the decades. This was captured in its 1994 elections slogan of *A Better Life for All. Sekunjalo*.

2. Twenty-five years later, our movement face an existential crisis, which countless national gatherings since the 1997 National Conference in Mahikeng has highlighted. The 54th National Conference, and the Policy conference that preceded it, spent much of its deliberations on this existential crisis. At the end of Conference, the Declaration called for a "*deliberate and sustained programme of unity and renewal*", based on what Strategy and Tactics (2017) calls '*strategic interventions of re-engineering, renewal and regeneration*'.

3. The 54th Conference identified the problems which renewal, regeneration and re-engineering must address, in order to carry forward its mission as a liberation movement and as a governing party:

   Problem statement 1: A distant inward-looking ANC unable to be agents of change and connect with communities, the motive forces, and sectors of society, out of touch with our constituency, and not schooled in the values and goals of the ANC. Leaders and members who lack basic leadership, organising and communication skills, and are unable to motivate and mobilise activists, civil society, supporters, and voters. This is reflected in the ANCs declining electoral support, including the loss of a majority in five out of eight metros. This also includes the re-emergence of careerism, previously noted in the 1997 ANC 50th National Conference by then President, Comrade Nelson Mandela, with ANC membership seen as a means to advance personal ambitions to attain positions of power and access to resources for their won individual gratification.

   Problem statement 2: An ANC that is increasingly losing credibility and trust

from the people because of its performance in delivering a better life for all, corruption, and state capture, and because we are not seen to be "*managing state resources for the benefit of our people, effectively, efficiently and economically*". We undertook to build a developmental state as a major instrument of transformation, and yet our people no longer believe that we have '*good plans to create jobs and change the economy.*'

4. The ANC Veterans League document on ANC Renewal also draws attention to the fact that during the years serving as governing party, the movement:

   - Attracted into its ranks people who did not support its policies, principles, and values, who were characterised as opportunists and careerists.
   - These people joined the ANC to access state power and to use this to promote their personal interests, including self-enrichment.
   - While this negative development was discussed at successive conferences of the ANC since 1994, the movement failed to act against this phenomenon.
   - As a result, the numbers of these opportunists and careerists in the ranks of the ANC grew in numbers to such an extent that they impact on the very behaviour of the ANC; and,
   - Therefore, the existence of a large contingent of opportunists and careerists within the ranks of the ANC accounts for the high levels of corruption and theft of public resources which have come to characterise our governance system.

5. In addition, the point has also been made that during the years of struggle, the apartheid regime infiltrated many agents into the ANC and the rest of the democratic movement.
   - The movement failed to identify and remove all these enemy agents from its ranks. It would be safe to assume that some of these agents have continued to work as an essential part of the counter-revolution.
   - It is obvious that a combination of such agents, opportunists and careerists cannot but mean that the ANC will be afflicted by the negative tendencies mentioned earlier.

6. It is also important to note that as early as in 1997, the Strategy and Tactics document adopted at the 50th National Conference of the ANC drew attention to the threat of counter-revolution in these words:

   "*Counter-revolution can be defined as a combination of aims and forms of action that are mainly unconstitutional and illegal, to subvert transformation. Uppermost in the immediate objectives of these counter-revolutionary forces is to disorganise, weaken and destroy the ANC, the vanguard of the NDR, both from within and from outside its ranks. It is in the interest of these elements that the masses of the people should be left leaderless and rudderless, and thus open to manipulation against their own interests. Counter-revolutionary mobilisation can only take root if there are real grievances to exploit, whether these grievances are deliberately engineered or not. The democratic movement itself needs at all times to be vigilant that its own actions and omissions do not assist such mobilisation.*"

7. Many of these issues are not new, but the general agreement is that it has reached such an advanced stage, that has led to an **existential crisis for the ANC**. Existential, not so much that the ANC may cease to exist, but that its historic role in the South African polity, its unity of purpose, values and standing amongst the people have been battered to such an extent, **that its very**

character as a people's movement and agent for change is under mortal threat.

8. Renewal, re-engineering and regeneration therefore has to focus on the vital matters of *the* ***renewal of the values and integrity of the Movement,*** **identifying and *developing cadres who would be loyal to those values and the of strengthening our common vision for South Africa and the achievement of our organisational mission.***

A RESILIENT REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

9. The ANC since its inception has been a revolutionary movement and an agent for change, always seeking to act with and in the interest of the people, that adapts to external and internal challenges and changes. Few political organisations and parties survive for more than a century, weathering local, continental, and global changes, but its ability and resilience to adapt to external and internal changes stood it in good stead. This resilience has characterised the ANC over the decades of struggle and into laying the foundations for a new democratic order.

10. Born at the turn of the last century, the ANC was formed against the backdrop and in response to the Union of South Africa of 1910 and the 1913 Land Act, the growth of the mining-energy industrial complex, the consolidation of colonialism of a special type and patriarchy, the growth of volkskapitalisme in tandem with grand apartheid, becoming a mass movement in the 50's, banning and exile, and the transition of 1994. It lived through two World Wars, the consolidation, struggles against and dismantling of colonialism, through the 1917 Russian Revolution and the 1918 Spanish Flu, the Great Depression of the 1930's, the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin War in 1989, the war on terror, unilateralism, multilateralism, structural adjustment programmes, globalization, rising neoliberalism, the growth of regional blocks and recently through the global Covid 19 pandemic.

11. Organisationally, these 110 years were challenging, with ebbs and flows, and sometimes with its very existence in question. And yet, the ANC continued to regenerate, renew and re-engineer its mission and itself, even after a range of factors placed its survival as an organisation and leader of progressive forces into serious doubt during the late 1920s and 1930s. It survived the severe repression, mass detentions, banning of its allies and leaders, treason trials and the steady advance of grand apartheid and consolidation of apartheid colonialism and patriarchy in the 40s to 60s. The ANC adapted to and emerged intact after illegality and thirty years of exile – from its banning in 1960, with large numbers of its leadership and activists in prison or banned – to its unbanning in 1990.

12. The various elements which made it possible for the movement to renew, re-engineer and regenerate itself over the decades include: a commitment to its progressive ideals and mission; selfless and courageous leadership and cadreship; putting the interest of the people and the country first; understanding of the balance of forces, and strategy and tactics; and continually building the capabilities of cadres and the organisation to implement and account for the tasks at hand. In addition, it managed to establish and keep a disciplined underground presence throughout the country.

13. As we face this existential crisis, we must ask therefore ask the question whether we have what it takes to pull the Movement from the brink, and drive a successful programme of renewal and unity, as urged by Conference.

A RESILIENT REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT, WITH A REVOLUTIONARY MISSION AND TASKS

14. Despite these existential challenges, there is ironically agreement about the mission, character, and tasks of the ANC in the current period. This consensus is contained in **Strategy and Tactics (1997/2017),** which articulates the central mission of the ANC as the liberation of Africans in particular and black people in general from socio-economic bondage, by resolving the fault lines created by apartheid colonialism and patriarchy, and the creation of a National Democratic Society.

15. In this regard, the ANC has national and democratic tasks, listed as:

    - A united, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist state based on the will of all people.
    - A dignified and rising quality of life among all people by providing for equal rights and opportunities for all citizens.
    - The restoration of the birth rights of all South Africans with regards to access to land and other resources.
    - A thriving mixed economy, which reflects the natural endowments of the country and the creativity that a skilled population can offer, and that addresses the political economy of the distribution of income and assets, and the reality of white and patriarchal dominance in the economy.

16. The NDR seeks to build the best in human civilisations, in terms of political and human freedoms, the realization of socio-economic rights, value systems and identity. Such human civilization should firstly be based on our ability to continually improve the use of our natural endowments, to turn it to collective human advantage, and ensure its regeneration and sustainable use for future generations. It is secondly based on the management of human relations on the basis of political equality and social inclusion.

17. It is indeed the continuity of this mission of a National Democratic Revolution, social and economic emancipation, and the building of a National Democratic Society, that still defines the ANC as a '*disciplined force of the left.*'

18. Arising from this mission, there is also agreement on the ANC tasks during this phase of the NDR:

    (a) To represent, organise and mobilise communities and the motive forces and win their support and elections.

    (b) To win and use state power, by building a capable, developmental state, to better the lives of the people and advance towards a National Democratic Society.

    (c) To make policies, win broad support for them, implement them through the state and monitor implementation and the impact on the people and transformation.

    (d) To transform society through our programmes, values, our integrity, exemplary leadership in society and by winning the battle of ideas in a convincing manner.

    (e) To select and deploy capable leaders and public representatives, with integrity, capacity, the correct orientation, and expertise to drive and implement our programmes.

    (f) To develop cadres, schooled in our values and policies, with the capacities to be agents of change wherever they are deployed.

19. These tasks in the current phase are indeed revolutionary, and National Policy Conference must review progress we have made in each of these tasks. It will have to honestly reflect on whether we are tackling the organisational challenges identified in the problem statements (para 4), which consistently undermined our capacity to effectively implement these tasks, continues to endanger the building of a National Democratic Society and therefore our

character as a revolutionary movement.

A DECISIVE MOMENT FOR RENEWAL

20. The global Coronavirus pandemic has been a grey swan event warned about, but very few in the world were prepared for how quickly it would engulf and affect every country in the world. It has challenged many "established truths", about the importance of multilateralism and the importance of national institutions. Indeed, that societies with capable developmental states, with universal health coverage and social safety nets, are in better positions to deal with global disasters and its aftermath, than countries without these systems. At the same time, like with other seismic global events such as the Spanish Flu, the Great Depression or World Wars, it provides a window or windows of opportunities for progressive 'turning of the tides.'

21. In South Africa Covid-19, exposed the ugly face of the structural fault lines of poverty, inequality and unemployment, the ravages of gender-based violence, the festering sores of hunger and food insecurity, the precarity of livelihoods of the majority, and how little it takes to tip millions below the poverty and hunger line. The ANC government must continue to lead the fight for recovery and reconstruction, and to deal with the social and economic crisis, exacerbated by the pandemic, supported by ANC structures at all levels.

22. The movement contests elections, in order to win and use state power to effect transformation and its mission of a National Democratic Society, the electoral decline since 2009 and the devastating results of the 2021 Local Government Elections, are therefore a cause of grave concern. It "represents a serious reversal for the progressive movement and a significant advance for the right-wing forces."

23. In the 2000 NGC document, ***"ANC Revolutionary movement and Agent for Change"*** we identified one of the unique characteristics that sustained the ANC over the decades, as its ability to *"identify and seize decisive moments…when the combined elements (for) qualitative movement forward (are) evident."*

24. Decisive moments for organisational renewal can be driven by a number of factors, or one lead factor that provide opportunities for others. These include:

    - a burning platform such as losing elections;
    - pressure from below or within like was done by the ANC Youth League in 1944;
    - re-engineering of organisational culture or structures, like becoming a governing party and the impact of the close alignment of ANC structures and governance structures on leadership in the ANC;
    - leadership changes, although we commit to collective leadership, the vision, quality, experience/ capabilities, and style of leadership matters; and lastly,
    - an external event or situation, like the Nationalist Party coming to power in 1948, which prompted the 1949 ANCYL Programme of Action or having adoption of armed struggle when the regime closed all peaceful avenues in 1960.

25. Indeed, the range of contemporary issues impacting on the balance of forces – the social and economic impact of Covid-19, the global insecurities caused by the war in Ukraine, changes amongst the motive forces for transformation, the July 2021 unrest, the 2021 local government elections results – all makes the existential crisis facing the movement,

and therefore the imperative of renewal a burning platform.

26. Every aspect of the Movement has become so deeply flawed that it is producing deeply flawed results, including its poor implementation of its policies, and episodes of absence of leadership when most needed by the country and society. The ANC's renewal must be dealt with as a multi-faceted and multi-dimensional process, encompassing ALL aspects of the ANC of today, which must include major policy decisions and changes, constitutional amendments, and re-engineering of several procedural and operational measures. There is no silver bullet.

27. The moment also coincides with other '*cumulative quantitive conditions and factors*' – the leadership outcomes of NASREC, finally moving forward on the OR Tambo Political School as well as the new online Membership Management System, the potential and push for renewing our other organisational systems, including the system of leadership selection and election; and the strong Conference mandates on issues such as restoring integrity and fighting corruption, and on radical socio-economic transformation.

28. The current crisis forced us to be outwardly looking, to practice community activism and solidarity, to read, to analyse and to engage, to act local and think global. The crisis also mobilised and raised the profile of key government departments, of course Health and COGTA, but also Water and Sanitation, Human Settlements and Housing, Education, and Social Development and economic departments such as Trade and Industry, Employment and Labour, and Small Businesses. Local government and ward councillors must also be more visible, there is potential to generalize the District Development Model beyond the initial pilots, and a critical institution like NEDLAC re-engaged.

29. Of course, we must expect internal resistance to change, and external interference to keep us in the perpetual state of internal conflicts. The reports of abuse of Covid 19 funds and of racketeering, the recent Auditor General report on municipalities, are worrying indicators. Now is the time to build the momentum and implement a sustained programme for organisational renewal!

A SUSTAINED PROGRAMME OF UNITY AND RENEWAL

30. The ANC Strategy & Tactics (2017), adopted by the 54th National Conference a call for "*strategic interventions of re-engineering, renewal and regeneration.*" What is required are therefore fundamentally looking at our values and cadres (renewal), as well as how we are organised and our capacities for governance, transformation and organisational work (re-engineering), in order to provide the framework for the healing and regeneration of the movement.

31. We must also remind ourselves that already at the 53rd National Conference (2012) the issue of a **Decade of Renewal** was raised, in order to strengthen the following capabilities, capacities and urgent tasks of the ANC:

    a) Capabilities to act as a strategic centre of power and influence, organised along, and effective, in the five pillars of social transformation.

    b) Capacity as a vanguard movement for social transformation, to organize and mobilise the motive forces and lead grassroots and sectors in a programme of participatory and mass-based community and sectoral transformation, empowerment, and development.

    c) Fast-track a coherent and targeted Cadre policy: recruitment, cadre development, deployment,

accountability, and cadre preservation. Through the political school and other programmes, prioritise the political education, general education, academic skills and capabilities of ANC leadership and membership, with special focus on the ANC Youth and Women's Leagues, with a view to build and cultivate the New Cadre.

d) Speed up Economic Transformation by fast tracking the development of entrepreneurs, small-medium entities, including large-scale infrastructure development and enhancing the capacity of the state to intervene in key sectors of the economy in pursuit of inclusive economic growth and development, employment creation and broad-based empowerment.

e) Build a democratic and capable developmental state, with the agility and resolve to drive and implement the programme of social transformation and the creation of a National Democratic Society.

f) Restoration of the core values of the ANC, ethical conduct, and integrity in society, rooting out factionalism and corruption in its ranks.

g) Education, skills and the development of human capabilities, creativity, dignity, and well-being of all at the centre of social transformation.

h) Our participation in the African renaissance and agenda, and as part of the global progressive forces, towards a peaceful, more just and equitable social, political and economic world, and that is environmentally sustainable.

i) Urgent and practical steps to professionalise and modernise the operations of the ANC, its membership system, introducing technology and progressive management sciences to improve its operations.

j) Political and ideological work amongst the new generations of young people, in all of different sectors and social strata, to reproduce a cadre of responsible citizens and active participants for social transformation.

32. "*At the core of the ANC's tasks in the current period is the renewal of the organisation for it to exercise societal leadership in a changing environment, the consolidation of democracy and the speeding up of programmes of fundamental transformation to attain shared prosperity, social justice, and human solidarity…*

33. *A strategic centre of power should command both legitimacy and authority, deriving from the quality of its collective ideas and the discipline of its members. It should ensure that its mandate is carried out by its members, wherever they are located. It should be able to monitor and evaluate the implementation of its policies. When and where there are weaknesses – whether these are a result of poor policies, weak implementation, or poor leadership – it should be able to act decisively.*" (Strategy and Tactics, 2017

DISCUSSIONS ISSUES ON RENEWAL TASKS

34. The National Policy Conference must review the detailed Conference resolutions adopted before on renewal and deliberate on how we strengthen their implementation.

35. In addition, the following issues require emphasis and attention, as National Policy Conference debates these recommendations on this **Decade-long Programme of Renewal**:

a) **Agreeing on a vision of a Renewed ANC:** what would a "renewed ANC" in the current period look like, in relation to the current tasks of the moment and having rid ourselves of

the negative tendencies? The NEC has tasked the Renewal Commission to develop a vision for the movement for 2032, when it shall reach its 120-year milestone. This should form the foundation of the renewal action plan, for immediate implementation. Arising from this, the suggestion for simplified booklets in all languages, which explains the crisis we face and what a renewed ANC should look like by the ANCVL should be taken forward

b) **Renewing the Cadres of the ANC:** when the ANC declared The Year of the Cadre for the first time in 1985, Comrade Oliver Tambo when he delivered the January 8th Address of that year, Comrade Oliver Tambo said: "The strength of any organisation lies in the calibre of its individual members and units… We need cadres of unquestionable loyalty, dedication and understanding of our struggle." Key to renewal of ANC cadres is a recommitment by cadres to in word and action defend the values and integrity of the movement and to develop cadres who are loyal to the values of the movement and the interests of the people, including the commitments contained in the ANC Oath.

c) **The role of leadership in renewal:** the impression is oft created, that because leadership are conflicted when we deal with renewal, unity and integrity issues; and they are responsible for deciding on action as per Conference resolutions. Is this ascertaining correct, and if yes, how do we then address this, so that the organisation is able to act decisively to restore integrity and discipline in the movement? How do ensure that:

   (i) The leaders we elect are themselves cadres of quality and integrity, who in action and words exemplify the values of the movement, the commitment to the people and transformation and do not bring the ANC into disrepute?

   (ii) Our leadership contests are not marred by factionalism, divisions, influenced by various interest groups, but instead reflect the tasks of the movement of the moment and the best cadres to lead these tasks?

d) **Dealing with Corruption:** Corrupt practices across government, and the perceptions of widespread corruption have become a serious blight, undermining transformation, and the trust of the people. The Zondo Commission reports implicated ANC leaders and members, the Step-Aside Guidelines have been adopted by the NEC, but we still have serious contest on these issues. How do we draw a line on this matter, learning from other examples, so that we can turn the tide?

e) **An Accountability and Performance Framework:** what should be the main elements of such as Accountability framework, towards building a developmental and effective state, and how do we ensure it works and is adhered to?

f) **Role of Leadership Collectives:** The ANC Constitution sets out the tasks of the NEC, PEC, REC and BEC – are these structures living up to these tasks, and what roles should be given to each member of these collectives, for example each BEC members assigned a block of streets and to report on issues, etc?

g) **ANC Branches, Membership system and Recruitment:** how do we ensure conscious recruitment and development of members from amongst the motive forces? Are geographical based branches the best way of recruiting and involving members, what are their strengths and weaknesses? Is it not time to

consider other forms of sectoral branches, what form and status should they have, what potential challenges and opportunities? What are the features of the ANC Membership System that must be strengthened so that it combats manipulation and gatekeeping?

h) **Elections capacity:** how do we win back lost ground in elections since 2009, including voter registration and turnout, youth participation and elections capacity?

i) **Mobilising and Organising the Motive forces**: what is the ANC standing amongst key sectors of the motive forces today – working class, rural masses, unemployed, youth and women, the middle strata, intelligentsia and professionals, patriotic bourgeoisie? How do we strengthen our strategies and engagements with these different sectors?

j) **Strengthen system of leadership selection:** Is it not time to review the system of proportionality branch representatives to conferences, which leads to branch processes being subverted and delegates being wooed, simply to add voting numbers? How do we deal with money in our leadership elections processes? Should we give membership a more direct role in electing leadership, beyond just nominating and electing delegates to represent the branch at elective conferences?

RECOMMENDATIONS ON INTERNAL ASPECTS OF RENEWAL

36. **Reinvigorating and maintaining an ANC value system, imbued by our traditional tried and tested ANC values and principles and our national constitutional imperatives**. Induction courses and continued, regular political education should become a priority and be entrenched in the ANC DNA.

37. **The optimal organisational form, including structure, processes, and operations, for the ANC, must be identified and implemented.** This requires an urgent broadening and more flexible organisational form, with increased entry points for membership, by introducing, amongst others, sectoral branches in the ANC, in sectors like health, education, and labour, legal and so on, and a recalibration of branches and their role. So, this requires an expansion of the one-dimensional, single geographical point of entry into the ANC, namely membership of the branch where you reside, into multiple entry points into the ANC, by including membership of sectoral branches in the health, education, disabled, legal and so on sectors, into a new ANC organisational form. Simplistically put, a mixture of the present ANC organisational form and the organisational forms of the UDF/MDM. This will require amendments to the ANC Constitution. This is elaborated upon later.

38. **A recalibration of our approach to membership recruitment and development is required, to ensure our members are steeped in progressive thought, driven by integrity, dignity, morality, intellectual endeavour, and a strong work ethic, underpinned by an approach of "fewer but better."** This may require a constitutional amendment to introduce a process for reapplication of membership. The introduction of an induction course for aspirant members and introduction of criteria to be applied in the assessment process to decide if a member is fit to be a member of the ANC. The Membership system must be further and continuously strengthened to limit and combat manipulation of the system.

39. **A capacitated, diverse, and progressive political leadership core, with the collective skillsets needed, imbued by the values articulated in the "Through the Eye of a Needle:** Choosing the Best

Cadres to lead Transformation," has become an absolute necessity. Consideration should be given to introducing a new internal electoral process or, at least, to review and change the internal mechanism of electing leaders to eliminate vote-buying, vote-rigging and slate voting. Consideration should also be given to create a mechanism, to balance respect for internal democratic processes when electing leaders, with agreed to principles to be applied to ensure that a diverse leadership emerges who collectively reflect the capacities and skillsets identified for that level of political leadership. Consideration should be given for a total prohibition or, at the very least, the regulation of use of money or other resources during internal electoral processes.

40. **Effectively address toxic factionalism and factional activity, its effects and consequences, and its legacy of institutionalization into the fabric of the ANC.** Consideration should be given to introducing a Code of Conduct, promoting acceptable group or factional activity, and prohibiting toxic or unacceptable forms of factional activity. This may require a constitutional amendment.

41. **Organisational design processes of the internal workings of the ANC have been an ongoing process for many years and now needs to be considered and implemented.** In this regard consideration should be given to the efficacy and efficiency of NEC subcommittees and whether changes are needed. Consideration should be given to introducing more objective, meritorious and fact-based criteria into the processes of the deployment committee, so that its positions taken are publicly defensible, including in court if challenged.

42. **Continuous and regular political education must be institutionalised and well-resourced throughout all the structures of the ANC.** Consideration must be given to linking political education as a pre-requisite to upward mobility in the leadership core of the ANC. If agreed, consideration should be given to a constitutional amendment in this regard.

43. **A diverse and inclusive capacitated collective of public representatives, at each sphere of government, with a collective minimum skillset, which enables them to govern a modern state, at that level, has become an imperative**. At present we use the exact same electoral process in the ANC to elect our internal leadership collectives and to elect ANC public representatives, from the same pool, members in good standing. The result being that we mostly duplicate the internally elected leadership as public representatives. An almost mirror image. These processes are further exacerbated when factional wars are raging in the movement. This is very restrictive and limiting on the ANC.

44. **The pool from which the ANC needs to elect the requisite collective skillsets for deployment as public representatives in government at all levels can no longer be limited to members in good standing in the ANC.** It needs to be substantially broadened, so we can use the best available human resources to serve our people. To this end, a new process must be devised to elect such public representatives, at all levels of government, to achieve the optimal outcomes to enable the ANC to access the best human resources to make it a successful governing party which delivers to our people. Consideration should also be given to introducing a more objective fact-based performance management system of all ANC public representatives. So, we retain those performing well and not lose skills because of subjective processes and factional activity in the ANC.

45. **Revise or amend the present mechanisms of consequence management in the movement, to allow for the implementation of effective and speedy disciplinary and integrity commission processes**. Both the Integrity Commission and the National Disciplinary Committee system require major review and strengthening. This requires various constitutional amendments.

46. **Effectively allow our movement to show zero tolerance towards any facilitation of ANC and/or State capture, any dishonest conduct and other serious matters of misconduct and any unethical conduct**. This necessitates establishment or speedy continuation of a process for the full and immediate implementation of the 54th Conference resolution dealing with corruption in the movement, for the removal, suspension, or step aside of charged persons, criminal offenders, and state capturers, from within our leadership core and membership.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON RENEWAL OF THE ANC AS GOVERNING PARTY

47. From a point of view of being a governing party, the following are some of the critical drivers that go hand in hand with the renewal processes above within the ANC, and must be addressed:

48. Effective delivery of basic services to the people, especially at local government level, being conscious of the fact that this is a highly regulated and contested sphere of government, closest to the everyday lives of the people, thus the need for highly skilled cadres and staff to manage it.

49. A capacitated, diverse civil service with the correct skillsets to manage a CAPABLE developmental State: and to undo the damage caused by flawed application of ANC cadre deployment processes.

50. Adoption of adaptable, flexible and transparent government policies needed for a CAPABLE developmental State, with a bias towards policies which benefit the marginalized, poor, and unemployed and is directed at narrowing inequality.

51. Design, develop and maintain projects and programmes, to rapidly institutionalise and build social capital, by massive public and private investment, directly targeting the massive inequality gap and the causes of growing inequality, throughout the country, but especially in working class, poor and rural areas.

52. All these facets or aspects of our renewal project are equally important and urgent. They must be collectively and individually addressed as they are interlinked and intertwined. A plan of action devised in respect of each facet/aspect of our RENEWAL PROJECT is under construction. A measure of some prioritisation may also be required. Upon completion, it must then immediately and vigorously be implemented by all structures of the Movement. Swift consequence management must follow non-performance or tardy implementation.

CONCLUSION

53. The present ANC has all the hallmarks of a modern political party, not a liberation movement operating underground. It is necessary that members experience greater ownership of the renewed ANC.

54. As we prepare for the next twenty five years of democracy, we want to see the ANC celebrate 120 years in 2032 as a renewed movement and South Africa celebrating its Golden Jubilee by 2044 as an example of the African renaissance we so deeply desire: a country that is thriving and prosperous, where the land and other resources and assets are shared, which is free from hunger, poverty, racism and

sexism and want, that is creative, innovative and entrepreneurial, has a capable, legitimate developmental state and that represents the best of human civilizations.

55. The starting point is the renewal of our revolutionary movement. We do know the tasks at hand. Let us get to work.

ANNEXURE A

Implementation of 54th Conference Resolutions

54th National Conference resolutions on Organisational address two core issues: (a) Strengthening the Organisational capacity and structures of the ANC, and (b) Strengthening the Integrity of the ANC and its role in society. The main actions and how far we have implemented these are summarised below:

A. Resolutions on Strengthening Organisational Capacity and Structures

A1. Work of the Branch in the Community

The resolution spells out the tasks of rebuilding branches, their role in communities, and the annual plan of the Branch Executive Committee (BEC). The process of rebuilding branches, over the last 30 months, have focused on the introduction of the new Membership system, Induction of BECs and ensuring that Biennial Branch General Meetings (BBGMs) take place. The Mass Political Education programme saw the training of trainers on the Branch Manual, but the training for BECs were held back by their mandates expiring and delays with the Membership system implementation.

Despite these challenges, most branches during 2018-2019 participated actively in the 2019 Elections campaign, although once again we only managed to reach 20% of voters through our outreach, using the voting district system.

During the Covid-19 pandemic ANC branches were initially demobilized, but a Covid-19 Action plan was developed and distributed to structures, and on 15 April 2020 we started a ward base Covid 19 reporting system on the ANC Cloud. Within three months, we managed to have 64% of branches reporting on the system, working with ward councillors.

Branches also participated in the various national programmes, including political seminars, and commemoration days.

The technical details of the Branch Functionality Audit have been developed, but this is delayed by the focus on getting branches to be in good standing, delayed by the Covid 19 pandemic.

Aspects of the resolution still to be implemented:

Develop training on the ANC Branch manual as an online course;

Branch Functionality Audit and reporting

Establishment of ANC international structures in countries with sizeable SA diaspora

A2. Member Recruitment and Induction

The resolution calls for a **"modernised, technologically enabled, membership system, speed up membership cards, online renewal and discourage gatekeeping and encourage transparency."** Further calls for a branch recruitment strategy, allocation of the membership fee to branches, probation period, branch audits involving BECs.

The ANC procured a new service provider, and development of the system started, with Phase 1 completed. The system is live and has the essential elements: allowing members to manage their own membership system, transparency in state of membership at all levels, key role for branch secretaries, and audit trial throughout the system. It also makes the physical counting of forms, which makes gatekeeping and other fraudulent activities such as membership buying more difficult. The initial development phase had its difficulties, including the need for the Ziveze campaign in 2019, but the system eventually went live in February 2020. Training on the membership system started in December 2019, and we were starting with training branches. The pandemic halted this but Organising has since June 2020 started to train Branch secretaries and others virtually.

The delays with the launch of the system, though necessary, had an impact on BBGMs due over the last two years, with a knock-on effect on regions and some provinces. The next steps for 2020 is to complete the Branch training on the system, resolving teething issues, review Phase 1 and to move towards phase 2 and 3 development of the system.

Aspects still to be implemented/strengthened:

Resolve issue of allocation of membership fee to branches: recommendation from Finance Committee.

Recruitment strategy for branches part of the ANC Branch manual

Complete Phase 1 evaluation and roll-out of the MMS.

Ensure production of regular Membership reports to NWC, PECs, RECs and BGMs.

A3. Clear ANC POA at all levels

As per the injunction of the Resolution, the NEC since 2018 each year adopted and Annual POA, based on Conference resolutions, which provinces and regions then use to develop their own POAs. Annual budgets have also been presented to the Finance Committee each year, however, there remains a serious problem in our capacity to fund our programmes and structures. The POA are discussed at Makgotla at the beginning of each year, and we also had a special Lekgotla in May 2020, after the NPE to plan around the Manifesto.

POA implementation has been inconsistent, as has been the reporting on the implementation of the POA. We have produced Annual reports for 2018 and 2019, but this has not been discussed by the NWC or NEC. For 2020, we also have to revise our POA in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Areas of resolution to be improved or implemented includes the capacity in SGO to monitor and coordinate POA, and to ensure discussed by structures.

A4. Cadre Development

The resolution calls for Induction of membership; RECs, BECs and PECs; and Councillors. Expansion of the Political school online courses to assist ANC study groups and individuals to complete the courses. Encourage leaders and deployed cadres at all levels to develop their skills, qualifications and enhance capacities and ANC to run compulsory schools for leadership collectives and deployed cadres. Develop virtual and real discussion forums on current debates; use radio and podcasts.

The NEC adopted the Mass Political Education programme, aimed at training 1000 cadres capable to help with political education in branches, especially supporting branch study group and Induction. To date, less than half of this number have been reached, due to resource constraints, with similar restrictions on more general Induction.

The OR Tambo School of Leadership was finally launched at the beginning of 2019 and is now up and running with its board and staff. To date over … have enrolled and passed the current Online ANC courses, and funding has been sourced for the remaining 5 modules.

During 2018-19 we celebrated the Centenaries of cdes OR Tambo, Mandela and Ma-Sisulu, through memorial lectures and other events. Ironically, the 2020 pandemic forced us to do more virtual Umrabulo session, and we have seen especially ANC Youth League structures being very active in this regard, followed by the ANC and the WL. We have, however, not been able to use this to influence national debates nor engage sufficiently in the battle of ideas.

Areas still to be implemented/strengthened: Mobilising sufficient and sustainable resources for Cadre development and the OR Tambo School; Online Membership induction course; Complete remaining 5 Modules of the Online political school.

A5. Elections

The resolution notes the declining electoral fortunes of the ANC as a serious concern, and we need to build permanent and professional elections capacity; building the ANC Cloud to track campaign and organisational work; strengthened communications capacity at all levels; engage the demarcation processes; culture of respect for fair and free electoral processes; monitoring capacity; involve communities in councillor selection processes.

The 2018/2019 Elections campaign was well coordinated, although our fortunes went below 60% for the first time, but we did win back some of the ground lost in 2016. Resources remained a key problem, as well as continuity in elections management. The 2019 NPE also saw little distinction made between national, provincial, and local government issues, unlike in previous elections, and with many hotspot issues. The Thuma mina campaign in 2018 helped to orientate our structures towards service delivery, although we need a better mechanism for consistent monitoring and follow-through.

By-elections have been mixed, with a blow in Maluti-a-Phufong, and doing much better in other by-elections, notably Mamusa.

During 2020, the following issues with regards to our electoral system came sharply to the fore, including some the issues which we should have dealt with much earlier: Synchronised elections – for national, provincial and local government elections to happen at same time; the Constitutional Court ruling on individual candidates standing for national and provincial government; and issue of a mixed electoral system at national and provincial levels.

The **2021 Local Government Elections results** were devasting for the African National Congress. Millions of ANC supporters and voters stayed away and did not participate in the elections. For the first time since 1994, our national share of the vote fell below 50%. We lost 1500 proportional and ward councillor seats. The number of hung municipalities, where no party received a majority, increased from xx in 2016 to 66 municipalities in 2021. The ANC is now in opposition or minority government or coalitions in 83 out of 257 municipalities – almost one third of municipalities.

In only two of the eight metros in the country, did we manage to win a majority. More than 50% of the economy is based in the metros and cities we do not govern – most of these are the ones that are financially viable (only one third of municipalities). The ANC is in outright control of most of the poorest municipalities, many are not financially viable (about two thirds of municipalities). This has massive impact on our ability to deliver services and local development.

Our research and the research by other institutions indicate the following main reasons why voters stay away or did not vote for the ANC. These include in the main:

They have lost trust in our performance as a government and as a party/movement.

They are no longer confident that we are committed to their social well-being and/or have the capacity to deliver on the aspiration of a better life for all.

They are seriously dissatisfied with our track record on delivering basic services: water, electricity, roads, sewerage and refuse removal, stimulating local economic development and maintenance of infrastructure such as r.

They think we are not serious about fighting and acting against corruption, against the abuse of public resources.

They still appreciate the fact that the ANC is the movement that brought about freedom, and that remains committed to democratic rights.

These sentiments show that the movement has seriously lost its connection with the people and that its performance in government is not up to par. This situation must therefore be a serious wake-up call for the renewal of our movement.

A6. Alliance

The Resolution calls for building a strong Alliance on a minimum programme of action, and to ensure that Alliance structures so meet, so that we avoid public spats. It further calls for the strengthening of COSATU in the context of one industry, one union; one country one federation, and engage with the broader trade union movement towards working class unity.

The Alliance over the last 30 months have met more frequently at the level of the Secretariat, as well as the APC. During the Covid 19 pandemic early days, regular APC meetings took place to discuss this national crisis, resulting in the development of an Alliance Framework document on Covid-19. Amongst the other issues which the Alliance structures have been dealing with include the 2019 National and Provincial Elections Campaign, SOEs (especially Eskom and SAA), Energy strategy, and a range of other national issues. Alliance structures at provincial level have also been engaging, although in some provinces the relationship have been fractious based on specific issues, e.g., VBS in Limpopo, Metsimaholo, Maluti-a-Phufong in Free State. The issue of the Reconfigured Alliance, a paper by the SACP is still on the agenda and being discussed with provincial structures.

There have been intermittent engagements with unions outside of the COSATU; the dream of one union one industry, one federation one country, remains elusive, given the political and other issues giving rise to the split from COSATU.

A7. On Sectoral Work

The resolution emphasized the following: the role of the Youth and Women's Leagues as mass formation of youth and women, their role in their respective sectors and society. Specifically on the Youth League, the resolution called for the YL to consider its cut-off age, and for the YL and SASCO to work together when contesting SRC elections on campuses, to unite behind SASCO in contests, supported by the PYA. The resolution also urged organisational work amongst national group and focused programme to build non-racialism; engaging with civil society and for ANC members to be active in community and sectoral organisations in the country; to engage motive forces in their organized formations, including those not part of the Alliance; affirmed the role of traditional leaders in advancing

development and transformation, gender equality, social cohesion, deepening democracy, and the participation of rural motive forces.

The Women's League structures over the last 30 months have active programmes around the Molo Makhelwane campaign, mobilizing in the NPE campaign, the fight against gender-based violence, and more recently during the Covid-19 period, its weekly Umanyano programme to reach out to women virtually, on a range of issues.

The NEC disbanded the NEC of the YL following its legal liquidation and appointed a National Youth Task Team to assist to take the ANCYL to Congress, but the process has been very slow. The YL structures have risen to the occasion during the Covid-19 organising virtual political lectures and seminars on issues of the day and have also been more active during Youth month in 2020.

Most sectoral work have centred around elections, with outreach to various sectors. NEC Committee who also have responsibilities to reach out to sectoral formations in their area of work have not been as pro-active as they should be. Outreach to business and professional organisations also continues through the Progressive Business Forum. A national task team was established to coordinate activities on the mobilization Coloured and Indian communities.

A8. Policy Development and Implementation

The resolution calls for the establishment of a Policy Institute and to explore public funding for political party policy institutions. In the later resolution on Provinces, it calls for provinces to also develop policy monitoring capacity. Extend the policy cycle to a decade, rather than the hitherto five-year cycle. Emphasised the need for macro policy planning and coordinated implementation in government, with the Presidency as the central driver of the developmental state. As part of the Organisational Design process, a strengthened Policy, Research, Monitoring and Evaluation Department at headquarters is being established.

A9. Selection Process for Public Representatives

The resolution called for strengthening our guidelines, to ensure we select candidates with good standing in communities, screening, and other processes, in the context of having a permanent ANC Electoral Commission. Review the process of local candidate selection in 2021, lessons and how to strengthen and improve.

A10. Process for Elections of ANC Leaders and Managing Succession

The resolution calls for the establishment of a permanent ANC Electoral commission, with its roles, that will oversee the elections of leadership. It also highlighted areas to strengthen electoral rules, including outlawing slate voting, candidates to contest elections to declare interests, including campaign money and sources, conflict of interests and lifestyle audits, a youth quota (25-40%), consider gender equity in elections of Officials. The resolution also required the NEC to manage the two centres of power.

The NEC established the Electoral Committee in 2020, to oversee the process of the local government candidate selection, and in 2022 to oversee elections at the 55th National Conference.

A11. Regions, Sub-Region/Zone

The resolutions deal with the role of ANC governance committees, at these levels, as a space for accountability between the councillors and the ANC structures, involving the Troika and MP/Ls.

A12. Veterans League and Council of Elders

The resolution mandated the NEC to engage with the Veterans League with regards to options on its role, and to investigate the possibilities of a Council of Elders.

A13. Champion an Education, Skills, and Creative Revolution

All ANC members and leaders are called upon to take practical steps to improve their literacy rate, skills, levels of education, support and participation in the arts and creative sectors, and general knowledge on matters relating to global and domestic socio-economic and political issues. Every ANC, Youth and Women's League branch shall strive, through the education and skills revolution, to improve the literacy rate, the work of cultural and creative sector and general level of education and skills among the people in the ward. Every ANC member should be involved in a project or programme to improve the quality of learning and teaching in all schools, promote the culture of reading, and raise the level of education, skills, entrepreneurship, and literacy rate in a specific community.

A14. Create an ANC Accountability Framework

Which outlines the roles and responsibilities and performance management of cadres.

A15. Finance and Fundraising

Legislation on funding of political parties to be amended to provide for increase and transparency in party funding, and apply to all three spheres of government, with separate funding for political foundations. Strengthening ANC fundraising and building its resource and sustainability base; maintain professional management and accountability and financial systems; and settle longstanding debts and liabilities.

B. STRENGTHEN THE INTEGRITY OF THE ANC AND ITS ROLE IN SOCIETY

B1. Social distance

The resolution calls for a change in how the ANC relates to the people, especially the gap between ourselves and the people, leaders and cadres doing grassroots work, and encouraging the values of humility, discipline, hard work, ubuntu, empathy and respect for people. This resolution is closely linked to the role of the branch in communities and the role of leadership, and restoration of the values of the ANC.

B2. ANC Credibility and Integrity: Dealing with Corruption; Integrity Commission and Discipline

Strengthening understanding of values, ethics, and morality; cadres accused and Integrity committee to present themselves; publicly disassociating ourselves from any person accused of corruption or criminal activities; cooperate with law enforcement; strengthen state capacity to investigate investigation; strengthen capacities of state law enforcement; ban all slates and enforce code of conduct; implement NEC resolution on special commission on state capture.

On the Integrity commission resolve that the NEC to conclude the terms of reference, its powers and that it reports directly to NEC and NGC, National Conference. On Discipline, to introduce dispute resolution capacity, discourage and defend organisational court cases; and investigate and act on gate keeping.

The Officials and NWC have been consistent in their message of unity, starting with the pilgrimage to different provinces; during the 2018/2019 conferences encouraging PECs to bring in comrades excluded using the co-option clause. At the same time, NEC members have been guilty of breaches of the Communications Protocol, and the coherence of the NEC took time to build. The appointment of the National and Provincial Dispute Resolution Committee has also helped during the run-up to the elections to resolve mainly internal

disputes; on the whole it has reduced the number of court cases, although there have been still quite a few.

The NEC after lengthy deliberations adopted the Terms of Reference of the Integrity Commission, and consistently look at how to strengthen its work and make it more effective and fairer. However, as expected, the matters which the Integrity Commission has pronounced on to date, with recommendations to the NEC has been difficult, most notably the review of the Lists for National and Provincial public representatives in 2019 and the VBS matter. Provincial Integrity Commission have also been established, and we need to get a report from the provinces on how these have performed their tasks.

The President established the Zondo Commission in 2018, and it has been a gruelling period for the ANC and its image. The consistency on the principled position which the ANC has taken, that it supports the commission, encouraging its members to cooperate with the commission; will not give a blow-by-blow response, but instead intervene for the record when matters affect the ANC have been adhered to on the whole. On the overall issue of the image of the ANC with regards to corruption, there are worrying signs that this is not improving, especially with regards to public expenditure.

Review implementation of the Step-Aside Regulations and address weaknesses.

B3. Dispute resolution and Discipline

Establishing the National Dispute Resolution Committee and mechanism, respond to complaints timeously and give feedback to structures and individuals, so as to discourage organisational matters taken to and settled in courts. This should include training on conflict resolution methods as part of our mass political education and induction.

B4. Communications and the Battle of Ideas

Social transformation requires the production and dissemination of progressive ideas for a National Democratic Society. This struggle for hegemony takes place in a heavily contested terrain, with increasing interconnectivity, use of social media; growing civic and social activism, sometimes anti-establishment, but more often combining tactics of protest and cooperation. It is recognizing that ideas in society are disseminated through media in all its forms, the education system, the political apparatus of the state, and a range of faith based, cultural and other institutions and practices. Within this, the women's movement plays and important role in contesting the ideas and dominance of patriarchy, and its intersections with poverty, inequality, and unemployment, as well as race and class. We must therefore strengthen the ANC's engagements in and with all facets of ideas, values, and culture, in contributing towards social cohesion as well as its own internal capacity for the battle of ideas.

B5. Non-racialism and Non-sexism

These are two key organizing principles of a National Democratic Society, the ANC must be at the forefront of progressive ideas to advance a non-sexist and non-racial South Africa, and itself become the political school for non-racialism and non-sexism, setting an example for our society, and active in the fight against the scourge of racism, sexism, and gender-based violence.

ANNEXURE B

Growing Concern about Organisational Culture and Values of ANC (1994-2017)

*Extract from paper on **"Organisational Renewal, Unity and a Common Programme of Work"** (2018, B Hofmyer)*

"In **1994 Conference in Bloemfontein** we recognised the centrality of political education and cadre development especially as we lost many leading cadres to positions in government and had recruited hundreds of thousands of new members unschooled in the values of the ANC. In 1995 we set up a political education unit and an organising department to focus on building the organisation. The last time mass national BEC training was done in the ANC was in 1998/9. Since then, resources have been restricted and used mostly for election or pre-conference training. From being the foot soldiers of building branches driving implementation of ANC programmes, organisers have evolved to bureaucrats and auditors who check compliance of nominations, membership, and other ANC processes, rather than driving programme implementation. As a governing party in most of SA our focus shifted to the many challenges we faced in government. We were still negotiating the final constitution, setting up new local municipalities, managing an apartheid debt close to the size if the annual budget, and dealing with the untransformed apartheid public service. In spite of these challenges and our inexperience, we made quick progress and managed to deliver massive improvements within the first 100 days. Free health care was extended to pregnant women and all children under 7. School feeding was introduced in the poorest schools. 26 000 community land claims were settled. A massive infrastructure improvement plan was developed and started. Eskom started the electrification programme in townships and informal settlements as well as rural areas. The RDP housing programme was conceived. Every government department was focussed on delivering efficiently and economically. A combination of political will, clear goals (RDP), a united ANC and capable and committed leaders and managers in government enabled these successes

In our **50th Conference in 1997, Mafikeng** we came to terms with the remaining challenges we faced in government and recognised our weaknesses in building a dynamic and responsive government in touch with the people. It had become clear that expectations were very high, and that government alone could not address all problems fast enough. We passed resolutions to build people's participation, ward committees, community police forums, school governing bodies, government communication and stronger coherence and oversight between ANC structures and government deployees in local government. Twenty-two years later all of these remain on our wish list without much evidence of widespread successful implementation. We recognised the "reality of the scourge of rape, the battering of women and the abuse of children" and resolved to address these evils within society, in our communities and in our own ranks. While we have improved polices and laws we have failed to effect fundamental social change and eliminate either patriarchy or violence in our communities and in our organisation.

In **2000** at the **Port Elizabeth NGC,** we confronted the changing face of the ANC and the development of a political elite with growing access to personal wealth and government resources. We discussed revolutionary morality and the dangers of political careerism and

resolved to use political education to develop cadres who are agents of change wherever they are active, clear about our values, the NDR and programme of the ANC, and accountable to the ANC. The same 2000 NGC highlighted the roles of the Youth and Women's League as leading agents for change with regards to the two sectors they organise.

In **Stellenbosch, 2002** we noted the need to sustain and strengthen the mass character of the ANC and ensuring the implementation of our cadre development policy as a means of sustaining the revolutionary culture and traditions of the movement among new generations of cadres and members. We also noted the need to enhance organisational democracy and discipline as well as strengthening the Leagues of the ANC, giving leadership to the struggle for women's emancipation and assisting the Youth League in increasing its mobilization of youth in all sectors of our society. Maintaining and enhancing the unity of the Alliance and ensuring that the historic relationship continues in the implementation of the important tasks of the National Democratic Revolution as well as building a broad movement for national transformation that draws together democratic forces in a range of sectors and unites them in this important task that is led by the ANC, supporting the ANC's efforts to remain the largest mass political movement in South Africa.

In **2007, Polokwane** the **Organisational Report** was brutally frank about our continued failure to build the kind of ANC we needed to lead transformation and development in our society. The 2007 Strategy and Tactics sharpened our focus on the internal challenges we faced, and we resolved to set up a political school and a policy institute to address some of our ongoing weaknesses in the organisation and the state. We agreed to increase public participation and strengthen relations and accountability between our structures and public representatives, as well as deployment strategies, and monitoring evaluation of public representatives and deployees.

In **2012, Mangaung** we developed a comprehensive **Organisational Renewal** discussion document that recognised increasing social distance between the ANC and the people, a breakdown of relations with civil society, increased factionalism and corruption, and weakness in leadership and structures. We resolved to rebuild our relationship with key sectors of society and to strengthen the Alliance, declared a decade of the cadres that would focus on developing the cadres we need to implement our programmes and achieve our goals in government and in the organisation. We also resolved to set up an integrity committee to deal swiftly and decisively with lapses in integrity and morality.

In the **2015 NGC**, we took a hard look at **leadership election** and **candidate selection** and strongly condemned practices of slates and factions, membership bulk-buying and ghost members, money politics in securing votes within the ANC, and the impact of all these negative practices on the lives of branches and the quality of leadership and public representatives. We resolved to ban slates and take strong action against vote buying. We decided to strengthen the Integrity Committee and act more decisively on allegations of corruption. We also resolved to set up an internal election committee and to review our candidate and leadership selection processes.

In **2017 at NASREC** we focussed on many of our weaknesses, passed the strongest resolution yet on corruption, clarified the role of the branch, outlined the community and sectoral work expected from every branch, made political education and induction compulsory for leadership at all levels, and set up the framework for an Electoral Committee to guide and run candidate and leadership election processes. In every Conference, we have resolved to improve coordination in government, especially at the local level, monitoring of implementation, the ANC's own policy and monitoring capacity, and our capacity to hold deployees to account and recall them if needed."

3

Digital Communications and Battle of Ideas

INTRODUCTION

This paper is divided into three parts. The first part contains a reflection on the developments that took place since the 54th national conference. In the second part, this report focuses on specific resolutions of the 54th national conference and how they have been fulfilled by the National Executive Committee ("NEC") or the 6th administration. These resolutions are discussed under the following topics: the battle of ideas, media, broadcasting, Information Communication Technology (ICT), the digitization of government, the digital transformation of society, and postal services. Lastly, the third part canvasses policy matters that were not covered by the 54th national conference but which are pertinent to the development of the ICT sector.

A. CONTEXT

The current policy review takes place against the backdrop of the Covid 19 pandemic, the United States of America (US) restrictions on the use of communication network equipment manufactured by OEMs from China, the international shortage of micro-chips, and irregular supply of electricity in South Africa.

The national lockdown necessitated by Covid 19 meant that all social, economic and government activity had to transition to virtual or online instantly. The successful transition was enabled by the availability of both fixed and mobile infrastructure. The South African electronic communications infrastructure proved to be resilient and effective.

However, the pandemic also highlighted gross inequality and uneven spatial development. Those in the margins of society suffered the most from the lockdown. They were excluded from online interactions because of lack of access to broadband and inadequate connectivity. They could not work from home or access essential services online.

Covid 19 has underscored the importance of electronic communications infrastructure and universal service and access. Future policy interventions should focus on increased deployment of fibre and mobile communication infrastructure to cover the length and breadth of South Africa.

The ongoing security concerns raised by the United States on network equipment from China requires close monitoring . Some of the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) that have been blacklisted by the US are major network providers in South Africa and the continent. China and the US are South Africa's major trading partners. A fallout between these world powers will have adverse implications on networks in South Africa and the continent. Most of the mobile network equipment in South Africa is provided by OEMs from China.

South African needs to proactively develop an approach that ensures continuous availability of its telecommunications infrastructure.

Furthermore, China produces 90% of the global production of rare earth metals ("REE"). REE properties drive technological advantages of performing at reduced energy consumption, greater efficiency, miniaturization, speed, durability and thermal stability. REE are used in Electric car motors, iPhones, military jet engines, batteries, and satellites. The continued disagreements between the US and China has implications on the global supply of REE.

The shortage of microchips has stunted manufacturing of electronic equipment and the provision of associated services in South Africa. Major economies have taken steps to ensure adequate supply of these chips for their own use. It is recommended that South Africa should embark on economic diplomatic efforts to secure supply of microchips to support domestic manufacturing and production of electronics, ICT and IT equipment.

Intermittent electricity supply has a negative impact on the delivery of mobile and fixed broadband services. The operators have resorted to power their base stations with diesel generators. This increases the costs of providing broadband and adversely impacts on the environment.

In summary, South Africa's broadband aspirations require policies that will extend connectivity to outlying areas and the hinterland, adopt measures that advance network security against external intrusion, insulate the current network provision from geopolitical currents.

B. SPECIFIC POLICY AREAS

The section on the battle of ideas deals with the changing dynamics in national discourse and draws mainly from the assessment of the balance of forces. The media section examines policy developments in respect media diversity, digital, and print media.

In the section on ICT, this report analyses progress against the goals set out in the Integrated ICT Policy White Paper (the ICT policy) and SA Connect policy. The assessment of broadcasting policy developments canvasses topics such as radio, television, digital, public broadcasting, and the implications of broadcast digital migration.

In postal services, the report surveys the progress made in the licensing of the Post Bank, the transformation of the postal services to accord with the demands of a modern society.

The section on the digital transformation of society examines the extent to which South African society has embedded new technologies in their way of life.

In the section on the on the Fourth Industrial Revolution, this report reflects on the proposals contained in the report by the PC4IR .

Under each topic, the report recaps on the policy objectives, canvasses how these objectives have been met since the 54th national conference and advances new policy proposals, where applicable.

1. BATTLE OF IDEAS

The battle of ideas is the struggle over agenda setting on the ideas themselves, and a struggle for the progressive production and dissemination of ideas in society, including the media, the educational and training system, and the policy apparatus within the state.

The terrain of struggle for the battle of ideas also include a wide range of cultural and faith based institutions and practices. The ANC struggle is, and remains that of attaining political hegemony in the South African society and, in this regard, within a heavily contestation to win the hearts of South Africans towards full attainment of freedom and democracy.

The ANC is guided by the historic mission of building a united, non-sexist, free democratic South Africa. In this task, the ANC has seeks to renew its membership base, to keep the organization rooted in the masses of our people, rural women, and all the motive forces retaining the mass

democratic character of the organization, as a leading disciplined movement.

In 2012, we asserted that there exist an ideological onslaught against the ANC using all forms of media including broadcasting, print, social media and the internet seeks to dislodge and undermine the character of the movement. This view persist in the current phase, where the organization faces new challenges including policy contestations which seeks to impose other policies within the governance system led by the opposing forces to the ANC, in particular the opposition political parties. There exists a political agenda which seeks to portray the ANC government as loosing hegemony amongst the masses, weakened force failing to lead the national democratic state.

These kinds of tactics by the opposing forces should be thwarted, dislodged, and promotion of political governance of the state taking centre stage at all times, where the ANC demonstrate leadership character in the state, leading in all levels of governance, eliminate corruption, and consistency through policy implementation founded in the Constitution of the Republic. South Africa needs a renewed strong ANC which also mobilize all motive forces within the ANC lead Alliance with COSATU and the SACP, but also women, youth, and the urban, and rural poor masses with the national democratic revolution guided by the strategy and tactics document.

The potency of social media influence in the political landscape in South Africa cannot be denied. Given its strength in rapid and instant communication, social media has emerged to be an engine of activism, mobilisation and digital leverage, as well as a conduit for channelling sensationalism, peddling disinformation and hate speech.

Social media goes beyond people sharing views and opinions online, but the technology can also play a pivotal role in orchestrating protests that move beyond the digital realms of communications.

In terms of statistics, an estimated population of about 59.62m million, at the beginning of 2020 around 36.54 million South Africans were internet users, and 34.93 million people could access the internet through their mobile phones. By 2023, it is estimated that this will increase by 40%. This is by-far a commendable growth, which is a function of market demand, aggressive and competitive marketing, and a conscious policy by the ANC -led government in embracing the technology revolution.

It is estimated that about 25 million South Africans are currently social media users, and a vast number of about 21.56million users access the platform through mobile devises.

On the role of social media, it is observed that this new phenomena of online media network has changed the terrain of battle of ideas, and engagement, in particular, where the opposition parties take advantage and launch attacks on the government and the ANC in general, targeting performance in government, local and provincial administration in particular. Misinformation and false news has also added a layer of new forms of misleading the people in the public domain. The reduction in the value circulation of print media newspapers, and quality of news report has the potential to distort the hegemony of the ANC, the alliance (SACP, COSATU) as the true leader of the national democratic revolution advancement for freedom, and democracy.

The ANCs performance in the elections if used as a demonstration and indicator for assessing the ANC and government leadership in the battle of ideas in society, there are challenges faced by the democratic movement in this regard, amongst others disunity and leadership discipline. Notwithstanding the prevalence of Covid-19, the ANC dipped below 50 percent during the local government elections in 2021 for the first time since democracy.

The ANC must operate in a coordinated and disciplined manner to set the agenda

in the battle of ideas. The war of ideas must be fought like a real war therefore there must be a strict coordination of content and messages between all structures of the organization. The advent of the community and public media space offers a potential, progressive opportunity for the ANC, depending on the ability to influence this media and provide it with adequate support.

In the post-Covid-19 governance era, the ANC and its deployed cadres must continue to articulate the ANC policy positions in a manner that is consistent and coherent, with clear content. In the era where corruption has become endemic in society, it remains important that the principle of articulation of policy position is handled acknowledgement that credibility of any message lies in the credibility of the messenger.

The ANC has continued to show strong presence during the national state of disaster related to the Covid-19, with a strong showing of leadership that cares for the masses. However, the corresponding element of corruption during the disbursement of funds, and related Covid-19 PPE spending has the potential to undermine trust in the governance of the state.

The outcomes of the Commission on State Capture in the form of volume reports of the Commission bring forth a new agenda setting trajectory in the social and mainstream media. The ANC is expected rally its leadership capability to articulate its position on the State Capture findings, bringing ethics of accountability and restoring the credibility of government, and state institutions, and a state founded on the Constitution.

The ANC's organizational renewal program must be underpinned by a mass program of political education and training, seeking understanding of the organizational revolutionary role, the constitution and leadership discipline. ANC branches should engage in understanding the basic documents of the ANC such as the Constitution, Strategy and Tactics, Organizational Renewal and the Conference resolution in order to inculcate a culture of revolutionary discipline within the organization across all provinces, regions and branches.

The ANC should consider a implementing a media literacy program for its members in order to educate on cyber-disinformation campaigns or operations and ensure that members understand the impact of peddling or sharing fake news – this would further ensure that members are not persuaded by those who wish to fight the ANC in digital platforms.

The Policy conference should discuss the battle of the ANC against:

- the political platform of the South African counter revolution;
- the ideas advanced by the neo-liberal forces; and,
- the ideas advanced by world imperialism.

In the end, the ANC Policy Conference must respond with a concrete program of what platforms with the organization use in order to respond as it engages in this battle of ideas.

The document should reflect on how the ANC should liaise with its Allies and the MDM to ensure that all these act in concert with regard to the battle of ideas.

2. DIGITAL BROADCASTING

The Broadcasting Act articulates the founding principles and policies underpinning broadcasting in South Africa, and these remain relevant for the move from analogue to digital broadcasting technology. Broadcasting services remains the most powerful method of sharing information that influences the minds of the citizens. For any democracy to achieve the objectives of freedom and access to uncensored information, broadcasting policies need to be progressive and take

into account the changing platforms for content distribution.

User generated content and non-linear broadcasting content distribution have become the order of the day.

Ownership of the media assets remain the most powerful strategy adopted in South Africa and protected by the Constitution, and provided for in various pieces of legislations. The idea of ownership of assets is not only driven by market interest, but also hegemony and influencing the agenda in the battle of idea, what gets broadcast. In addition, the agenda for providing information, education and entertainment informs its key role in our democratic society. When considering broadcasting policy, the broadcasting value chain discussed below should be considered:

i. Content generation

Content is the main driver of audience reach. When considering how content draws audiences, especially local content, any broadcaster who seeks to succeed in the sector needs invest more than 50% of its annual budget on content generation. Not only that, there has to be some focus on special interests content such S SPORTS. Especially sports of national interest.

The sporting bodies should not sell broadcast rights on an exclusive basis.

If they do so, there should be an agreement upfront to make all sports to be sports of national interest. This should not be a burden to public broadcaster to carry these sports codes on commercially unviable basis.

A policy should be adopted to ensure funding of local content generation is a priority. This will drive local production and create local jobs,

ii. Content distribution

What is the point of creating compelling content if you can't get the content to the eyeballs of the viewers? There are different platforms of content distribution such as Digital terrestrial, Satellite, OTT etc. The cost to deploy these platforms vary from levels of sophistication and control mechanisms used to protect the content from piracy. For the private sector broadcasting sector, the method of funding is simply from the shareholders of the business and it is mainly a venture for profit gain.

The public broadcaster on the other hand, the mandate is to get the content to the broad audience. This will require a policy shift on. How the public broadcaster is funded. The current funding model of the SABC lands itself on a pseudo commercial and yet expected to be carrying public broadcast mandate of universality.

iii. Content Regulation

The issue of content regulated has been sufficiently covered in the current regulatory framework of ICASA where the local content quotas are regulated. In Fact it has become clear that local content drives audience uptake. Most broadcasters have done more than the quotas stipulated because local content is more compelling and results in more viewers preferring to watch the home grown content as their television channels of choice.

The policy consideration could be to consider the following:

a) Set a minimum of 60% local content limit as a minimum in the future. The transition should be managed so that policy and regulations of local content do not have the unintended consequences of loss of audience resulting in drop in advertising revenue.

b) The public broadcaster should focus on delivering a high percentage of local content.

c) Funding of local content as a way of promoting local culture and heritage should be encouraged. The modalities of who should be the custodian of funding local content should be discussed and a policy position be taken. In Australia, there is a debate on dropping local content quotas and

replacing that with the funding model for local content. In RSA, the consideration should be for both regulated quotas and funding that promotes locally produced content.

iv. Ownership and control

Media ownership plays itself out in how content is broadcast. This is especially through when it comes to politically charged content. Ownership of media assets by indigenous South Africans is critical. Broadcasting assets ownership is expensive and therefore any policy that seeks to prescribe minimums must link it to some incentives.

How much local ownership is correct for protection of democracy and freedom of speech and access to information deserves some consideration. It could be helpful to limit foreign ownership of the privately owned broadcasting assets to 45 %. However, broadcasting has changed in form and even in substance. This means that it could even be more difficult to impose ownership quotas in the digital broadcasting world. This is because more broadcasters could just turn to online content distribution platforms.

Therefore, South African owners of broadcasting content should be encouraged to be majority owned by South Africans and link this to the incentive funded local content.

As South Africans, we should not be shy to initiate concepts which are originally South African. Therefore, for the sake of industry transformation, South Africa should promote majority South African owned media assts.

v. Public broadcasting and its role in a building democracy

The benefits of having a public broadcaster far outweigh the funding required to deliver public service content. RSA's current broadcasting system requires a different form of funding. This will alleviate the pressure on the broadcaster to focus on commercial drivers. The broadcaster has to be funded for most of its high cost budget items such as local content, local sports rights acquisitions, signal distribution costs and local content that is educational and informative.

The sports rights for broadcast is a highly contested area. This requires strict oversite and regulatory intervention. There is a big question about using TV license fees as a means for generating funding for the public broadcaster. There is high level of piracy resulting in many free to air TV license fees not being collected. The fact that there is an exemption on license fees for the indigent who are beneficiaries of free STBs for digital migration demands that there be a policy change regarding Free-to-Air (FTA) TV licenses.

The following policy considerations should be made:

a) the SABC should be a fiscus funded public broadcaster

b) All commercial broadcasting services should not be part of the SABC because it bring mandate confusion.

c) The PBS service should be funded for generating local content of all different genres.

d) All sports of national interest should be live on PBS.

e) All signal distribution costs should be funded directly from the fiscus.

vi. Funding models for community broadcasting services

Community media remains an important pillar of the broadcasting system in South Africa. However, this sector's sustainability remains questionable under the current funding model. The biggest challenge for the sector is the cost of signal distribution. Also the quality of service for this sector, especially TV remains a challenge because of high cost of producing good quality content. For a number of years, the community broadcasters remain financially challenged. It is critically important that this sector is kept alive with some financial support.

The policy considerations should be that:

a) Funding the community broadcast signal distribution cost from the fiscus.

b) This funding should be directed to the signal distributer as a mandate to carry community media for a medium to long term horizon.

c) MDDA to focus on funding the community for long term sustainability

vii. Diversity of media platforms

A move from analog to digital is under completion this year. As a result, policies and regulations should focus on digital platforms like Digital Terrestrial Transition (DTT), and Over-the-top (OTT) services and the well-established Direct-To-Home delivered over satellite technology.

On DTT: The regulator should be encouraged to appoint multiplex (Mux) operators to establish and maintain the DTT network. A policy should inform the regulations on how many muxes should be licensed per broadcaster. All DTT frequencies should be licensed to the signal distributor to enable it to configure multiplexes based on demand by channel owners/broadcasters. There is a need for regulatory reform when it comes to digital broadcasting.

On the OTT Services: The challenge faced by the broadcasting industry is how to best manage the licensing of OTTs. The general view is that let OTTs be free from licensing constraints, however, the regulation of content and how its appropriateness remain critical for the protection of children.

On DTH: The regulations on DTH remain practical for now for commercial and free-to-air services. It is important that the regulator authorizes all channels that are carried on any content delivery platforms.

The capacity on licensed muxes must carry different languages to promote diversity.

On 5G Broadcast: For the future of broadcasting, spectrum should be allocated for 5G broadcast. This could mean that all VHF spectrum post digital migration should be reserved for the next generation of broadcasting systems. A number of papers have been published by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) on the future of broadcasting spectrum under the banner of 5G Spectrum for broadcasting. A policy consideration should be taken to allocate some spectrum for broadcast under the 4IR technologies like 5G.

SENTECH plans to implement a satellite technology strategy where South Africa's access to satellite beaming into the whole of Africa. The satellite technology investment will improve South Africa's satellite access and capability in order to provide multiple technology -based services including Direct-To-Home broadcasting services.

Also develop capacity for over-the-top (OTT) services in order to support the growth of the broadcasting industry and online service for various communities.

3. PRINT MEDIA

Sustainability of print media as advertising revitalisation programme

The ANC policy acknowledges that journalism as a practice has a long and rich history commencing in 1824, which has had a double edge sword. That is has been a contributor to the struggle of freedom and a champion of media literacy at the same time. It has become a conduit for reporting content that generates a buying mood resulting in higher circulation and distribution figure. That, the end apartheid and the election of Nelson Mandela and the ANC government was a moment of real optimism;

Print media is considered a bulwark of democracy and that the South African Constitution in section 16 guaranteed the right of freedom of expression, including freedom of the media.

The ANC itself has a long record of accomplishment of commitment to media freedom. It therefore means that the

deepening of South Africa's democracy will depend upon the acceptance and tolerance by the ANC and the government of the scrutiny by the media of its performance.

Print media faces challenges of usage and adoption in the face of mass popular digital social media, therefore for its sustainability, it needs to adapt to the changing digital landscape in order to continue to serve society. It must also seek to develop content that serve a different purpose than that of digital sources which have a distinguished value as opposed to something that is offered e.g. online

Print media is an age-old business and service. It has been for a long a time a primary form of conveying information, until competition from ICTs, Internet, OTTs and social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook. These platforms have now become the vehicle for breaking news stories and changed the way people consumed content. This form of media has posed a serious threat to the long-term sustainability of print media.

The four key phenomena are driving the transformation of media audience are *media/audience fragmentation*; *audience autonomy*, exorbitant production and distribution cost.

Further, note that, despite the negative tones in the industry print remains profitable as a business. There are still many areas in South Africa which still depend on the printed format owing to lack of infrastructure coupled with the excessive data cost.

The average daily circulation of South African newspapers and magazine has declined by 7%; that despite acquisition taking place, however, the sector is still dominated by four big players who control the entire value chain of the market thus creating a barrier to market entry for small and emerging players.

The ANC notes that GCIS needs to implement various programmes aimed at the print and digital media revitalisation;

The ANC believes that support is critical for the sustainability of the newspaper industry, GCIS can do more, including supporting a diverse mainstream and community press, whilst maintaining media independence.

The ANC emphasize and understanding the importance of reviewing and concluding the transformation charter to enable the sector to deal with content diversity and comply with B-BBEE. At the same time, the print and digital media and GCIS must with immediate effect implement measures that protect the print and digital media, MAC sectors against the proliferation of Facebook, Amazon, Google, (FANGs) etc. protect South African businesses.

4. STRENGTHENING THE COMMUNITY AND SMALL COMMERCIAL MEDIA SECTOR

The community media needs continued support to strengthen its role in building a strong democracy. In fact, various policies such as ComTask Report 1996 and ICASA's Triple Inquiry Report, and pieces of legislation identified public funding for the public broadcaster and community media as important for attaining media diversity. , The latter recommended support for community media and that funding from industry and foreign donors should also be provided by government.

The 1998 White Paper on Broadcasting was the first major policy document not only to shape the vision for broadcasting including for community broadcasting, in which the Policy emphasized the need for subsidies for community radio to ensure that freedom of expression was accessible to all communities.

The current Draft White Paper on Audio-visual and Content Policy, a successor to the 1998 White Paper on Broadcasting introduces new provisions in government public service media the broadband and in the multichannel environment.

The National Development Plan (NDP 2030) highlights that "*access to information via print, broadcasting and the internet are vital for building an informed citizenry. It also*

contributes to education and economic development". The media plays a core role in nation building and are critical for democracy to function. Community media in particular, in both broadcast and print has the potential to create employment and drive innovation in predominantly rural provinces.

The there is a need for review and adoption of policy which must position the issues of community and small commercial media issues prompting the need for a standalone policy governing this important sector.

Further, community and small-commercial media has grown from 3 radio station in 1994 with less than 2% listenership to over 215 radio station, over 300 community print and over 50 small-commercial media projects with an estimated 33 million listeners across all provinces or 25% of the market share.

A combination of factors has weakened the impact of community broadcasting support and the mushrooming of community broadcasters in a single community, resulting in high signal distribution tariffs and rental funds for premises to host community broadcaster.

The revenue through advertisement has fallen due to increase of licensed stations in the same vicinity and the broadcasting environment has become increasingly complex. That with the increasing demand for the support amid declining public funds, clarity has to be provided regarding the objective, nature and criteria for the support as well as clear value proposition for public funding to community media of the future.

Despite the growth of the MDDA support over the years, it had its own limitations in terms of both resources and its current Act. It has no comprehensive policy to deal with individual station's, uniqueness and needs, the exclusion of community TV, narrow in scope and not often linked to other government programmers around job creation and industry development, not subjected to regular reviews for improvement.

There is increasing demand for community broadcasting and a growing number of Community TV initiatives sprouting in the various parts of the country presents community TV as an inevitable reality. Therefore, it can no longer be ignored, both in terms of policy planning and future support

In recent broadcasting developmental years, a number of international developments have changed both the landscape of community broadcasting, licensing environment and the expectations for the community they operate and represents.

The government (GCIS /MDDA) needs to consider the developments in technology and online media in the digital media era, (4IR). Community media policy should consider licensing issues for community broadcasting which might include a single frequency plan. Must make provisions for digital radio; offer distinguished community media support packages especially in areas where there is limited or no economic viability for long-term sustainability of the sector; Must redefine audio-visual service, online video-on-demand (VOD) re-introduce provincial community Television and make policy provisions for a media diversity index or media plurality in South Africa.

There is a broad base of knowledge about how the sector provides the voice of the Community and expanding the opportunities for youth to acquire skills and experience. The community broadcasting programs must be based on developmental framework and provide solution to social ills; and centred on nation building and social cohesion.

5. GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION SYSTEM THE DRIVER OF COHERENCE OF MESSAGING.

Government communication mechanism is an important tool for imparting information about government's service delivery work

and the state in terms of the Constitution as a structured way of engaging with its citizens.

Research suggest that more frequent and better-quality public communication about government performance can improve the relationship between government and citizens.

Further that communicating public information is therefore a powerful instrument for the reconstruction, transformation of industrial, technological, educational, political and socio-economic development.

The government communication system, through GCIS has the sole responsibility to ensure coherence in disseminating and educating all citizens about government programmes, policies and activities and serve as feedback machinery of government. It also has the daunting task of selling and promoting the nation brand internationally for socio-economic benefits.

The public perceptions of the country locally and internationally depends on the government communications machinery. Thus without a powerful and positive reputation or "nation-brand", no country can consistently compete for consumers, tourists, investors, immigrants and the respect and attention of other countries and the world's media.

Government service delivery programmer is the implementation of a mandate it received from its constituents. Regular and consistent interaction with the citizens becomes an imperative that drives service delivery.

A dynamic engagement with society with regard to communication and information dissemination is a constitutional imperative for all the spheres of government.

6. INFORMATION COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY

a) institutional arrangements

The 54th national conference resolved, amongst others, that the institutional arrangements within the ICT sector be strengthened through the immediate implementation of the Integrated ICT Policy, augmentation of the capacity of ICASA to be able to discharge its public interest mandate, and the reconfiguration of the executive arm of government to reflect convergence of ICTs.

The executive arm has been duly reconfigured through the formation of the DCDT. This has had the desired effect of delivering policy coherence and oversight.

The augmentation of ICASA requires a comprehensive review of ICASA's functions, mandate, and organizational structure, funding and operational model. ICASA may be benchmarked against global best practice in the configuration of ICT regulators in developing economies. The review and augmentation of ICASA should improve its operational independence and effectiveness as a regulator.

Furthermore, the review of ICASA should provide legislative certainty on the role of ICASA as a regulator and licensing authority, the Minister as the policy maker, and Parliament as the oversight and appointing authority. ICASA must discharge its functions in accordance with national policy.

Much has happened since the promulgation of the Integrated ICT Policy in 2016. It has become dated in material respects. The policy should be revised policy to take into account, amongst others, the impact of new technologies, the structure and dynamic of competition in the mobile market, the relevance of the Wireless Open Access Network ("WOAN"), open access obligations, the emerging fibre market, the need to attract investment in the deployment of ICT infrastructure, infrastructure sharing, and the best approaches to universal services and access.

b) Rationalization of State-Owned Companies

In line with the resolution to merge Sentech and Broadband Infraco (BBI), the DCDT has developed the SOE Rationalization Framework to merge Sentech and Infraco to establish the State ICT Infrastructure Company. The acquisition progress would be completed in the 2022/23 financial year. The recapitalization of the merged entity will be critical for enabling the company to fulfil its mandate.

In December 2017, Cabinet approved the framework for rationalization. The DCDT is proceeding with the preparations to amalgamate the two entities. The merger or amalgamation raises a fundamental issue whether the government should be investing in ICT infrastructure assets. If so, what the rationale for such investment should be. It is recommended that the government should develop an investment framework or approach that will guide its investment in, or disposal of, particular asset classes in the ICT sector.

c) Licensing of IMT spectrum

ICASA has concluded a successful auction. It was a sophisticated yet well executed auction. ICASA raised R14 billion from the auction. The auction took place within the context of regulatory and policy uncertainty. It is open to question whether the licensing of spectrum complied with national policy and whether its outcomes accord with the resolution of the 54th national conference on the promotion of competition in the ICT sector. Policy and regulatory certainty are necessary conditions to attract investments.

More IMT spectrum remains unassigned. It is important that this spectrum is licensed urgently. Furthermore, South Africa should align its licensing of spectrum with the cycles of the International Telecommunications Union on the declaration of spectrum as IMT.

South Africa should start preparing for the licensing of the millimeter wave spectrum. Further licensing of spectrum should be informed by South Africa's policy priorities. In particular, South Africa should produce a policy on 5G urgently setting out priorities for the rollout or deployment of 5G, incentives, and how 5G can support the digitization of government.

d) Repositioning of the State Information Technology Agency

In terms of the conference resolution, the government is required to review the mandate of SITA to ensure that it is not only be procurer of IT products and services but an enabler of local capacity to produce software and hardware products. This work has begun but it needs to be expedited.

SITA must also lead the implementation of the digitization of government. Its mandate must be informed by an approved digitization plan for the public service. The Government should clarify the role of the DCDT, Department of Public Service and Administration and SITA in the digitization of government services and the provision of IT products and services.

e) Promotion of effective competition

In line with the Integrated ICT Policy, the 54th national conference called for asymmetric regulation to address existing dominance in the mobile telecommunications industry. In its Data Services Market Inquiry ("DSMI"), the Competition Commission found that high mobile data prices were caused by amongst others, the lack of effective competition in the market for mobile broadband. This was confirmed by ICASA in its Mobile Broadband Services Market ("MBSI").

The Commission directed the large Mobile Network Operators ("MNOs") to lower retail prices for mobile broadband services. The MNOs duly obliged. Although this is commendable, regulation of retail prices is undesirable and may have far-reaching consequences or innovation by the MNOs.

ICASA has promulgated a regulation to ensure that the mobile broadband market is competitive. This regulation promotes continuous monitoring by ICASA but imposes no measures that will impact on the lack of effective competition.

It is necessary that these findings be followed by holistic policies and regulatory measures to address the lack of effective competition decisively and comprehensively. ICASA must regulate holistically and ensure that its regulatory instruments are all consistent with the promotion of effective competition.

f) Transformation of ownership and control

By resolution, the 54th national conference encouraged the participation of youth, women, Black people, and people with disabilities in the ownership and control of licensees in the ICT sector. To this end, ICASA has harmonized its regulations with the Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act and the applicable sector code.

ICASA now requires licensees to report any drop over 5% in black equity in a licensee. In terms of the Regulations in respect of Limitation of Control and Equity Ownership by Historically Disadvantaged Group, all large Individual Licensees are required to have 30% Black ownership by 31 March 2024.

There is a need for a regulatory impact assessment to determine whether the measures proposed by ICASA will deliver any meaningful transformation of the ownership patterns in the sector. In particular, an assessment should be made whether the applicable flow through principle in the regulations does not dilute the transformation objective of the regulations. Furthermore, the rationale for the legislative and regulatory threshold of 30% needs to be reviewed.

g) Universal service and access

The SA connect phase 1 was completed in the financial year2019/2020. A major drawback in the achievement of SA Connect goals is the lack of funding.

On 28 January 2022, cabinet approved the revised model and implementation plan for Phase 2 of SA Connect. This plan proposes, amongst others, the connection of 18 036 schools, 3 873 health facilities and 8241 tribal authority sites within 36 months. Further, the plan intends to have 15 691 government sites connected including 949 libraries and Thusong Centers. To date close to 600 sites have been connected. Eastern Cape, Western Cape and Gauteng are currently implementing similar initiatives.

The SA Connect initiative is complements by universal service obligations ("USO") that successful bidders of spectrum must fulfil. These include the connection of health and education facilities.

The assessment of the effectiveness of past USOs suggests that when contrasted with positive acts by provincial governments in connecting schools and extending ICTs to the marginalized, USO have had far less success. In light of this, it is recommended that the government, the ICT sector, and the sector regulator should conclude a positive social compact on universal service and access. This compact should provide a blue-print on universal access. It should assess the connectivity gap and the policy and legal instruments required to support universal access, the implication of the universal access compact on the local manufacturing and repair of end-user devices, the priority sectors to be connected, the revival of the hub and spoke method of extending access to ICTs, the necessary trade-off between the contribution by licensees and the regulatory obligations.

h) Promotion of investment in ICT infrastructure

The past national conference encouraged the government and the private sector to deploy broadband infrastructure and services. The government efforts are reflected in the execution of the SA Connect roadmap.

The private sector invests in the upgrade, modernization, and expansion of their infrastructure in line with their business requirements. The 2020 State of the ICT sector report suggests an upward trend in investment in ICT infrastructure. The report records an investment of about R38,9 billion

in 2019, an increase of about 13,3% over the 5-year period. However, this is not enough to address the underserved areas and the extension of fibre and 4G enabled base stations to marginal towns, townships, and rural areas.

The recent licensing of spectrum is likely to inspire more investments in mobile infrastructure. New technologies such as 5G will also require investments in fibre infrastructure to backhaul and support mobile services. These should not only end in the urban centers.

In order to enable South Africa to advance in technology and to take advantage of benefits of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, there is a need to singularly focus on the acceleration of the deployment of fibre and mobile infrastructure.

The government and the regulator should study options to accelerate the deployment of ICT in South Africa and adopt supportive policy and regulatory infrastructure. These policies and regulations should ensure that scalable, Gigabit-capable, reliable, secure infrastructure is extended to rural areas, marginal towns, and areas identified as underserved.

(i) Fibre

- Lower the costs of deploying fibre;
- Promote the local manufacturing of fibre optic ables;
- Provide tax and trade incentives for the mass deployment of fibre in rural areas and townships;
- Promotion of innovative methods of infrastructure deployment, co-investment and risk sharing arrangements.

(ii) *Mobile infrastructure expansion and 5G*

- 4G mobile technology to be the minimum technology offering in South Africa. This should be accompanied by an orderly deceleration and decommissioning of 2G and 3G technologies.
- Although the licensing of radio frequency spectrum is neutral, it is not technology agnostic. It is based on available technology ecosystems. The Minister should issue a policy direction on radio frequency spectrum that will promote sustainable investment in 5G and 6G technologies.
- South Africa should have a 5G strategy that sets out the best options in which the private sector and the government may extract maximum benefits from ITU identified 5G use cases. This strategy should set out priorities for the rollout of 5G in sub-national government (smart cities) and specific economic sectors such health, education, and manufacturing.
- The unassigned spectrum in the mid-band should be released in 2024 and the government should provide a policy framework for the licensing of millimeter wave spectrum urgently.
- ICASA should closely monitor the distortion or developments in the mobile and fixed market that may stifle competition and discourage investment infrastructure.
- ICASA must introduce a secondary market for spectrum and provide a regulatory framework to ensure that the resultant transactions do not impact negatively on competition. ICASA must introduce regulations to enable flexible sharing models between licenses, spectrum pooling, lease, and sales of spectrum licences.

(iii) Tax incentives

The government should encourage mass and rapid deployment of mobile and fixed infrastructure through taxation. In this regard, the government may consider the following options as a minimum:

- *Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) framework* – extend the framework to cover unlisted ICT infrastructure such as towers and fibre networks. This will enable individual and institutional capital

investment in fibre and tower companies and promote more deployment and sharing of critical infrastructure. The proposed recognition of unlisted property as REIT is foreshadowed in the 2017 amendment of the Financial Sector Act and annexure C to the 2019 national budget review.

- *Depreciation of ICT infrastructure assets* – The current depreciation of fibre is between 10-25 years. There is a need to investigate an appropriate period of depreciation for both mobile and fixed infrastructure to encourage savings and reinvestment.

7. CYBERSECURITY

The 54th national conference observed that there is a need to strengthen capability for cybersecurity to enhance protection of critical databases, systems and critical infrastructure resources, including protecting society against fake news, cybercrime, cyberattacks, and hacking.

On 21 May 2021, the President assented to the Cybercrimes Act, 2020. Furthermore, the government has established the Cyber security hub to monitor potential breaches to security. Since the 54th national conference both the government and the private sector have experienced cyber breaches. There is a need for the ongoing review and heightening of capabilities and technology to monitor cyberattacks on critical databases in South Africa. The advent of 5G and the increased digitization of society and government demand more expertise, capabilities, technologies, and cooperation with other security agencies.

8. SMALL MEDIUM AND MICRO ENTERPRISES

The conference identified the need for the government must put in efforts to ensure that SMME opportunities are created in the whole ICT value chain. Some of the SMMEs have benefited in the rollout of SA Connect but this is restricted to the deployment of infrastructure. It is important that the Minister issues an appropriate policy directions to promote the use of SMMEs in the whole ICT value chain particularly by licensees and their major technology and equipment suppliers.

At retail level, the policy direction should consider the stimulation of economic activity in the township and rural areas.

9. FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (4IR)

In line with the 54th national conference resolution, the President established the Presidential Commission on the fourth Industrial Revolution. In March 2020, the Commission delivered its report. In summary, the Commission recommends that South Africa should:

- *Invest in Human Capital* - South Africa's greatest opportunity and greatest resource is people. In essence, the Commission recommends the redesign of the education system to enable it to produce skills and expertise that will promote innovation and sustain the digital economy. This is consistent with the 54th national resolution which calls for the "[d]evelopment of digital skills, reskilling, target of new entrants in the labour market should deliberately target rural areas and provinces in preparation for the digital economy."
- *Establish an AI Institute* - Artificial intelligence (involving the theory and development of computer systems to perform tasks usually requiring human intelligence), is a bedrock technology in the 4IR, underpinning the growing connections in cyber-physical and biological systems.
- *Establish a platform for advanced Manufacturing* - The revival of South Africa's manufacturing sector is a core concern of the Industrial Policy Action Plan given the centrality of these for job creation and global competitiveness. To be successful in the context of the 4IR, it is imperative that the manufacturing sector be supported by a state-led research initiative focused on advanced manufacturing and new materials.

- *Secure and avail data to enable innovation* - The principal opportunity in the 4IR is the storage of large sums of data. Reliable, accurate, standardised, integrated and easily accessible citizen data is critical for building e-government services across sectors such as health, transport and justice. However, this opportunity must be safe guarded by securely organising public data through the bolstering of cyber-security capacity and capabilities. Comsec should be strengthened to enable it to provide the much-needed security of state information.
- *Incentivise future industries* – The government should consider a set of deliberate incentives to encourage the emergence of industries of the future. For instance, these incentives may be used to support the acquisition and application of advanced technologies in manufacturing.
- *Build 4IR infrastructure* – the Commission recommends that 4IR be integrated in infrastructure planning. This means that the delivery of other critical infrastructure should be future proof and factor the implications of advanced technology.
- *Policy and legislation* – amend policies, statutes and regulation that inhibit innovation and the application of new technologies. The overriding objective is to provide flexible environment for experimentation and development of new technologies and ideas.
- *Coordinating Council* – the Commission recommends the establishment of the Council to be located in the Presidency. It is envisaged that this council will be responsible for implementation, coordination, resource unlocking, accountability, and policy coherence.

The work of the Commission is commended. The implementation of its recommendations and observations requires the government to designate specific capacity. It is recommended that instead of an addition to the established structure of government in the form of the coordinating council, the government should constitute an Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) that will oversee the digitization of government and the implementation of the recommendations of the PC4IR. The Chairperson of the Inter-Ministerial Committee can be the interface between the public and the private sector on issues relating to 4IR.

10. DIGITISING GOVERNMENT

The 54th national conference made three critical resolutions on the digitization of government. First, that public servants at all levels be empowered with IT skills and enabled to deliver public services through technological interfaces. Secondly, that government should use ICT to address the communications needs of people with disabilities, use of Apps to address government needs and services, etc. Lasty, digitizing and automating systems will assist in minimizing crime, coordinating information about citizens and Government services, integrating education system, Home Affairs, and the Justice cluster.

In essence, the national conference expected measures to be put in place to ready the government personnel and systems to deliver public services through technology. In the view of the conference, technology can be used to improve services in sectors such as health, education, and crime prevention.

A lesson that may be learned from the administration of the courts is the introduction of the system known as caselines for the filing of court processes and documents and the use of MS Teams to hold court hearings. This improved the efficiency of the courts and allowed the courts to operate seamlessly during the national lockdown.

Covid 19 has accelerated the digitization process of other government processes which impact on the public. The public has had to interact with the government remotely. Now, it is possible for the public to book appointments with different

government departments or agencies using the internet. These efficiencies should be harnessed and used a springboard for further innovation.

On education, the 54th national conference resolved that all learners should have the benefit of the advanced electronic communication infrastructure at their schools. The resolution encouraged government to invest nationally in a paperless system. In the Gauteng and the Western Cape, the provincial governments have made strides in the delivery of technology in schools.

There is a need for the Council of Education Ministers to oversee the expeditious implementation of this resolution and to report to an IMC tasked with the oversight of the digitization of government.

The digitization of public service requires a deliberate plan with identified priorities and set timeframes. Similar to the implementation of the report of the PC4IR, it is recommended that this be an agenda of the same IMC. The President should hold this IMC into account on the development and rollout of the government digitization. The municipalities should adopt plans that are consistent with the national plan.

11. DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIETY

The DSMI has confirmed that a majority of South Africans access broadband via mobile handsets. In 2021, just over 60% of South Africans had access to internet. This number is expected to grow to over 67% in 2026. There is now a prevalence of online services, for example, e-market places such as take-a-lot, e-hailing taxi services, grocery retailers in urban centres have online stores, news is available instantly online, and bank customers are now able to transact online and via mobile applications.

There is a significant uptake of social media in South Africa. For instance, according to statista, in 2020, the potential audience that could be reached via facebook in South Africa was estimated at 24 million users.

On entertainment, streaming services are abundantly available and compete with scheduled television and cinemas. The demand side is expected to grow.

The affordability of the handsets and the availability of infrastructure at national level will drive further digitization of society. One of the catalysts for the digitation of society is the digitization of government. If government services are as available online same as banking and other retail services, it is conceivable that this will impact on the uptake of technology by society.

12. POSTAL SERVICES

The 54th national conference resolve that the Postbank must be licensed and capacitated to play meaningful role in providing banking services before the end of term of office of the current Government administration. The Banks Act has been suitably amended to enable the Reserve Bank to issue banking license to Post Bank. The Postbank has applied for the full banking license from the South African Reserve Bank. Based on the current progress, it is concluded that this resolution of the 54th national conference is likely to be met.

SAPO has been riddled with crisis that threatens its sustainability. Technology and competition have changed the postal services are conducted globally. SAPO does not seems have responded well to these changes. SAPO's sustainability depends on the modernization of its services, adequate capitalization, and the recalibration of its business case. Funds must be made to available to SAPO to redefine its business case and present a future proof postal model that ensures that SAPO is efficient, reliable, and self-sufficient.

C. MATTERS NOT COVERED BY THE 54TH NATIONAL CONFERENCE

1. FINTECH

The introduction of fintech has the potential to democratize finance. If its innovative features are promoted and supported,

fintech will extend financial services to the marginalized in society and increase financial services products that may benefit low income households.

Fintech in the form of digital banks, robo-advisers and online platforms will lower the transaction costs because it will transform financial intermediation.

The current challenges to the development of fintech and further innovation is in the intersection of financial services regulation and ICT regulations. Appropriate reforms are required to ensure that the operators and the financial services firms can take advantage of this innovative proposition. In financial services regulation, reforms are required in the licensing of banks or deposit taking institutions as well as the national payment system. On ICT regulation, appropriately licensed operators should be allowed to use airtime credits and data as legal currency.

The greatest challenge to maximise the benefits of fintech while minimising potential risks for the financial system and the protection of consumers.

Policy options include a specific regime for fintech or development of specific requirements that are directed at fintech which may bridge the gap between ICT and financial services regulation.

2. DATA CENTERS AND CLOUD COMPUTING

The increase in online transactions requires mass storage. This is only possible through cloud storage and data centers. The DCDT issued a discussion document of data and cloud computing. Further consultations should be encouraged. There is a need for policy and regulatory interventions to support the growth of data centers in South Africa. South Africa has the potential to be the data center hub in the African continent. It currently has the largest concentration of data centers.

Investment in data centers has the potential to drive economic growth. The Teraco has invested $250 million to build Africa's largest facility on a single site in Johannesburg.

South Africa has been able to attract hyperscalers to locate their data centers in South Africa. Data centers are part of a unique value chain including electricity, fibre optic cables, IT, hosting and cloud providers, and internet exchanges. Investment in data centers in catalytic.

3. SPACE AND SATELLITE

The South African satellite capability is built on the earlier efforts of the South African military. The state space infrastructure includes satellite assembly and testing facilities at Houwteq with RF Labs for EMC facilities, Telemetry and tracking capability, launch facility near Bedarsdorp, ground station complex at Hartebeesthoek with satellite and spacecraft tracking capability, magnetic observatory at Hermanus, Sentech infrastructure, Sentech infrastructure, Sentech infrastructure, Gerotek test facilities, National Antenna Test Range and EMC facilities.

South Africa is ranked 31 in Geospatial Readiness The country has grown and developed knowhow in Nanosatellite/CubeSat and Sub-Systems The expertise are driven by universities and entrepreneurs. Most are non-commercial but rather are funded by the State. There is an emerging global trend in Nano Satellites or CubeSats. South Africa need to develop a clear strategy regarding Nano Stats or CubeSats. South Africa must extend their global networks with other Nano Sat companies or countries. This extension will require appropriate bilateral agreements to take the CubeSat program to the next level.

There is a need to consolidate national space assets, allow access of use or transfer ownership to universities. The success of South Africa's space aspirations depends on collaboration of the government and the private sector, awareness programs in schools, promotion of entrepreneurial activity, higher education institutions (HEIs) and research institutes.

There is a need for a national space policy. It must encompass a clear national space strategy and roadmap to support its

implementation over the long-term. In the strategy or roadmap, the government must consider the creation of collaborative environment for the ecosystem to flourish. The leadership and coordination of South Africa's space aspirations must be harmonized to address fragmentation - multiple government departments manage interactions with various stakeholders leading to silo operation mode.

4. MANUFACTURING

The acceleration of the uptake of technology excites demand for network equipment and end-user devices. South should encourage a localization of assembly and manufacturing of critical network components and end-user devices. The OEMs should be encouraged to localize their production of products or equipment that are consumed on mass scale by the ICT sector or the government. For example, the manufacture of low cost handsets that are used by leaners to access education may be standardized and produced in South Africa.

The increase in the deployment of fibre should support the local production or beneficiation of fibre optic cables in South Africa. Trade or tax incentives should be considered to support local production that is associated with the digitization of society and government.

4

Arts, Culture and Heritage

1. CONTEXT

This policy paper is informed by the enduring vision of the African National Congress (ANC) on arts and Culture. This could be traced back to the Freedom Charter adopted at the Congress of the People in 1955, with clause 8 of the Charter stating that the "Doors of Learning and Culture Shall Be Opened" where "the government shall discover, develop and encourage national talent for the enhancement of our cultural life". In Ready to Govern (31 May 1992) on the arts and culture, the ANC envision "a flourishing cultural life that is vital to the well-being of South Africa. [Where an ANC government] will strive to facilitate and celebrate cultural production that captures the diversity, complexity and vibrancy of all South Africans…in which the ANC recognizes that through arts and culture a sense of national identity and pride can be cultivated".

Broadly put in its context, we saw arts and culture as a 'potentially unifying force in a country divided along ethnic and cultural lines by apartheid" (Ready to Govern, 1992). By this it was meant that the arts, culture and heritage use-value is embedded in their ability to be "thought provoking" and thus with a great ability to "contribute to a democratic and tolerant socio-political environment" (Ready to Govern, 1992). The intolerance of the other that we are currently experiencing in our society could be the result of a weakened and weakening arts, culture and heritage that is rooted within our communities where young people are able to be creative and take the lead in reflecting on the kind of society we live in through various forms of cultural expression such as theatre, poetry and music for instance.

The Ready to Govern Policy Document when it relates to Art and Culture identified that the aim of art and culture policy is to "redress the imbalances inherent in our society in terms of race, class and gender. In particular, our rich and diverse artistic traditions in the fine arts, literature and music that needed nurture and promotion" together with all other represented traditions. Further to this, the aim was the "promotion and preservation of cultural heritage and art forms, heritage resources and facilities, including those previously neglected… to be popularized, preserved, democratized, be opened and belong to all South Africans".

The Freedom Charter and the Ready to Govern Policy Document were given further expression in the Draft National Cultural Policy of the ANC published on 25 February 1994 shortly before the first national democratic elections based on a common voters roll. Here we bring clarity to the meaning of arts and culture and first define it as "customs and traditions, beliefs, religion, language, identity, popular history, crafts, as well as all art forms, including music, theatre, dance, creative writing, the fine arts, the plastic arts, photography, film, and in general the sum of the results of all human endeavor".

Henceforth, our assessment below will deal with how we have performed in this important aspect of our lives in terms of policy development and implementation since it affects our identity as a people and our own humanity. The Draft Arts and Culture Policy of (February) 1994, also concerned itself with the "priorities of nation building and development where the energies of the culture of resistance [could] be channeled, in order to promote and sustain a culture of democracy, development and human rights, based on the fulfillment of the entire range of socio-economic aspirations of the country's people".

Here we were acknowledging that the arts and culture played a pivotal role in the struggle for national liberation in South Africa and that it should continue to mobilise society around new objectives of building an inclusive non-racial, non-sexist and equal society for all.

However, in considering these, we were not blind to the fact that contestation over power was still continuing and that there was no political formation that would act as victor since we were involved in negotiations. Negotiations by their virtue imply that there is going to be a give and take depending on the balance of forces. In our analysis of the balance of forces, as early as 1992, we therefore noted that there will be a need for a government of national unity. By this we understood that the "balance of forces has forced onto the South African political situation a relationship between the ANC and the National Party characterized by conflict, in so far as the regime attempted to block the transition, and constructive interaction in pursuit of agreements the regime has been forced to enter to".

This presented many challenges for the ANC when forming the first democratic government of national unity. It had to priorities which departmental governments it would assign to parties that have lost power, but had to be accommodated in the cabinet. The Ministry of Arts and Culture was one of those departments that were allocated to one of the minority parties. This meant that, in the early stages, policy formulation on the arts, culture and heritage was not under the ANC's direct control and influence. A subject dealt with extensively below.

However, this is water under the bridge, as we look forward, and as the ANC seeks to renew itself, and by implication the renewal of society as whole. In the 4th National Policy Conference we asserted that members and leaders of the ANC at all levels have the responsibility to "safeguard and promote the core values of the ANC" in this new phase of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR). We further asserted that the renewal should take into consideration that the promotion of these values "should be undertaken within the context of the ideological struggle to cultivate progressive values among all South Africans as part of building a national democratic society". We are of the view that these could be achieved if we have a vibrant art, culture and heritage policy that is rooted in our communities and imbued by them. This is important in South Africa where the values and ethics of liberation struggle are under serious attack and the credibility of the ANC as leader of society is seriously challenged on all fronts by the forces that seeks to control the narrative of liberation to suit them. By implication, these forces seek to lead the dialogue in society with the objective of undermining the historical injustices and drive the dialogue that will determine future policies. Such policies as they seek to promote are aimed at undermining the progressive policies set by the liberation movement and replace them with policies that seek to undermine the efforts towards a developmental state. It comes as no surprise that some organisations will challenge the heritage of the liberation struggle in court and use the courts as censor officials of this heritage. On the other hand, where progressive institutions have sought to ban the symbols of apartheid like the old South African Flag, they again go to go and seek the court to give reactionary forces the freedom to hoist and promote such symbols. It is in this

context that the following critique is offered and recommendations made.

2. BACKGROUND

This position paper is a brief overview and evaluation of the past 28 years on arts, culture and heritage within our society. We do this mindful of extensive material on this subject but choose to settle for a modest and yet important task of a critical self-introspection that is meant to highlight key areas of ANC performance, strategic importance of arts, culture and heritage in challenging dominant ideologies or hegemonic systems as well as outlining key areas of possible interventions going forward.

We first recognize that the Covid19 pandemic has unleashed an economic and social disaster across the world. This had a disastrous impact on the arts, culture and heritage sector since they could not practice their craft. We note that in many societies, the arts, culture and heritage sectors often become the first victims of funding cuts or austerity measures when there is an economic distress. South Africa is no different. However, what makes it more difficult in South Africa are the high levels of unemployment that have negative consequences to many families.

Having noted the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic had on our society, we are also aware that it also presented an opportunity for re-evaluation and for us to think and do things differently. This is primarily so because we are all aware of the social fabric that has been weakened over time. Such breakdown in our social fabric includes the scourge of gender based violence, children abuse with the rise of child headed families, gangsters, drug and alcohol abuse, intolerance which includes violence against non-South African nationals, etc. In all these cases, the role of the arts, culture and heritage in building communities and bridging gaps between people cannot be undermined and is of critical importance. The lack of cultural activities for the youth and their understanding of their own heritage has resulted in regressive political posturing and the rise of prosperity churches occupying buildings that were once thriving businesses in the townships and city centres, among others. It could only be surmised that, this is a result of our own limitations to articulate a well thought-through and progressive position on arts, culture and heritage, in which we also included indigenous knowledge systems.

This position paper is meant to stimulate rigorous discourse on this often-understated yet critical and instructive strategic area particularly in the area of social cohesion, with the aim of generating concrete policy interventions and programmes to protect, promote and preserve our arts, culture and heritage.

In the final analysis, it is argued that it is inconceivable that the ANC's National Democratic Revolution (NDR) would fully succeed without elevating arts, culture and heritage which in many instances is seen as soft power at the same level (if not more impactful) as economic and political power. It is only through a well knitted social fabric that political and economic power can have room to thrive.

3. AN OVERVIEW OF ANC PERFORMANCE IN THE ARTS, CULTURE AND HERITAGE SECTOR

We note that the arts, culture and heritage were important weapons in pursuing the liberation struggle in South Africa as already illustrated in section 1 of this paper. In this instance, the ANC in exile and the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) structures inside the country profiled its envisaged cultural policy for a democratic dispensation through extensive discussions that took place in various forums and conferences. The ANC and MDM structures also used culture to mobilise the international community against apartheid. Conferences and festivals of anti-apartheid cultural workers were organized in 1982 in Botswana, and the same year in Netherlands and again in 1987 in Netherlands. This demonstrated the good grasp the ANC had on the strategic

importance of arts, culture and heritage and its ability to convey a unifying message. MDM structures such as Trade Union Movements and Youth Organisations used a variety of art forms to mobilise workers and communities.

President OR Tambo succinctly stated this understanding when he proclaimed that "let the arts be one of the many means by which …we inspire the millions of our people to fight for the South Africa we envisage". The seemingly de-emphasis of a critical strategy that worked before – which is the arts, culture and heritage or what others argued is the neglect of the sector post-apartheid has robbed the ANC of one the important weapons of mobilizing for a socially cohesive society, that is built on non-racialism, non-sexism and a truly democratic ethos. For a society to be truly cohesive with safe communities, it needs a stable political power, growing economy that creates employment, anchored on an evolving culture that is progressive and addresses the (feel good) and spiritual needs of the communities it serves. However, we also note that with limited intervention and direct support from the ANC and its structures, our deployed cadres in government, informed by the theory of our revolution have made some strides in addressing some of the societal problems in the portfolio they occupy. Such efforts are appreciated. For example, the Department of Sport Arts and Culture has a concerted campaign against Gender Based Violence. This campaign must also be taken up by all our branches and Alliance Partners.

While we note that the ANC developed strong progressive and extensively debated policies such as economic policies, we also note that policies on arts, culture and heritage seemed to be ad hoc, tentative and poorly expressed. It is often subsumed under a range of other policies with no dedicated focus such as the current combination with sports, which undoubtedly receives more prominence and funding compared to the former.

It is telling that the ANC has had no dedicated arts, culture and heritage policy commission in its conferences since 1991. As a consequence, much of arts, culture and heritage policies were developed and implemented by the Department of Sport Arts and Culture with little authoritative input from the ANC's vision and policy position. We can only imagine what would be the results of such policies had the ANC actively led in this process and actively participated in all interactions and consultation and not left this to the Ministry to shoulder this responsibility in isolation. We state this in light of our general experience that very often, Government Green and White Paper policy blueprints on this sector are an expression of and diffusion of diverse stakeholders in the sector with little policy directive or input from ourselves as the ANC.

4. RICH HISTORY OF THE ANC IN ARTS AND CULTURE

As already mentioned, ANC had a better coordination and articulation of anti-apartheid cultural workers' resistance that was rooted within the understanding of a future society the ANC envisioned. This consciousness extended to the concerns the ANC had with regard to its memory and history, hence it secured an agreement with the University of Fort Hare to house its archival material. The security of this archival material was achieved. Today our policy position must clarify ways in which this archival material should be enhanced and to exploit its value.

The digitization project that has taken place on the collection also requires a clear policy formulation of what is to be done with the digital record and how it should be exploited and protected. In addition to this, we need to come out with a clear policy position of what we will do with our archival material that is scattered across the world taking into consideration complex legislative frameworks of different countries and how the material came to be with the current holders. In short, a policy position is urgently required to deal with issues of repatriation of ANC heritage resources. This extends to the South African heritage resources where some of the archival

material belonging to the ANC or the state may be in private hands and or with private companies. We note and appreciate that the Department of Sport Arts and Culture submitted to Cabinet for its approval the Policy on the Repatriation and Restitution of Human Remains and Heritage Objects, as the ANC we need to engage with this policy and where we find aspects that limits our objectives, we need to submit for its review.

5. WHY DID THE ANC OVERLOOK ARTS, CULTURE AND HERITAGE DURING DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION?

There is a complex interplay of various factors that seem to have cumulatively led to marginalization and de-emphasis of arts, culture and heritage. The most prominent factors included the following:

a) The ANC seemed to forget the role played by the Arts and Culture in the liberation struggle and therefore relegated it as a "not so important portfolio". The prioritization on other portfolios at the expense of arts and culture, the results of that neglect are felt today more than any other period in the post-apartheid state. The levels of violence against foreign nationals is caused by the lack of understanding of our common humanity, issues that the arts and culture are ceased with. A misconception that real power was in the political and economic realm and not in culture and heritage. In many ways this has been shown to have been a misdiagnosis of power since the arts and culture shape public consciousness and therefore, national character.

b) The misconception that culture and heritage is about distant past issues which are traditional and conservative, which pose a hindrance to efforts to modernize and deal with unfolding futures such as the 4th Industrial Revolution. And yet many advanced modernized and modernizing global powers such as Japan, Russia, China, India, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and many others have demonstrated that enhancing and infusing their culture and heritage does not become an obstacle to their advancement instead it is used as a source of inspiration and national pride.

c) The complex and pervasive nature of this sector, which others may regard as not given the necessary attention it deserves has made it difficult to assess and quantify its social and economic value or contribution to societal well-being. It is for this reason that lack of proper conceptualization and delineation of arts, culture and heritage has led to a caricatured view that this is merely an entertainment "song and dance" area of no strategic importance and value in nation-building and social cohesion, and in pursuing a revolution or transformation in a transitional post-apartheid society.

Our limitations of building a new progressive culture for the new society informed by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and empowering previously marginalized heritages (such as the liberation heritage) has led to a default embrace of culture of groups that were dominant during colonial and apartheid past as default South African cultures. Dominance of English and to a lesser degree, Afrikaans, of neoliberal ideologies and western cultures can be attributed to this neglect of arts, culture and heritage as strategic levers of the battle of ideas and counter-hegemonic struggles. In other words, while we had identified this in Ready Govern has one of the aspects that needs to be transformed, we have not succeeded to transform this reality for reasons we have already mentioned in other sections. This does not necessary mean we have not made any strides.

If we are to renew ourselves and continue to lead society, we have to deliver and improve on the material conditions of the poor, mainly black people, on the one hand, and, on the other, we must also master the art of profiling the liberation heritage through sustainable high profile programmes; and work towards the

transformation of the arts, culture and heritage sector. This should include opening up the space and empower the previously disadvantaged nationalities. In this way, we believe that some of the social ills that we are currently experiencing in our society will be reduced, such as destruction of public buildings that are of service to learners and the health of the community. We note that the Department of Sport Arts and Culture since 1996 has been steadily undermining the apartheid spatial planning through the establishment of legacy projects such as the Robben Island Museum, the Luthuli Museum, the Nelson Mandela Museum, Freedom Park etc. In the past five years, the government has upgraded the Winnie Mandela House in Branfort, the OR Tambo Garden of Remembrance in Mbizana, it is constructing a new Limpopo Provincial Theatre and Film Hub in East London in the Eastern Cape. While these are important, their strategic intent should directly benefit our people especially the youth. We have noted with concern that at times these seemingly progressive ventures such as art centres are built and no continued support and resources are provided for their success. Our policy position must address itself to this dilemma.

6. DOES CULTURE REALLY MATTER IN A COUNTER-HEGEMONIC STRUGGLE WITHIN A TRANSITIONAL SOCIETY?

A cursory assessment of South African social and cultural landscape immediately reveals that we have been unable to transform society to reflect our own diversity in various spheres of life. Most importantly, this is reflected in the celebration of our public holidays. Occasions that are supposed to mobilise us as a society and be reflective of our Constitutional aspirations are dominated by one race group at the self-exclusion of minority groups. We need to understand why it is so? What role could the arts, culture and heritage play in rectifying this? How should it go about doing this?

Our lack of cohesion as a society was clearly demonstrated by the Fallist Movement of 2015/2016 student protest with their target on statues, place names, languages, history and institutional cultures of public universities. It is also the case that name changes for streets, towns and geographical places in general, has met fierce resistance from those who are custodians of the dominant cultures. Indigenous languages are largely missing in public participation in our democracy and in commerce and education. English and to a lesser extent, Afrikaans, still dominate the space with few cosmetic changes.

Ultimately, it is for this same reason that South Africans do not have a shared memory of history, something that is a pre-condition for social cohesion, unity, collective memory of a nation as well as basis for understanding tradeoffs necessary for building an inclusive society. This is despite the fact that we have implemented some of our earlier policy directives in the Ready to Govern Document. One of the key issues we state there is that the government must strive towards the achievement of nation building, cultural diversity and a united country through the use of the arts, culture and heritage. We further state that, the government must establish institutions that will fund arts and culture in our country. These have been done as soon as we came to power.

We also note that, efforts of government to implement some policy decisions on this sector are crippled by lack of coordination among departments that have arts, culture and heritage components in their work. These include but are not limited to the Departments of Basic Education, Higher Education and Training, Environmental Affairs, Social Development, Defence and Military Veterans, and Cooperative Governance and Traditional affairs. This then poses a need for the strengthening of cooperative governance in areas of common interests, with the Department of Sport Arts and Culture at the centre of the coordination. This will assist the state in the mainstreaming of its activities as various departments are faced with huge budget cuts, with the arts, culture and heritage disproportionately affected by this.

The ANC, as a governing party that also led the liberation struggle, is charged with two main historic missions that seem to be contradictory and yet essential for realization of the promise of liberation:

a) addressing the injustices of the past through some form of redress, and

b) uniting South Africa towards a common purpose and destiny.

Currently, South Africa remains a divided society to some degree with many under privileged communities without arts, culture and heritage centres. The bulk of these being semi-urban and rural communities. In such an environment, it makes it difficult for the arts, culture and heritage to play its pivotal role of uniting the country. In this instance, we have to debate and come out with policy position of the role of the Local Government and Provincial Government in relation to the National Government in the promotion of the arts, culture and heritage. This is so when we know that the mandate of Local Government does not include the arts, culture and heritage. However, if we are to be mass based and rooted in communities, there has to be a rethink of the role of this sphere of government which is the coal face of national government with the people, in supporting the arts, culture and heritage.

7. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? PROPOSED INTERVENTIONS

We are the oldest liberation movement in Africa and one of the oldest in the world. With this comes experience and responsibilities. We need to utilize this experience to rebuild our society through active citizenship. Knowledge of self and of society plays an important role in this regard. Archives are the source of this knowledge. We have presided over the most internationalized anti-apartheid liberation struggle in the world. We have also developed a home-grown experiment in resolving political conflict and a "world-acclaimed" model of peace and reconciliation. We however also acknowledge that this model has its own limitations that could be improved on. After two decades of political power, the fissures caused by the continued economic disempowerment of the majority are showing. South Africa has a rich tangible and intangible culture and heritage which is globally recognized. All these are heritage treasures which could ignite and rejuvenate arts, culture and heritage emanating from a unique South African experience. It has the potential to capture national and global imagination. More important, we must be deliberate to involve the youth as key agents who will also transmit this to future generations and also utilize it as part of the creative industry. Such mainstreaming of culture and heritage will also assist in decolonizing the public social spaces and the education system.

8. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The following is a summary of recommendations of what could be done in the medium to long term:

Recognising the national and global unifying appeal of Arts, culture and heritage, the ANC should ***establish a dedicated Policy Commission at every conference that focuses on arts, culture and heritage*** as a focal point for policy development to guide government.

The ANC should:

a) **Elevate and amplify the understanding of Ubuntu/*Botho which is already widely embraced as a worldview and way of life for indigenous Africans and yet has a universal appeal.***

b) Come up with ***New funding methods*** to ensure sustainable resourcing of the arts, culture and heritage even during periods of economic challenges. Lessons can be gleaned from other countries where this sector is regarded as a national treasure and artists are on a continuous basis subsidized by the state.

c) Lead and champion ***the creation of a liberation memory bank*** , such as a **Liberation Heritage Resources Centre**,

that transcends partisan lines, thus bringing on board different strands of liberation movements such as the Pan African Congress, Azanian Peoples Organisation, Unity Movement, Trade Union Movements and sister organisations.

d) Champion the ***promotion of digitization*** as part of the 4th Industrial Revolution. This should include archives of all liberation movements that participated in the liberation of South Africa. In this regard, the ANC needs to develop a clear position on the Department of Sport Arts and Culture Policy on the Digitisation of Arts, Culture and Heritage and engage government on its position.

e) Develop a clearly articulated position paper on ***culture and heritage in a post-apartheid society***.

f) Develop a clear policy and guidelines on ***repatriation and reburial*** of those who passed on in exile. On this, we note that Cabinet adopted in 2021 a National Policy on the Repatriation and Restitution of Human Remains and Heritage Objects.

g) The ANC, partly in line with the above, should develop a position on vandalism of heritage sites, especially graves and monuments associated with liberation movements.

h) Develop a clear policy and guidelines on how to pay respect and maintain the resting place (graves) of South Africans in general.

There is also a need for the ANC to pronounce on the **concept of a place where struggle icons are buried or honoured in a form of a Heroes' Acre.**

Linked to the above, the ANC should also:

a) Develop a clear policy and guidelines on the repatriation of liberation material and cultural objects.

b) Aggressively ***drive and advocate for authentic prescribed history in schools, with culture and heritage emphasis in Life Orientation programmes***.

c) Actively promote the **development and adoption of the Southern African Liberation Heritage Route as an anchor flagship project of promoting and preserving liberation history – *"Lest We Forget".***

d) The ANC should Champion the project of declaration of the Southern African Liberation Heritage Route as a World Heritage Site just like the Silk Road or other similar trails. The African Union has also expressed its support for this project. The embrace and adoption of this SADC-focused heritage project will go a long way to symbolically express gratitude to countries that hosted South African exiles and, in some form, address perceptions of South Africa as a xenophobic country that has no regard for the history of international and frontline state solidarity during the anti-apartheid struggle. It will be a significant manifestation of cultural diplomacy for the region and the rest of the continent. It is worth noting that some work towards realization of the liberation heritage (incomplete sentence).

e) The ANC should develop a policy on the ***Infusion of indigenous knowledge systems and craft including medicines into the mainstream life***. Oriental alternative health and medicine is a prominent example of dual systems of health and wellness.

f) The ANC should promote inter-governmental corporation ***on departments that have a bearing on arts, culture and heritage.*** These include but are not limited to Arts, Culture and Technology, Environmental Affairs, Basic and Higher Education and Training, Defence and Military Veterans, Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs and social development.

The ANC in collaboration with the Department of Arts and Culture and DIRCO

should revive and send to its embassies cultural attaches for pretty much the same kind of rooted solidarity that was established during the struggle years.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS ON PRIORITY POLICY INTERVENTIONS AND FLAGSHIP PROGRAMMES

All of the above-mentioned areas are important and worthy of intervention. But it is argued that at this historical moment it is important to single out and identify only a few flagship programmes and policies that have a catalytic impact on others as well as a huge symbolic importance for the liberation struggle. In terms of policy intervention, the following areas are in need of urgent attention:

a) Revival of cultural attaches established in critical embassies across the world.

b) Repatriation policy for mortal remains of South Africans abroad and those in the country away from their places of birth

c) Archives policy

d) Indigenous Knowledge Systems and language policy

e) Promotion and mainstreaming of Ubuntu

There are specific flagship projects which are underway but can be formally adopted and endorsed because of their potentially profound impact on the liberation struggle in public memory and national consciousness. There projects are:

a) Southern African Liberation Heritage Route.

b) Liberation Memorial Multi-purpose Centre

c) Establishment of a National Heroes Acre

5

In Pursuit of Progressive Internationalism in a Changing World

1. INTRODUCTION

The ANC, our Alliance partners and the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) are once again gearing themselves in preparation for the forthcoming National Policy Conference. Following a long tradition, it is important that our cadres appreciate the centrality of international relations in advancing the National Democratic Revolution (NDR), a better Africa and a better World. Indeed international relations will continue to play a central role in enabling South Africa's development, affecting all policy areas of the ANC. This discussion document, with its analysis of the international balance of forces, and how it will impact on our own specific concrete material conditions as a country and continent.

The African National Congress holds firm in its progressive internationalism, an approach to global relations anchored in the pursuit of global solidarity, social justice, common development and human security, etc. It notes that progressive internationalism 'envisages a just, equitable, non-racial, non-patriarchal, diverse, democratic and equal world system.' A bold and militant advocacy is required for the fundamental transformation of the global balance of forces, a radical restructuring of global governance, and a progressive global movement. These are the principles that have informed the stance of the ANC in its history as a liberation movement since its formation in 1912 and affirmed at successive conferences.

The 54th National Conference in 2017 took place in a period that saw a Republican presidency in the United States that drove an "America First' policy, igniting a sustained trade war with China and impacting global supply chains. This strained global economic recovery as the two economies competed for rare earths and in semi-conductor production. It was a period that saw increased divisions among the permanent five members in the UN Security Council leading to stalemates on ways to respond to various international conflicts and a weakening of cohesion in the global South. Competition between the two largest world economies has ignited debate on decoupling and the dominance of the dollar in global trade. It has ignited debate about the 'second cold war' and the possibility of a third world war with states reviewing their positions on important treaties such as the open skies treaty and treaties on the development of certain categories of dangerous weapons.

Africa is in the throes of political and economic difficulties including the rise of armed conflicts involving rebels or terrorist groups, deepening poverty and widening socio-economic inequalities. Africa continues to be on the margins of the global economy, with a large infrastructure gap, limited access to global supply chains and limited benefit from the extractive economy. But Africa was buoyed by the adoption of Agenda 2063 and acceptance of the AfCFTA. The world was energised by the adoption of the Sustainable

Development Goals and the Paris Agreement on climate change.

In the period since the 54th National Conference, many of these challenges have continued to shape the international situation. The Covid-19 pandemic displayed the world's failure to achieve solidarity when it was most needed, and as well as under-preparedness for future pandemics. The rise in right-wing extremism, authoritarianism and illiberalism globally present a threat to the pursuit of a progressive international agenda including such goals as the strengthening of global and African multilateralism, the reform of institutions of global governance and the search for a just and fair world order. These challenges, and growing geopolitical tensions have been exacerbated by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine as South Africa and other non-aligned countries to the conflict call for dialogue and addressing the root causes of the conflict.

Some sanity did eventually prevail for collective action to contain the Covid-19 pandemic including both therapeutic and non-therapeutic measures. Vaccine nationalism and hoarding that characterised the early efforts have made way for increased production and the establishment of state of the art vaccine manufacturing capacity in Africa. This development still awaits the much needed TRIPS agreement for its full benefit. Our involvement in vaccine production and the end of the state of disaster boosts the already promising signs of a post-Covid economic recovery.

In responding to these developments in the global environment, the ANC needs introspection to reflect on its policy processes and resolutions. Resolutions that will become policy need to reflect on o this progressive internationalism. This includes discussion at branch level, through to regional, provincial, and national discussion at the National General Council (NGC) that reviews policy implementation and performance midway through national conferences, the National Policy Conference (NPC) that prepares and proposes policy and National Conference (NC) that resolves on policy. It needs to reflect on the role of International Relations (IR) in the ANCs renewal effort and the reflection on values and domestic imperatives on foreign policy and the kind of IR department required.

The Covid -19 pandemic has imposed alterations to the normal schedule of the ANC. The NGC could not sit as was intended. The Policy Conference provides an opportunity to review progress made towards the implementation of the resolutions of the 54th National Conference and in the run-up to the 55th National Conference. This will assist in the consideration of policy responses that must guide the ANC and government for the next five years. In between conferences, the NEC IR sub-committee has done well to monitor progress in the implementation of conference resolutions on international relations.

2. BALANCE OF FORCES

2.1 THE SITUATION ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

The ANC's commitment towards a better Africa in a better World has historically translated recognised the centrality of the African continent to its international relations and foreign policy. At its forthcoming National Policy Conference the ANC will once more place Africa at the centre of our international relations. In order for South Africa to strategically navigate the changing geopolitical landscape, there is need for an assessment of the party and state's capacity and the diplomatic tools available for implementing foreign policy priorities. This will enable a coordinated approach to international relations, especially on the African continent. This means ensuring that the manner in which the country's social, political, and economic resources are deployed aligns to the strategic objectives of the country.

Despite an economy faced with various challenges, South Africa still possesses various diplomatic assets to drive its overall

foreign policy objectives. However, in order to increase the impact of the various diplomatic tools available, there will have to be better coordination at the national and sub-national levels, including how the country uses its development finance instruments through structures such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), the African Renaissance Fund (ARF) and various other government departments and agencies. It will also have to better coordinate the international relations work of provinces, cities, and various state agencies. This requires an approach that proactively works with non-state actors operating at track two and track three diplomacy to ensure that foreign policy and the strategic orientation of the country is discussed with a broader section of society.

The balance of forces on the African continent and the Southern African region is intricately linked to the conduct of the governing parties in the region. Just as the strengthening of historical relations among liberation movements in Southern Africa is important for the region's dynamics, their evident weaknesses also explain such dynamics as slow implementation of regional aspirations. The ANC has shown weaknesses in galvanizing the region and continent to maintain a progressive posture in Africa. It is important to note that the progressive movement is relatively weak amongst mass political formations and the Governments on our Continent. The same is also true with regard to practical commitment to Pan-Africanism.

The ANC thus sets itself the strategic task of working with others on our Continent to strengthen the progressive, Pan Africanist forces to help ensure the achievement of the goals set in Agenda 2063 as well as the African Unity and Renaissance the AU Assembly called for as Africa celebrated the 50th Anniversary of the formation of the OAU'.

The pursuit of a prosperous and peaceful Africa and Southern Africa remains strategic and principal. To this end, the commitment to strengthen the African Union (AU) and Southern African Development Community as platforms for a progressive African agenda is key. This has given rise to efforts to reform the AU, strengthen the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) agency, implement the African Common Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and achieve the African Agenda 2063. The signing and formal launch of the AfCFTA marks a major milestone towards a R50 trillion market for intra-African trade and investment. 54 countries are signatories, and the start of trading under the AfCFTA Agreement began on 1 January 2021, although no trade has as yet taken place under the AfCFTA regime. By April 2022, 41 of the 54 signatories (76%) had deposited their instruments of AfCFTA ratification.

Our commitment to the AU Agenda 2063 as an expression of the aspirations of Africans is central to the view that the silencing of guns on the continent is as much a security matter as it is a governance and development imperative. In this context, the full operationalization of the AfCFTA; the further strengthening of NEPAD and the operationalization of the tripartite free trade area between SADC, COMESA and EAC; and the presidential infrastructure initiative as an industrialization catalyst are crucial manifestations of the dream of an African renaissance that remains deferred. The strengthening of links with the African diaspora as the 6th region of the AU should continue unabated, especially given the International Decade for People of African Descent (2015-2024), which was proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in a Resolution adopted on 23 December 2013.

Yet, the impediments to the renaissance of Africa remain. The political economy of the continent has changed very little. The harmful effects of the global pandemic and the geopolitical tensions seen through the conflict in Ukraine will make it more difficult to address the challenges of jobless economic growth marked by skewed income distribution, the volatility of national economic situations, fragmentation and

uneven development across regions, resource dependency, political instability, and insecurity. No impediments matter more than widespread poverty, unemployment, inequality and underdevelopment, which rise to violence, despair and uncontrolled migration. The inadequacies in capacity development, health care, housing, access to technologies and innovations, and entrepreneurial opportunities undermine the ability of the continent to convert its demographic dividend in the form of a large youthful population into real economic value.

Under these conditions, African youth swell the numbers of those involved in internal and external migration. While this contributes to the world-wide circulation of skills and capital inflows in the form of remittances, it is also associated with the deaths of refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea and the rise in xenophobic and racist tendencies in Africa and the world. In migration routes, wanton violence and violation are rife.

The resurgence of violence in various parts of the continent is a recurring problem that has a negative bearing on the African renaissance. Violence and conflict associated with terrorism, violent extremism, cross-border criminal networks and fights related to overgrazing and cultivation land remain widespread. Parts of North Africa, the Sahel, the Horn, Central Africa, West, East and Southern Africa have seen this to a different extent remains a hotbed of a cocktail of militia and terror-driven violence, the collapse of governance and national security and the imperialist designs of major powers. Somalia has yet to recover from similar trends, but terror incidents have increased in the past two years. Armed banditry is driving the proliferation of arms, which is in turn fuelling internecine violence all over the continent. There are also serious concerns about a growing role of mercenaries in Africa's conflicts.

Concerning peace and stability in Africa, so far the Continent has failed successfully to address the two goals of silencing the guns and preventing the guns from opening fire. This has led to persistent conflicts in the Sahel, Nigeria, Somalia and Mozambique involving jihadists; Libya, Chad, Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan and Ethiopia rooted in the challenges of managing diversity; and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), because of Morocco's refusal to accept the right of the people of Western Sahara to independence. Recently military coups have taken place especially in West Africa with the subversion of the democratic system increasing the possibility that people will take to arms to achieve their objectives.

South African foreign policy actors will have to contend with the interrelated diplomacies of Morocco, Israel and France interacting with some of the Gulf States in navigating a changing African and international strategic landscape. They will also have to contend with Russia's re-engagement with Africa and an increasingly confrontational relationship between China and the United States.

The spike in terror attacks in Mozambique causes concerns that the terror problem will grip Southern Africa and cause long term damage to political stability and economic well-being, seen in regions where terrorism has festered. This has a direct bearing on South Africa's national security and well-being. The evolving regional response and close observation by the AU mark a beginning of a more holistic response. This response must also factor in the role of Rwanda to ensure that all stakeholders involved in peace and security efforts in Mozambique can coordinate systematically in the interests of the people of Mozambique and complement regional efforts to encourage peace and development.

The ANC together with government and non-state actors must also ensure that it works with stakeholders in Zimbabwe and the region towards the ending of unilateral sanctions and the normalisation of relations with key actors in Europe and the United States, especially. Indeed this is not only

important for Zimbabwe, but the region as a whole. This, while also remaining focused on the democratisation efforts in Eswatini to promote inclusive dialogue.

A prosperous Zimbabwe at peace with herself, its neighbours and the world would certainly bode well for the region in a time when much of the focus on the continent will turn towards economic recovery and regional integration. This is especially important as the country goes into national elections in 2023. A peaceful and inclusive dialogue process in Eswatini will likewise contribute to a prosperous region able to focus on the implementation the African Continental Free Trade Area. South Africa's Chairpersonship of the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security and its role in the Troika must thus be used to promote processes that bring about sustainable solutions. Having already historically invested much political and economic capital in the peace process in the DRC, the ANC must continue to work with the relevant national and regional stakeholders to contribute to peace talks and development efforts in the DRC. The fact that the current AU chairperson and incoming SADC chairperson is the DRC, it will be important to ensure continuity of processes initiated by South Africa. It will also be important to work closely with Namibia as the incoming chairperson of the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security to ensure continuity. Lesotho has benefitted from successful interventions by SADC and will continue to receive close scrutiny.

The Horn of Africa has continued to see growing militarization with external powers growing their military presence in Djibouti. With this comes concerns that this turns Africa and the Western Indian Ocean area into a zone for conflict and war instead of a zone for peace and development. The US has a vast number of military outposts and is involved in more than a dozen other operations on African soil, thus bringing Africa within the orbit of the US war on terror and its devastating consequences for a peaceful and weapons-free Africa. While the Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement has continued, internal situations in both countries remain areas of concern. Ethiopia, in particular, has seen rising internal tensions arising from challenges in its ethnic federalism. South Sudan has benefitted from successful regional interventions, while Burundi's peaceful change of government marks the end of a protracted transition that has seen delays. Elections continue to be associated with violence and politics linked to the winner takes all tendencies in conditions where there are not many alternative routes to resources and prosperity for the political elite.

The struggle for the self-determination of the peoples of Western Sahara remains incomplete and is facing new challenges with Morocco's attempts to drive a wedge in the AU away from its unity in support of UN resolutions calling for a peaceful resolution to the issue on the basis of the right of self-determination for the Saharawi people. The Morocco issue, like the growing role of Israel in African affairs, signals a waning influence of progressive African states including South Africa in African affairs. This fuels the perception that South Africa's sway in Africa has declined, its role in championing the progressive African agenda on the continent is seen as having weakened. In this context, Morocco and other forces not aligned with South Africa's progressive African agenda have taken a foothold and are weakening further the continental unity behind its long-established principles and values. While South Africa continues to enjoy the confidence of many as shown by its recent election to chair the African Union and the APRM, there is no doubt that its ability to work with others to lead a progressive agenda needs reinvigorating.

The issue of the growing influence of Morocco is inextricably related to the continuing challenge of FrancAfrique which sets French-speaking countries against others including English-speaking African countries in a manner that harms the cohesion of the African Union, its organs and programmes. This is also enabled by

South Africa's poor handling of the Anglophone-Francophone dynamics. The role of monarchs from the Middle East is also key to these dynamics, linking up with Morocco, France and Israel to influence African politics in their favour. The various conflicts and sources of tension make the task of building Africa's Peace and Security Architecture increasingly difficult, a challenge must be addressed with urgency.

South Africa has yet to release the National Interest document adopted by the Cabinet for debate and comment by the ANC and public. The discussion would aid in coherent policy and planning, strategy development and implementation. This will ensure that South African interests are consistently projected continentally and globally.. It will further enhance citizen support and participation in respect of its progressive foreign policy agenda which is the pursuit of a just and equitable world order.

While Africa was recently reeling from the ravages of the Ebola epidemic, it now has to contend with the immediate and long-term effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. Covid-19 affects all 54 African countries with South Africa as the epicentre. Health workers have been severely affected, while health facilities are stretched by a combination of Covid-19 and the general state of illness in many countries. This not only undermines the already weakened health systems crucial for fighting the continent's battles with various infectious diseases and rising lifestyle diseases, it also impedes economic recovery from the ravages of the global economic crisis post 2008. Covid-19 followed a devastating locust infestation that severely damaged food and agricultural production and threatened livelihoods. Indications are the manner in which Africa is responding to this threat will in the long-term strengthen health systems, promote industrialization around the manufacture of essential health equipment and pharmaceutical products. This will lead to greater focus on resilience through self reliance on health care systems. The ANC and government must thus be seized with efforts to enhance the continent's resilience to and its ability to effectively contain future pandemics and epidemics whilst supporting efforts that contribute to the development of regional value chains. Relations with external actors must equally be geared towards meeting this objective.

Africa's response to Covid-19 is also underlining the importance of cooperation, sharing of information, exchange of expertise and solidarity. This is part of a trend globally where we have seen the practical expression of solidarity mainly from the global South to the global North when the pandemic hit Europe very hard in March-April 2020. We have also seen international NGOs and countries like China, Cuba, Russia and others extend a hand of friendship through the donation of equipment and resources to Africa and other parts of the world. Countries in the global North have also donated medical equipment and vaccines however, their reluctance to support South Africa and much of the global South's position on a TRIPS Waiver to boost the manufacturing of vaccines in the global South has continued to taint the global response. T We have also witnessed countries in the North readily embracing policies that put their own national interests ahead global access and solidarity efforts. This has been the practice against the advice of structures such as the World Health Organisation (WHO).

South Africa's recent Chairpersonship of the African Union and the APRM Forum of heads of state and government presented an opportunity for the country and the ANC to build a progressive movement in Africa, harnessing influence in the Pan-African Women's Organization (PAWO), the Pan-African Youth Union (PYU) and Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The challenges facing women and youth in Africa have deepened as poverty, inequality and unemployment grows. Women and youth formations have continued to mobilise for gender and youth empowerment, this is constrained by weak fragmented progressive African movements.

South Africa has finalised the hosting agreements with continental institutions that are critical for the African agenda. It should however address any outstanding matter that require its attention to ensure these institutions are able to fulfil their mandate effectively. The challenges facing POWA and PYU epitomise our weakness as a motive force for the progressive agenda in regional and continental integration. The assumption on our part that the progressive agenda is common-sense and shared by other governing parties must be addressed with urgency as South Africa seeks to revive its foreign policy objectives and its global stature with Africa being the epicentre.

Regional structures such as SADC and the Conference of Liberation Movements remain critical for pursuing a progressive agenda in the region through developmental regional integration. The in this respect ANC has not given this sufficient strategic attention to turn the potential into reality. We have not acted with sufficient vigour to address the key challenges to the dream of developmental regional integration such as insecurity and instability and democratic reversals in some countries. This is due to the weak implementation of the regional agenda as contained in the Revised Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (2020-2030), the Regional Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap, the Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan, and the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ. The lack of concerted and consistent attention has meant an inadequate strengthening of the SADC and its institutions. All these continue to be hampered fundamentally by insufficient political will on the part of regional states to give shared regional sovereignty a chance to work. This in effect is the failure to transcend the inherited notions of narrow national sovereignty that fragment the region. Liberation movements in the region, working with counterparts inside and outside of government continue to possess the potential to reinvigorate the political movement for a progressive agenda by turning the affinity among them into decisive collective action to achieve developmental regional integration. These efforts must also focus on ways to effectively manage and facilitate the inter regional movement of people.

The spike in xenophobic attacks and tensions in South Africa, increasingly politicised by political formations seeking to grow their power in the run up to the 2024 elections poses a serious risk to internal stability and our Africa policy, which is in risk of being perceived as anti-African; this will undermine our ability to lead with others a progressive African agenda. This is likely to continue and worsen towards the next elections and will require skilful public diplomacy all over Africa to counter the disinformation that accompanies it. It will also require the elevation of progressive voices and approaches to managing the movement of people, especially economic migrants within the region.

To this end, the building of extensive relationships at a party to party level, with social movements and civil society is paramount. This and its access to critical state power gives the ANC potential capacity to build momentum across Africa for turning consensus, policies and plans into concrete actions that bring about a progressive, prosperous and peaceful Africa in line with the African Agenda 2063.

2.2 INTERNATIONAL BALANCE OF FORCES

As observed in 2017, growing challenges of poverty, unemployment, inequality, underdevelopment, conflict, and environmental degradation are the direct outcome of failures of the neoliberal international system. These are exacerbated by the rise of right-wing tendencies at national, regional and international levels globally. The spread of right-wing extremism has displaced social democratic and centrist forces in Western Europe and North America. It has helped to sharpen the differences between the global North and the global South in international fora on anything from multilateral trade to climate change, and global governance to multilateralism. The right-wing movements

reject globalism because it constrains their ability to impose their will on the international system, undermine multilateralism and cooperation and weaken the principle of sovereign equality among states.

The US-China trade war that intensified under the Donald Trump presidency of the US manifested in this penchant for power games, unilateralism and masculine politics. Today, tensions between the US and China continue, not just over the origins of COVID-19, but also over the role of the WHO, China's developing country status under the WTO, the status of Hong Kong, and the South China Sea territorial disputes. These tensions can weaken international cooperation, whist also presenting opportunities for progressive forces to push for a new and better world order.

The Russian military operation in Ukraine has turned into a costly war with NATO indirectly involved through the unprecedented supply of lethal weapons as part of the larger Western support for Ukraine against Russia. This has a bearing on global geopolitics and has an impact on Africa and South Africa. There seems to be a great degree of polarisation within the membership of the United Nations as countries are placed under increasing pressure to side with the West against Russia. This was on full display in the lead up to various recent resolutions brought to the UN General Assembly. A significant number of countries are non-aligned, pushing for non-military solutions to the root causes of the conflict. Western sanctions against Russia are unprecedented in both their scale, their extent and their impact on the global economy. It has resulted in rising energy , food and fertiliser prices. The ripple effect is felt in South Africa as the price of petrol goes up and with it the cost of living. The information war that accompanies this conflict has seen powerful Western forces and their proxies in South Africa push for the country to shift from non-alignment to support Ukraine. The hypocrisy of the West in its dealing with previous military incursions such as the US-led operations in Iraq, Iran, Syria, Somalia, Libya as well as Israel's military occupation of Palestine have made countries reluctant to unquestioningly support Ukraine and the West's military response to the Russian military operation. In the process, the UN Security Council has been further divided to the point of being moribund. The UN General Assembly has also remained divided. This may have a negative bearing on the centrality of the UN in the pursuit of the sustainable development goals during the decade of action and in pursuing various global reforms.

Under these conditions, we have also seen the rise of new politics driven by neo-Nazism, homophobia, islamophobia, xenophobic tendencies, ethno-religious nationalism, antisemitism, and masculine politics. The attacks on social democracy, socialist alternatives and left civil society platforms have become more pronounced.

The cohesion of the global South is also in peril partly due to political and economic cleavages that prevent the South from demonstrating unity of purpose and approach when major geostrategic issues emerge, such as with the Covid-19 threat and now the Ukraine war. Right-wing tendencies and narrow nationalism have manifested in crucial countries of the global South. BRICS forum has continued to pursue global reform and deepen intra-BRICS cooperation, demonstrated through intentions to build alternatives to the Bretton Woods Institutions through the New Development Bank., The elevation of right-wing, authoritarian forces in some of the BRICS countries threatens the internal ideological cohesion of BRICS around a progressive agenda for global change. The BRICS countries could not fully mobilise its Vaccine Centre to ensure a united response to global vaccine apartheid and these efforts must be re-energised as South Africa prepares to host the BRICS Summit in 2023. Attempts to re-energize the India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) forum will confront similar challenges. There is insufficient coherence among emerging and developing powers within the G20 to effectively use this forum for the transformation of global

governance. The weakness of the G7 component in the G20 as a result of internal contradictions presents opportunities for progressive emerging and developing countries like South Africa to build momentum for progressive change.

The expectation that regional formations will champion progressive change is inadequate without concrete acts of mobilization on the part of countries like South Africa and its allies. Formations like the African Union (AU), MERCOSUR, Euro-Asian Alliance, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; a China, India, the Middle East and Africa (CHIMEA) Indian Ocean nexus; a revived Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic; the Cuban-inspired Community of Latin American and Caribbean State (CELAC); South-Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC); ASEAN+3; the CARICOM and others have the potential to build momentum in support of the restructuring of global power. This requires leading nations of the South to mobilize with intent and energy.

The core of the neoliberal international order remains under a great degree of strain due to the aggressive posture of the USA. Tensions have emerged within the governing structures of NATO, although they have somewhat subsided in the united Western confrontation of Russia. However, the future of NATO and its cohesion on certain actions will remain tested, as displayed in its lack of consensus to impose a no-fly zone in Ukraine. Divisions within the G7 after the exclusion of Russia over Crimea continue to intensify along ideological lines. The differences between the US and the EU have increased in light of the US position on BREXIT and the security pact between the Australia, UK, and the United States (AUKUS). Contestations between right-wing and centrist forces in Western countries have deepened with the latter losing ground. In this context, the greater potential for blow-back comes from social movements and progressive civil society formations across the world. These developments must be factored into the ANC's international outlook.

The US dollar, like the US' disproportionate dominance of arms supplies and military bases across the world, represents a potential threat to the birth of a truly multipolar world order with strong multilateral institutions. The power of the dollar is evident as it is the dominant currency of global transactions. It is also the predominant currency of external debt of developing countries. It is a tool that enables the USA to increase its unilateral coercive measures on some countries and now increasingly against institutions of multilateralism.. The unilateral sanctions against Iran, Syria, North Korea, Nicaragua, Russia and Venezuela, the economic blockade against Cuba (more than 60 years already), are perfect examples of this bullying conduct that is intensifying. The USA has also been intimidating the staff of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to pressure it not to try cases involving US citizens. Ironically the US wants to use the same court to prosecute its enemies including Russia. The raft of sanctions, which are unilateral measures not sanctioned by the UN that is imposed by the West on Russia and others has had a corrosive effect on international governance and relations. This conduct has intensified in the context of both the Covid-19 pandemic and the global economic crisis before it. The extra-territorial nature of international law enables the US to impose these measures with success, while the weaknesses of existing instruments for censure against misbehaving states enables it to act with impunity.

In response to coordinated western sanctions, Russia is moving ahead to reduce its dependence on the US dollar and dollar-based international payment (SWIFT) system by linking its systems to those of China and India for international transactions. Russia has also begun Rouble based payments for business dealings with the West. The search for alternatives to the dollar-denominated financial system is ever more urgent if multilateralism and global governance is to be transformed.

Imperialist designs also continue to manifest in support of the right-wing in Latin America. Nowhere is this felt more brutally than in Venezuela whose economy has been wrecked through a combination of sanctions and sabotage, further deepening internal weaknesses and contradictions. This has led to a sharp rise in inflation, poverty and hunger. The country's political stability is severely weakened, its national security is fragile and its vulnerability to external machinations has increased. While onslaughts on Venezuela deepen, the solidarity with the government and progressive people of Venezuela has not improved. Russia and China have offered much-needed credit lines to the government of Venezuela and have joined forces at the UN Security Council to shine the spotlight on the USA's imperialist designs in Venezuela. A version of the USA's Monroe Doctrine designed to extend the USA imperial influence over Latin America and the Caribbean is thus widespread. The USA sponsors reactionary forces in Colombia, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia and other countries, and progressive forces are placed under pressure in society and government.

There seems to be a lack of bridge builders working to cement linkages and build alliances among progressive movements across the world in defence of principles, values and vision of a just and fair world. Revolutionary formations like the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, ALBA, SAO Paulo Forum, World Peace Council, the Organization of Solidarity for Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America (OSPAAL), and the World Social Forum are becoming weaker. Forums such as NAM, the G77+China, and the African Union are also faced by their own internal challenges of lethargy and exhaustion of radical ideas within and their preoccupation with procedural governance. In this context, the global fight against inequality, poverty, de-industrialization, environmental degradation, neoliberal food policies, autocracy and dictatorships, crass materialism, personalization of politics and such is on the decline.

In this already complicated international environment, we witness the devastation wrought by the Covid-19 pandemic since February 2020. It has aggravated weaknesses in global health, economy and social well-being, caused havoc on the global economy, resulting in an astronomical rise in unemployment, poverty and inequality at national, regional and global levels. While both developed and developing economies are affected, the devastation is felt most acutely in the developing parts of the world. Africa under the leadership of our president as the chairperson of the AU in 2021 and then an AU envoy on Covid has been exemplary, keeping infections low cases and fighting successfully for Africa's access to vaccines.

International regimes regulating the behaviour of international actors are not as robust and legitimate as global governance and effective multilateralism require. Yet, these conditions also present an opportunity for progressive forces to rejuvenate and generate fresh ideas to guide the reconstruction and restructuring of world relations and conditions going forward based on long-standing progressive principles of inclusive, just and fair outcomes.

The Middle East region is still suffering the devastating effects of the regime change agendas of the United States and its allies particularly in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Iran, and Yemen. Using the pretexts of (non-existent) weapons of mass destruction, or 'humanitarian' support to local protests, or fighting terrorism, the US has continued to create political, economic and security havoc in the countries it has intervened in. Compounding this is the ever-growing aggressiveness of Israel (with the support of its US ally) manifested through its support of terrorist groups in Syria; its increasingly brazen transgressions of international law, agreements and UN resolutions, particularly in relation to the Palestinians and its total disregard for the territorial integrity of Lebanon and Syria. Turkey is attempting to establish its hegemony in the region, with some accusing it of trying to re-establish the

Ottoman empire. Its continued disregard of UN resolutions on its occupation of northern Cyprus; its illegal invasion and occupation of Syria and support to terrorist groups there, and its intervention in Libya all point to an increasingly assertive posture. Syria itself can be described as at the centre of the global political storm.

The United Nations and its associated institutions remain the legitimate platform for reversing challenges to multilateralism, but it too needs transformation in order to strengthen its management and the legitimacy of the Security Council. To this end, the reform of the Security Council and the entire UN system should not be allowed to collapse completely. The reform of international finance, especially the IMF and the World Bank is a key part of the transformation of global economic governance system as a whole. But these formations are also actively trying to present themselves in a positive light, offering interest-free loans to countries hit by Covid-19 and want to divert attention from the need for transformation. The IMF and World Bank have over the past decade introduced new subtle forms of conditionality focusing mainly on austerity measures, privatisation of state agencies and reducing the public wage bill, which weakens the ability of creditors to recover from crises over the long-term. This calls for extreme vigilance among emerging powers to ensure that this does not sink developing countries even deeper into debt and economic malaise.

The international balance of forces has a gender dimension with patriarchal systems remaining entrenched the world over, that deepens poverty among women. Women bear the brunt of global trends in socio-economic inequality, conflict and violence, environmental degradation, exploitation, and oppression. The calls for women inclusion in the economy, politics and global governance have grown and the role of UN Women is critical in this. 25 years later, the Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action remain unrealised and the need for a progressive feminist movement across the world has become even stronger. Discussions on the meaning of feminist foreign policy in theory and practice have also gained momentum across the world, including in South Africa.

Young people have also become restless throughout the world as poverty, unemployment and inequality affect them in ever more negative ways. Youth uprisings continue to serve as a reminder that the future of the world cannot be built without their participation. Yet the youth formations globally, continentally and nationally are weak, poorly linked and inadequately mobilized towards a progressive global agenda.

Under these conditions, the revolutionary credentials of the ANC have also suffered. The challenge of governing the country, which includes the inevitable compromises on strategy and tactics, the rise of factionalism, the inability to rally progressive social forces around an ANC agenda, among other reasons, has resulted in some global progressive forces questioning whether the ANC itself remains progressive. Subsequently, the ANC has had to rely on a government-centred international programme and its role in progressive international formations has declined. Thus, the ANC has not been able to build a global progressive movement as it had hoped to achieve after the Cold War.

The implications of this for the ANC is that it has to sharpen its revolutionary and progressive character and improve its ability to build effective alliances with a broad section of progressive forces in and outside state power towards a shared desire for a more equitable, just and fairer world. This will require internal ideological and political cohesion as well as a strong ability to mobilize and galvanize support for a progressive international agenda across the world, in Africa and Southern Africa especially.

The task of keeping the progressive agenda alive now rests increasingly with social movements and critical civil society in some cases, which are also in need of support.

The building of a global progressive movement, identified in 2017, must overcome fragmentation and signs of exhaustion among progressive forces to be realised. It must harness growing youth militancy and radicalization including among student movements.

Our commitment to the vision of a humane, non-sexist, non-racist and democratic world order is facing mammoth challenges. Yet there are many opportunities for the ANC as a revolutionary movement working with like-minded others across the world to build alliances for a progressive, just and fair world order. It will require strengthening the revolutionary ideological posture, strengthening progressive alliances at home, and reaching out to the social movements and critical civil society formations in the process.

While going through a process of trimming the number of foreign representatives through Embassies, High Commissions, and Consul-General offices, the country still has a large diplomatic footprint in the world, and this can be used to good effect in navigating a global order that challenges many of the values and aspirations of progressive internationalism.

3. ORGANISATIONAL PROGRAMME

In the pursuit of "progressive internationalism in a changing world" and to attain a Better Africa and a Better World the international relations work of the ANC has been reorganised around the following pillars:

- Building a Better Africa and World
- Party-to-Party, Intra-Party and Multilateral Relations
- Transformation of Global Governance
- Policy Development
- Solidarity and Campaigns

Additionally, taking into account organisational constraints the ANC has made capacity building and coordination a cross-cutting component of the work of international relations in line with the pursuit of organisational renewal. It is important to note that from conference to conference the resolutions that have not reached full implementation have often been carried over to the next conference resolutions.

There is evidence that the government has incorporated some of the resolutions into its annual plans and annual reports. The biggest challenge for the ANC in implementation is the lack of resources and the capacity of its structures to hold government accountable in relation to the ANC' s international relations mandate. There are also inadequate systems in place for monitoring and evaluating implementation as well as inadequate processes for progress reports on resolutions.

With this in mind it may require the ANC to review all the resolutions, looking at how it practically can implement a realistic programme with priority areas focused on the African continent and then the globe, especially given the resource constraints.

The discussion document has also made clear that the geopolitical environment is ever changing in the world and in Africa, limiting the scope of policy choices for the ANC and government. This volatile international environment has been compounded by the national environment, which witnessed adverse effects with the downgrading of our economy by credit rating agencies, budget constraints, Covid-19 lockdown and unrest in key economically important provinces such as Gauteng and Kwa-Zulu Natal.

The ANC's policies are formulated over a five-year period in this volatile environment. Consideration should thus be given in this conference on how to allow for adjustments in policy positions that impact on our national situation drastically to allow us to navigate for the well-being of our people.

PILLAR I: BUILDING A BETTER AFRICA AND WORLD

The ANC and its government must be consistent and ensure implementation of resolution regarding PAP, PAWO, PAYM and

ECOSOCC. Clear decisions and timelines for implementation must be determined. Host agreements regarding PAP and PAWO, which the AU has declared a specialised agency, must be concluded by the end of 2023.

The ANC clearly needs to do introspection on whether the partnerships with various external partners on the continent will address the poverty, inequality and unemployment alleviation in South Africa and the rest of Africa in line with Agenda 2063.

The ANC should outline clear ways to address the rise of populism and acts of xenophobia that would create better understanding amongst South Africans and Africans from other countries. Failing to do this will impact our political standing and economic opportunities in other African countries.

The ANC has to support the ANC Youth League to strengthen itself and take up its position in the region, the continent, and amongst international youth structures.

Given the formal AU resolution on the reform of the ICC and the review of the Rome statue without withdrawing from the ICC, the ANC needs to review its resolution on the ICC to avoid incompatibility in policy between South Africa and the AU.

Pertaining to the region the ANC should expedite engagements amongst liberation movements to consolidate all current programmes and development initiatives as well as fast-track implementation. The ANC should also create clear engagements with governing parties to find common areas of cooperation to ensure that the region and the continent create that better Africa.

PILLAR II: PARTY-TO-PARTY, INTRA-PARTY AND MULTIPARTY RELATIONS

The ANC should continuously analyse the ideology and character of strategic parties and those that seek relations with the ANC in order to engage with them effectively. Prior to this the ANC should do a reflection on its own ideological orientation and character.

Communication lines between the Party, Government, ANC in Parliament, the Alliance should be improved at all levels for Party- to -Party work to be harnessed. The ANC's role in reinforcing government through its party-to-party engagements remains important.

Changes in governments have left some of our historical friends in opposition. The ANC thus should consolidate a clear approach on engaging ruling parties, whilst servicing historical relations. Reviving and servicing of relations with liberation and progressive movements in the African continent and the world remains critical.

Lack of resources has limited our participation in organisations such as the Socialist International, Sao Paolo Forum and other progressive forums. These forums offered opportunities to shape the discourse on continental and global critical issues as well as to meet bilaterally with like-minded parties. This has affected our leadership and contribution and should be attended to with urgency and commitment.

The ANC needs to assist its leagues to improve their party-to-party work by including them in delegations assigned to engage parties and develop a clear strategy to this effect. Party to Party work should not be seen as an end in itself. It should promote solidarity, foster prosperity and address the broader challenges of inequality, poverty and unemployment that South Africa and the progressive countries in Africa and the world seek to address. Most importantly party -to -party work in Africa should be geared towards the achievement of Agenda 2063 aspirations and curb any form of neo - colonialism.

PILLAR III: TRANSFORMATION OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

South Africa needs to advocate for greater regional representation in the G20 and other multilateral institutions. The ANC must build its own capacity to engage

counterparts, especially non-state actors in the G20.

Considering the negative track-record of institutions such as the IMF and World Bank on the continent in dealing with inequality and poverty, it is important for the ANC to interrogate their role and polices on climate change and the broader role of development finance in Africa.

The ANC needs to discuss the current implications of the World Bank and IMF loans to South Africa and come with clear proposals on repayment of the debt speedily to ensure delivery of services and policy implementation is not adversely affected. The protection of our sovereignty must be key in this and not to cede control to the IMF or World Bank in the design of assistance programmes.

With the United Nations currently pre-occupied with the conflict in Ukraine, the ANC and its government should ensure that focus on African Development is not lost within the UN organs. UN Reform efforts should also not be limited to the UNSC but also put emphasis on UN agencies.

The Women empowerment agenda led by civil society, academics and UN bodies are very rife and the ANC should actively participate in theses dialogues and programmes.

The ANC and government should encourage proactive engagement in the OECD and its bodies as an observer to ensure that voices from the global South are heard.

The ANC and government should develop a framework on how to influence the ICC and encourage further reforms to the organisation in line with AU positions.

The current geopolitical tensions impacting the work in international organisations needs the ANC and its government to interrogate if real reforms remain possible within the UN and how these reforms should take place.

Despite challenges, BRICS has been moving forward positively and has established the New Development Bank. China and Russia are both members of BRICS and have come at odds with the USA. South Africa as a member has to analyse the implications of the current global situation on the BRICS. It should continue to track, monitor, and evaluate the implementation of BRICS programmes.

The ANC and government have to continue to create greater awareness on BRICS amongst South Africans, and it should outline how it will utilise the partnership to change the lives of our people with clear implementation frameworks, including efforts to highlight the economic and trade relations, the social, academic, and other areas of cooperation.

PILLAR IV: POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Parliamentary Diplomacy empowerment in foreign policy is an ongoing matter and a clear toolkit in this regard should be developed to assist parliamentarians navigate a complex global arena, especially now that the SADC-Parliamentary Forum is now a fully-fledged Parliament.

Parliamentarians must strengthen the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) and engage the relevant government departments to ensure that the necessary host agreements are signed, and the Malabo Protocol is ratified.

Greater engagement by the ANC and government with the Diaspora as the 6th Region of Africa remains important in realising the AU's Agenda 2063. Through this process, mutual opportunities should be sought, including through knowledge exchanges, investment, and cultural diplomacy. Similarly, engagement should also be pursued with the South African Diaspora to work towards supporting their work abroad and in the alleviation of poverty and inequality of Africans.

The public awareness and education programmes on foreign policy by the ANC, parliament and government must be implemented, especially in the age of social media and fierce contestations over

credible information. This would further assist in taking our citizens along with us on decisions that we make continentally and globally.

The ANC should develop a fully-fledged economic diplomacy position aimed at supporting the government efforts to enhance its economic diplomacy. Such a policy must be in line with the NDP vision 2030 but go beyond to envisage possibilities beyond 2030.

The operationalization of SADPA and its role in assisting the ANC and government in pursuit of our vision for a better Africa is still required and the Bill should be engaged and finalised.

The impact of Brexit on the United Kingdom and European Union requires the ANC and government to urgently facilitate research and dialogue on this matter.

The government must set up a clear coordination structure that can manage and ensure guidelines are adhered to in managing the international activities of cities and provinces.

Policy consideration and New Policy areas

- Economic diplomacy policy position articulating the NDP vision 2030 and beyond should be discussed and drafted.
- Cultural diplomacy has grown and gained momentum. The ANC has to develop a clear policy position on the elevation on cultural diplomacy in its ability to enhance economic diplomacy and political diplomacy, incorporating it through Brand South Africa as a contribution to the arts and creative industry.
- Noting parliaments' increased role in global matters and South African parliament's strategic participation, a clear parliamentary diplomacy framework is developed to ensure cohesion and consistency in the articulation of our Foreign Policy. The ANC needs to give policy direction to government on the implementation of the decisions of the 52nd, 53rd and 54th Conference calling for the establishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency to place on par with other emerging powers.
- The growth in diplomacy provincially and in municipalities is increasingly being used by states accredited to South Africa as an entry point to influence our foreign policy. The ANC has to resolve on the policy framework issues for provincial and municipal engagements with states accredited to South Africa, which ensures stronger coordination and to ensure alignment of all stakeholders to the National Foreign Policy
- The ANC to formulate its policy position in regard to the emerging world order following the Ukraine-Russia conflict. It should take into cognisance the major global changes resultant of the positions taken by the big powers on the conflict, inclusive of the threats to the dollar hegemony and Visa-Mastercard dominance of international payment systems, and diversification of sources of energy and oil. Non-alignment in global geo-politics is also taking on new nuances.
- The ANC must take a policy position on the White Paper that was withdrawn and decide if it will be introduced, what its parameters will be, what its purpose will be, what form it will take and to what end. The South African national interest should also be clearly defined for this white paper.
- Given that the nature and character of progressive forces as we know them is changing even in our region and given that the ANC is courted by various parties across the world looking for relations, the ANC needs to clarify its policy position regarding progressiveness and what parameters must guide decisions in party-to-party relations and solidarity.
- There is rising geopolitics fluidity in Africa, divisions among African countries in global forums and discussions. Work

needs to be done to unite the continent around our shared interest, the advancement in development to realise the AU Agenda 2063 through progressive means. The ANC must ensure that government puts Africa back in the centre of its foreign policy and rebuild relations on the continent clearly outlining the policy positions and implementation strategies to realise these set out goals and enhance our relations through engaging political parties and governments in our African in advancing our collective interest.

- Growing tensions amongst African foreign nationals and South Africans needs to be addressed by the ANC and government. The root causes of populism and acts of xenophobia need to be discussed with communities and migrants.
- The ANC has to reflect and focus on the 2024 Zimbabwean elections.
- Women and Gender inclusivity into our foreign policy has to be taken into account with the rising focus globally and continentally on the deliverable outcomes of the SDGs 2030 of "leaving no-one behind" and the intensive focus by organisations like the UN, OECD, and other international bodies on Women Empowerment through climate change and technology and financial and Economic Inclusion as resolved by the AU Summit of February 2020 that dedicated a decade to African Women Financial and Economic Inclusion.
- Given the growing embrace of the idea of feminist foreign policy among progressive partners across the world and noting the danger that this is being hijacked by powerful western forces for reasons that have little to do with the interests of women of the world, the ANC must consider developing its written position on women and/in foreign policy
- The importance of developing a strategy to engage the 6th Region of the AU, the African Diaspora on the implementation of the AU 2063 Agenda, AfCFTA, NEPAD, climate change; encourage them to invest into ensuring a better Africa through the set AU programmes as drivers of change.
- Digital Diplomacy has been accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic and has impacted and changed the way we engage on all levels. Digital Sovereignty, Cybersecurity, tools of trade for engagement, effects on missions abroad, effects on International organisation engagements are some of the areas that need to be ironed out and a clear policy framework be developed for the ANC and government to maintain integrity and security of engagements.

PILLAR V: SOLIDARITY AND CAMPAIGNS

The solidarity movement as we know it is very weak globally. Covid-19 has made countries and its people to become more protectionist and inward looking. The shifts in the global balance of forces has impacted on global solidarity, whereas the conflict in Ukraine has further pushed global solidarity to the back.

Africa must be at the centre of our focus, thus the importance of political education in educating the members of the ANC and the public on the sacrifices made by various African countries in our fight against apartheid is of paramount importance. Africa Day should also be utilised to promote this education, the AU anthem, and the broader education about the importance of our unity in the continent.

The ANC and its alliance partners continue showing solidarity through campaigns led by Cosatu and the SACP, advocacy, seminars and humanitarian-aid on Western Sahara (Sahrawi); Palestine, Swaziland/Eswatini, Cuba and Venezuela. The ANC's provincial solidarity campaigns have been weak and would be more effective with the resuscitation of the Provincial International Relations Committees and where changes in leadership on Provincial level happen, some of the previous committee members should

be retained and used as resource persons to create continuity and capacity for implementation.

Policy Considerations and new developments

- Reflecting and reviewing its resolution to downgrade the diplomatic relations with Israel, given the aggressive expansion of Israel on the African continent and the necessity to engage Israel on the intensification of the brutal occupation of Palestine, and given what we know about the implications of this resolution on our Diplomatic capital.
- The Annexation of the Jordan Valley by Israel which is illegal in international law, the United Nations Charter and the Rome Statute
- US and EU imposed Sanctions on Zimbabwe entitled "Zimbabwe Democracy and Recovery Act" (USA) both commercial and financial penalties/restrictions and travel sanctions on individuals and entities in Zimbabwe, while EU and UK sanctions remain in force since 2002 of an arms embargo, targeted assets and travel bans. These sanctions have implications for Zimbabwe and the region. This is a continuous contentious issue needing engagement and results in huge migration of Zimbabweans to countries in the region particularly to South Africa.
- The Imposition of sanctions by the USA on Venezuela in violation of international law
- Hosting of International Solidarity Conference to reignite global solidarity which was not able to take place due to COVID-19. The conference has to take place post-Covid to ensure the weakened global solidarity movement be reignited in strengthening people-to-people relations.
- The ANC has a draft concept document on how to engage diplomats as part of driving the ANC Campaigns.
- The success of the implementation of solidarity and campaigns requires better communication and involvement of the various stakeholders, alliance partners and Provinces. Most activities are implemented by the Provinces and Alliance partners and thus reigniting branch mobilisation in campaigns is important.
- The ANC also needs to create campaigns on the issues affecting migrants in line with the 54th conference resolutions and values and principles of the African National Congress.

4. CONCLUSION

The ANC's resolve on the creation of a Better Africa and a Better World remains key to its revolutionary objectives, taking cognisance of the ever-changing objective and subjective material conditions in a world that is not static. We will not attain our goals if the balance of forces is not in our favour. Our new theme, in "Pursuit of Progressive Internationalism in a Changing World", all efforts must be directed to rebuild and strengthen the progressive movement nationally, continentally, and globally.

Some of the decisions previously taken are becoming difficult to implement as they are taking longer due to complex changes. For instance, the African Union (AU) has resolved to reform or transform the International Criminal Court (ICC), and to review the Rome Statute with a view to strengthen it without withdrawing from it. For us to withdraw at this stage would undermine the African consensus having recently chaired the AU. In keeping with this AU position, a number of countries that had committed to withdraw have changed their positions, also because Venezuela and Palestine have approached the ICC to challenge the USA and they will need the support of African countries. Further, the Malabo Protocol providing for an African alternative court to the ICC has been hampered by insufficient ratification. Therefore, this calls on the NPC to take note

of these new developments that dictate a review of the 2017 position.

Indeed, the ANC's character and ideological orientation as a revolutionary liberation movement committed to the fundamental transformation of international relationships is crucial. This enjoins the ANC to assess itself in this regard and arrive at ways in which this outlook may be strengthened. This historical duty of the ANC towards progressive internationalism also requires its ability to mobilise like-minded forces all over the world in pursuit of the transformation of the current world order towards one that is democratic, just, fair and multi-polar. To this end, the strengthening and requisite capacitation of the ANC head office, the Department of International Relations especially, deserves utmost attention as centres from which solidarity, campaigns, party-to-party and multi-party relations, and the implementation of the plan of a better Africa in a transformed global order are coordinated, managed, and monitored. The ANC needs to reinvigorate discussions and activities to pursue a progressive international order as its long-term goal.

6

Social Transformation

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 This Social Transformation Discussion Document outlines the social transformation resolutions adopted by the 54th African National Congress National Conference in 2017.

1.2 The Document provides the background that elaborates the issues affecting the social cluster and the strategic policy positions and objectives in addressing these issues.

1.3 The STC continues to track the implementation of the resolutions of conference.

1.4 The Document concludes with the proposed new policies and further questions that need to be discussed at the policy conference.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1 The key mandate of the 54th Conference was to **renew and unite the organization.**

2.2 This Conference adopted the Social Transformation Report of the 27th National Policy Conference.

2.3 The social transformation agenda is part of the continuing journey of social change that began in the form of the Reconstruction and Development Programme through which the ANC sought **to build a better life for all.** At the centre of this clamour for change is a march towards a truly reconstructed, transformed, unified and developed South Africa. Alongside the radical economic transformation agenda, the social cluster's agenda seeks to ensure radical social transformation aimed at ending oppression, poverty and inequality, and creating a society in which all belong, live freely and prosper.

2.4 The strategic objective of the STC is to transform society and build a new society that is peaceful, equal and just as envisioned in the National Development Plan and the UN Agenda 2030 and Africa's Agenda 2063. This to prioritise the rights of women, children and people with disabilities as well as the previously disadvantaged, work tirelessly to reduce discrimination and violence against women and discrimination and violence against children.

2.5 At the centre of building a new society is the need to address socio-economic inequalities, which breeds social ills such as high levels of violence, gender-based violence and femicide including misuse of alcohol and drugs. The task of the Sub-Committee is to protect the vulnerable such as black lesbians, who are disproportionately discriminated against based on their gender, race and class. This includes the violence meted out to the Girl-Child.

2.6 The ANC has a responsibility to promote engagement with communities, to strengthen local community organisations to develop new forms of engagement with Government with a view to lessen violent protests and vandalisation of property.

2.7 The responsibility towards youth is to nurture them to grow as responsible citizens, to engage them in sporting and cultural activities and focus on their growth in terms of education and skills development.

2.8 There is need to intensify the focus on women empowerment. While the ANC has made some important progress in the public sector on this matter, there is need to ensure more improvements, especially in the private sector.

2.9 The STC has a responsibility to continue the struggle against patriarchal beliefs and tendencies that continue to suppress and oppress women.

2.10 The STC needs to continue the fight against violence against women and sexual violence in particular as part of the important work of helping the people to escape the degrading conditions of poverty. There is a need to improve the implementation of integrated human settlements developments; improve the fight to eliminate the squalor of informal settlements; and help give dignity to the people by eliminating the title-deeds backlog and household tenure security.

2.11 The ANC, as a glorious liberation movement, whose armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe played an important role in the liberation of the people of South Africa, needs to reciprocate by improving the living conditions of Military Veterans through the implementation of various policies and programmes.

2.12 Of importance, the STC has an on-going duty to help the ANC achieve **Social Cohesion** and accelerate the project of **Nation Building** which will create a just and inclusive society that draws on South Africa's rich heritage.

2.13 In this journey of creating a cohesive society the ANC remains tasked with the duty of fighting and defeating racism in all its manifestations, through policy and practical implementation.

2.14 The STC reaffirms the observation made by the 54th National Conference that overall, ANC policy is in place, and while refinements and adjustments to policy are necessary to meet the changing and shifting societal demands, the key task is ensuring the accurate implementation of these policies.

2.15 To this end, this Discussion Document outlines the Resolutions as adopted by the 54th National Conference, provides progress report highlights on the implementation of the Resolutions and concludes with new policy proposals as well as questions needing further discussion at the Policy Conference.

3. 54TH NATIONAL CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS

In relation to Social Cohesion, Nation Building and the Development of Society, the 54th National Conference RESOLVED that:

1. ANC branches must be effective agents of change as leaders in communities if the ANC is to drive the radical social transformation agenda, and to achieve social cohesion and nation building.
2. To this end, ANC members must be exemplary in their conduct in their families, in their community and in their organisations.
3. ANC branches must lead our communities in a programme of regular community dialogue throughout the year on issues of social ills, and on social cohesion and nation building.
4. ANC branches must be clear on the difference between the ANC anthem and the South Africa National Anthem and must sing the National Anthem with appropriate respect and etiquette. ANC branches must utilise the government information booklets on National and AU Symbols as well as Anthems, to ensure that national symbols are known in our communities and treated with appropriate etiquette.

5. There should be more local production and content screened on our televisions and broadcast in national and community radios to reflect our values. A practical and sustainable percentage must be determined

6. ANC branches must strengthen their relationships with key stakeholders such as inter-faith organisations, sports and cultural leaders, private sector and traditional leaders to enhance moral regeneration, social cohesion and nation building. Furthermore, ANC branches must intensify their communication and engagements with ANC government, Local Municipalities and Provinces.

7. Relevant legislation in relation to hate crimes should be better enforced; all forms of racism, crude and subtle, including tribalism or xenophobia, must be eradicated; the mind-set shift from an image of an African as being a victim to being a victor must be addressed.

8. African history and African symbolism should be promoted including pre-colonial African history. The struggle for freedom and democracy must be documented in all languages. Libraries must promote the literary works of local and African writers. The use of indigenous languages must be promoted. This must include the urgent inclusion and diversification of statues on the Union Buildings Precinct and other high profile places in order to reflect African history.

9. The cultural values of diverse communities, including in particular African cultural values, which advance togetherness and co-existence across the spectrum of human existence must be promoted.

10. Patriarchy divides society and must be combatted in all its forms. Gender-stereotyped socialization of girls and boys must be addressed to build social cohesion. As part of this work the active agenda of promoting women representation in key levers of power should be intensified. Leaders of society should be capacitated to deal with matters of gender abuse.

11. The public must be educated on the consequences of criminal damage to public property during protests. Government needs to impose heavy penalties to those who damage and destroy public property.

12. The Social Cohesion Advocates should be allocated across the provinces to support the Premiers in driving the moral regeneration and social cohesion initiatives.

In relation to Safety of Women and Children, Eradication of Substance Abuse and Gangsterism, and Promotion of Sports, Arts and Culture, and Empowerment of vulnerable groups, the 54th National Conference RESOLVED that:

1. Education, sport, recreation, arts, cultural and heritage activities, clubs and programmes are important vehicles to combat substance abuse, gangsterism, violence against women and children, and other social ills, as well as to achieve social cohesion and nation building, and should also be localised.

2. Street, Block and Village Committees, in which ANC members are active, are key vehicles of social protection and social transformation. These Street, Block and Village Committees must know exactly what is happening in each street in relation to violence against women and children, substance abuse, crime and be able to ensure that there are safe houses for victims, and that the police and social workers fulfil their functions. ANC branches must also be active in and strengthen the Community Policing Forums and Community Safety Forums. Members of the communities must know their neighbours and be concerned about their lives.

3. The ANC needs to lead the processes related to removal of offensive names and signage and the geographic name

changes. Part of this work involves the decentralization of administration of heritage to the provincial level. There should be Arts and Culture units at each municipality, and local Arts Councils as well as community arts centres. Municipalities should be encouraged to support local cultural industries through the LED programme. Local arts and culture programme should be implemented. Municipal facilities such as town and community halls should be utilised for local arts, culture activities and indoor sports.

4. The ANC should bring back the ANC Cultural Desk with representation of Creative and Cultural Industries Federation of SA (CCIFSA) and have cultural ambassadors to pursue cultural diplomacy. The ANC's Cultural Desk needs to develop a Cultural Diplomacy Document. A Cultural and Creative Industries Transformation and Performance Charter needs to be introduced. ANC should ensure that there is continuous building of national monuments to commemorate and remember our rich history and heritage.

5. ANC branches cannot remain silent on violence against women and children, on vulnerability of the elderly, people with disabilities, people living with Albinism, of the LGBTIQ community. ANC branches must be aware of changing forms of crimes against vulnerable groups arising out of anti-social beliefs.

6. The provision of safe public transport, in particular for girl leaners who live far from schools, is an important element of prevention of violence against women and children.

7. In particular, ANC men must be visible in 365 days campaigning against all forms of violence and abuse in particular violence and abuse against women and children. ANC branches should rise and hold men's marches against all forms of violence and abuse in their communities under the banner of Not in My Name - Count Me In.

8. Overall, ANC policy is in place, and the key task is ensuring the implementation of the policy. To this end, the ANC capacity to monitor and evaluate this implementation must be strengthened.

9. The social challenges of racial tensions, xenophobia, violence against women, children and other vulnerable groupings, substance abuse and gangsterism will all be vastly improved through strengthening integrated human settlements, through an active sports and culture programme in schools and in communities and through improving the implementation of existing social transformation policy.

10. Inequality, unemployment, and poverty underpin the social ills in our communities, and so, education and skills development, and internships and work exposure programmes that equip the youth with skills required and appropriate to the economy and economic opportunities are also important pillars of building social cohesion and the nation.

11. Effective resourcing of government structures to fulfil their functions must be focused on and in particular sport and recreation facilities must be properly resourced. The Department of Women needs to be fully capacitated to discharge its mandate effectively including enhancing its provincial footprint.

12. Izindaba on the progress on the empowerment of women per sector needs to be held on a regular basis.

13. The State must provide sanitary towels to girls and women, starting with the indigent girl learners and young women and those in the care of state institutions. Measures to improve affordability of sanitary products must be implemented including zero tax rating.

14. The comprehensive strategy for and the coordination and monitoring of the protection of vulnerable groups led by the Department of Social Development

must be resourced to enable effective protection of children, the elderly, people with disability, and people with Albinism across relevant departments and spheres of government.

15. The ANC must conclude its review and processing of the Kader Asmal Report on Chapter 9 and other Institutions supporting constitutional democracy.
16. The Charter of Positive Values must be included in the curriculum of Life Orientation in schools. The revitalization of Provincial Chapters of the Moral Regeneration Movement should take place in all provinces, driven by the Premiers and relevant MECs to ensure greater coherence with the national programme. Part of this work includes the revival of the ANC's Commission for Religious Affairs to coordinate the efforts of the ANC with the religious sector, as well as the ANC's programme of action on moral regeneration.
17. The socialization of our children, and in particular the socialization of boy children, to respect each other, to be healthy and active citizens, to take on roles in a non-gender stereotyped manner, is the foundation of addressing social ills, and ensuring the mind-set change necessary for social transformation, gender equality, non-racism, and social cohesion. Take a Girl Child to Work should be expanded to Take a Child to Work.
18. Parenting was identified as a key area of weakness in addressing social ills and in driving the social transformation agenda. Support to parents to develop appropriate parenting skills must be strengthened through government services, and through dialogue involving key stakeholders such as religious, sports and traditional leaders. Public education on the safety of children, including the prevention children being left in the care of strangers, must be undertaken by ANC branches.
19. Abuse of religion for sexual predation by some religious leaders must be combatted
20. Gender parity in sport must be promoted at all levels, including national teams. Green jackets must be awarded for all sporting codes.
21. Standardization of school sports across the country both in poor and affluent areas. Sporting infrastructure must be extended to rural and township schools and be part of all new school building. Sport should liaise with Traditional Authorities in the roll out of sport facilities and programmes to rural areas. Parents should be encouraged to support their children in their sporting activities.
22. Sport and physical education must be integral to school curriculum from Grade R to Grade 12. Sports professionals must be utilised to teach sporting codes. Anti-doping programmes in school sports should be introduced.
23. A 5% sport ticketing levy should be introduced for all major and designated sport tournaments to fund sport development.
24. The Draft Bill to ban alcohol advertising should be converted to a Money Bill with a levy to fund sports, arts and culture and educational programmes.
25. Policy review to determine the school sports policy should be the prerogative of the Ministries of Basic Education and Sports and Recreation -and not the SGBs.
26. Policy is required to regulate mushrooming unethical churches and traditional practices.
27. Legislative review is necessary to amend all laws relating to children that is inconsistent with the Constitution, particularly in relation to age of marriage, age of consensual sex, and statutory rape.
28. The calls to decriminalise Sex work must be subjected to a high-level discussion

and engagement with relevant multiple stakeholders, and to continue to engage society on this to determine the societal norm. Sex workers must be protected.

29. ANC must strengthen and capacitate neighbourhood watch and CPFs to continue working with law enforcement agencies, and in particular SAPS, to combat human trafficking and sex slavery.
30. The need for police stations and service delivery institutions should be determined by considering the population size, proximity to residents, and the nature of services required.
31. Decisive action against drug lords and environments for anonymously reporting crime should be created.
32. The Victim Empowerment Centres, Victim Support Units, and Thuthuzela care centres should be up scaled and fully resourced, including up-scaling the availability of social workers, including in schools. The integration of services and the utilisation of the Gender Based Violence Command Centre must be taken forward. SAPS officials must be trained in gender sensitivity and appropriate practice in dealing with victims of sexual offences and domestic violence.
33. Public education and awareness on criminal evidence required for successful prosecution of cases of violence against women and children is required.
34. The full might of the criminal justice system, including the denial of bail and the sentence regime, should be utilised in the combatting of violence against women and children, particular in relation to domestic violence and sexual offences.
35. In new courts, the Children's Courts should be designed to prevent children from exposure to other dimensions of the criminal justice system. Cases involving children should be prioritised for speedy finalisation in the courts.
36. The user friendly of disability specific access to government buildings for people with disabilities should be accelerated.
37. A comprehensive programme must be implemented that addresses minimum qualifications required for ECD practitioners, minimum norms and standards of ECD infrastructure, State remuneration for practitioners who work with children up to the age of 4 as they provide an essential service.
38. Regulation of advertising using children and women, and reporting on abuse of women and children, must be reconsidered to avoid undue social media exposure of children and young women.
39. Explore the introduction of mechanisms for organisations and employers to access information in the sex offender register to protect children.
40. Child headed households including street (homeless) children must be prioritised in social protection policy, in EPWP opportunities.
41. The child support grant should be extended from the age of 18 to 21 for beneficiaries that are still studying in order to eliminate the advent of vulnerability.
42. The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA) must be amended to enhance the promotion of equality between men and women public representatives.
43. Municipalities must regulate the location of taverns and liquor retailers to be away from schools and religious establishments. The Liquor Amendment Bill should also address this matter.
44. SASSA national administration should be modernized to be more effective and efficient in line with government overall

objective for the public service, while maintaining seamless integration with provinces to ensure that there is adequate support, decision making and ensure accountability through the organization. The use of pay points also needs to be phase out to support financial integration of communities by the use of more modern payment system.

45. The government's internship programme offers valuable work exposure for graduates and thus entry requirements must enable and not unduly restrict entry and access. Part of this work must intensify career guidance programmes for the youth, as well as allocation of more bursaries.

46. TVET college qualifications must be de-stigmatised through a prestige programme of partnering with local business and local municipalities to create opportunities of streamlined job access for graduates.

47. The NYDA must be strengthened and resourced to deliver effective youth programmes with the national youth service, the EPWP youth programmes and other youth employment programmes as flagships of youth development in government. Consideration should be given to reinstituting the Young Pioneers and the Masupatsela as leading information disseminators. Youth employment programmes should embrace new technologies.

48. There is a need to professionalise youth work for all youth development practitioners.

49. The mind set of dependency among the youth should be discouraged.

In relation to Social Cohesion and Social Transformation through Human Settlements, the 54th National Conference RESOLVED:

1. To implement structured support to black-owned companies in the housing and residential property sector, with special attention to those owned by women, youth, military veterans, and people with disability. 30% set aside should benefit these designated groups.

2. Transformatory urban planning and management that changes apartheid spatial residential patterns must be focused on, with a move away from dense single-use residential areas to those with appropriate recreational and sports facilities, other socio-economic amenities and the necessary public transport systems.

3. In the creation of new cities and towns, planning should promote de-racialisation of society and development consolidation of peri-urban areas

4. This must include accelerated implementation and consolidation of human settlements development legislation to utilise suitably positioned land for housing, and the enforcement of existing law and by-laws.

5. Land invasions must be curbed through appropriate by-laws. Fast track the amendment of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act 1998 (PIE) to deal with land for housing development.

6. To implement a rapid urban land re-distribution and release through constitutional means in order to meet development needs in a structured manner. Mining and other private sector land-owners should be encouraged to release their land to the state for human settlement purposes.

7. The sale of subsidised houses by beneficiaries should be prevented and beneficiaries who no longer need the house must be assisted to return the house to the State for compensation or allocation of an alternative opportunity in another area. The rental of subsidised houses to non-beneficiaries be discouraged especially in the face of growing need. Accelerate the issuing of title deeds and registration of subsidy houses in favour of the "family" rather than the individual beneficiaries.

8. Uniformity in the standard of housing provision across all provinces must be addressed and remedial improvements of houses at risk must be completed.
9. Provision of housing for military veterans must be fast-tracked and completed, with appropriate consultation, in line with applicable legislation.
10. To conduct an audit of all unfinished housing programmes and implement a programme to complete unfinished housing projects.
11. Human settlements housing options must include site and service schemes, options for people to build their own houses, high rise accommodation, affordable rental stock for those who are transitionary residents in urban areas for work and other purposes, the transformation of hostels into family units, and the provision of student accommodation and other priority needs.
12. The causes of shack farming are in part as a result of the need for income generating opportunities, and must be addressed by plot size control and by laws regulating the building of informal housing.
13. The allocation of subsidised houses must be consulted with Traditional leaders when developed on land availed by traditional leaders.
14. Water provision must be addressed as an integral part of human settlements and the Water Act should be reviewed to ensure that water resources are a public good.
15. Our communities must be served by water tankers where permanent infrastructure is not yet provided to the community.
16. Municipalities must commission viability studies for building of small dams to ensure water security
17. Sanitation at community and household level must be improved and the bucket system eradication must be intensified.
18. Community libraries, parks and socio-economic amenities should reflect on the planning of new communities from the initial planning stages.
19. Institutionalise and mainstream Programmes aimed at youth development such as a Housing Youth Brigade in order to ensure their sustainability
20. The ANC should champion proper service delivery especially in areas named after our leaders.

4. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS

4.1 It is important to indicate that the Social Transformation Resolutions are largely implemented by the following Government Departments, and it is through these departments that the highlights of the progress made in the implementation of the 54th National Conference Resolutions are presented:

(a) Department of Social Development (DSD)

(b) Departments of Human Settlements (DHS), and

(c) Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS)

(d) Department of Sport, Arts and Culture (DSAC)

(e) Department of Women, Youth and People with Disabilities (DWYPD)

4.2 Department of Social Development (DSD)

4.2.1 Social Assistance and Social Security

4.2.1.1 Provision of social grants reduces poverty and contributes to the reduction of income inequality in the country, and empirical evidence shows that Child Support Grant (CSG) for

example, contributes to improved school attendance, educational attainment and access to food. The Department of Social Development pays social grants to qualifying South Africans through the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA). Social grants reach more than 18 million people at a cost of R180 billion a year. The provision of social grants continued during nationwide lockdown with minimal disruptions.

4.2.1.2In addition to the social grants, the DSD portfolio provided an additional social relief package, consisting of the following:

- COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress (SRD) of R350 per month to adults aged 18-59 with no income from May 2020 to April 2021.
- Caregiver Social Relief of Distress (CSRD)
- Child Support Grant (CSG)
- Top up of existing grants - The Old Age Grant, Disability Grant, Care Dependency Grant and Foster Child Grant were each topped up by R250 per month in May to October 2020 inclusive. The CSG was topped up by R300 per child in May 2020 only.
- The introduction and roll-out of a new Special COVID-19 R350 grant for those between 18 and 59 reached 6 million new individuals who have not had accessed to a grant, in a very short space of time. The top-ups on existing grants has provided cushion to the most vulnerable individuals. Social grants overall proved to be the most effective mechanism available to government to cushion millions of the most vulnerable individuals and households from the dire socio-economic impact of COVID-19.
- The Social Development portfolio is also introducing and strengthening policies that are aimed at reducing high levels of poverty, inequality, vulnerability and social ills. These policies include;
- The Green Paper on Comprehensive Social Security – It seeks to integrate social grants, mandatory social security contributions and voluntary contributions into a coherent system that ensures that all South Africans are included.
- The Maternal Support Policy – it seeks to integrate the relevant systems from key departments such as DHA, DoH, DBE (ECD and Education), DSD, Employment and Labour, and SASSA. The linkage of pregnant women to comprehensive social protection package would further contribute to the ongoing development of synergistic linkages between services provided by the DSD.
- The Policy on linking Children grants beneficiaries to government services will integrate social welfare services, education, and health within the cash transfer system.
- Draft Policy (Basic Income Grant) Proposal on Income Support to 18-59 Year Olds will expand the safety net to this additional vulnerable group whilst also ensuring improved targeting of government services that will assist in empowering social grant beneficiaries.
- The Fundraising Amendment Bill seeks to consolidate the various Relief Funds into one National Social Development and Relief Fund that will enable the Fund to be more proactive and developmental in disaster mitigation.

4.2.2 Food Security

4.2.2.1About 13. 8 million people live below the food poverty line, which is R561 (in April 2019 prices) per person per month (Statistics South Africa). The country faces a 29% unemployment rate and a 55% poverty rate (Stats SA, 2020). Vulnerability to poverty and hunger has

now been exacerbated by Covid-19 pandemic. Since the announcement of the COVID-19 lock-down, government has shifted its food provision from centre-based feeding using existing network of Community Nutrition and Development Centres (CNDCs) to food parcels distribution as a short-term relief measure.

4.2.2.2The other delivery mechanism includes the Social Relief of Distress (SRD) from Provinces and SASSA. This is implemented in compliance with lock-down regulation. Over the past year, more than nine (9) million poor and vulnerable people have benefitted from DSD food distribution and the generous food donations made by our partnerships with various organizations and individuals. This intervention has made a great impact in ensuring access to food by many destitute people across the country; it has certainly gone a long way in alleviating the unforeseen devastating impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. Food distribution intervention by the DSD sector contributed to fighting poverty, hunger and malnutrition.

4.3 Department of Human Settlements (DHS)

4.3.1 Globally 1 billion people live in slums in 161 countries. More than 30% of the urban population live in slums and informal settlements. The number of informal settlements dwellers has been growing on an average of 9 million since 2000. Since the dawn of democracy in 1994, about 4.8 million houses have been delivered in South Africa providing safe shelter to over 25% of South Africa's households.

4.3.2 The Department of Human Settlements (DHS) is implementing the Title Deeds Restoration Programme to address the title deeds backlog of 1.1 million. A total of 50 000 title deeds were delivered in 2019/20 financial year.

4.3.3 A total of 136 Priority Human Settlements and Development Areas (PHSHDAs) were identified in 2020, which would promote integrated human settlements and spatial restructuring. A total of 12 social housing projects were gazetted to support the objectives of the priority development areas. Over 80% of the human settlements budget will progressively be invested in these areas. Work is under way to complete the first 41 area-based plans and to implement the related projects.

4.3.4 The NHFC distributed FLISP subsidies of R60 million to 1 167 households in the 2019/20 financial year alone. A total of 717 houses for military veterans was delivered between 2018 to 2020 financial year. In 2016/17 a total of 1 700 houses had been delivered.

4.3.5 The construction sector contributes 3% to South Africa's Gross Domestic Product and employs around 1.3 million people. Although the sector was brought to a halt by the pandemic, the Department of Human Settlements has been consistently spending its budgets, which stimulate construction activities in the sector. A total of R33.3 billion of the HSDG housing allocation was spent in 2019/20 alone resulting in the provision of 116 292 housing opportunities. A total of R11.6 billion USDG was allocated to provinces during the same financial year.

4.3.6 With more than a quarter (26.5%) of South Africa's households living in rental accommodation, the advent of Covid-19 meant that many households would lose income and be unable to afford rental payment. To alleviate the impact of Covid-19 in the human settlement portfolio, the Residential Rent Relief Programme was established with an allocation of R600 million to address the financial strain faced by low-income tenants and landlords. The relief funds were channeled through SHRA and the NHFC with each receiving an equal allocation of R300 million. The Human Settlements Contractor Relief Scheme (HSCSS) was introduced to provide relief

to contractors affected by Covid-19. It was funded from current allocations.

4.3.7 On the land release programme, the Department through the Housing Development Agency (HDA) has facilitated the acquisition of several land parcels from state-owned companies such as Transnet, Denel, ESKOM and PRASA. To date a total of 3 089.63 hectares of well-located land targeting poor and middle-income households has been acquired or released for human settlement development. The Department of Public Works and Infrastructure agreed to release a total of 1128.5345 hectares of land for human settlement development while 14241.1540 hectares of land have been identified and are currently being processed for release. The Department of Rural Development and Land Reform has on the other hand released over 13113.1309 hectares of land for human settlement development while 4835.04 hectares are currently being processed for release.

4.3.8 On empowerment of women, 23% of both the Human Settlements Development Grant (HSDG) and the Urban Settlement Development Grant (USDG) funding was allocated to women-owned businesses against the set target of 30%. Allocation to youth-owned businesses under the Youth Economic Empowerment Programme reached the set target of 10%.

4.3.9 The Department is reviewing and strengthening the following policy and legislative instruments to strengthen the implementation of its human settlements programmes:

- Housing Consumer Protection Bill – which seeks to provide for the protection of housing consumers.
- Human Settlement Development Bank Bill – which seeks to replace the National Housing Finance Corporation and offer products in relation to retail, contracting and financing.
- Property Practitioners Bill – regulates property practitioners and provides for the property sector ombudsman
- Home Loan and Mortgage Disclosure Amendment Bill, and
- Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Amendment Bill.

4.4 Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS)

4.4.1 Approximately 2.8 million households in South Africa do not have access to improved sanitation services. The ANC has resolved to eradicate the bucket system in order to improve sanitation services. By December 2020, a total of 41 290 out of 52 249 bucket sanitation systems were eradicated. Furthermore, a total of 14 235 rural households were served to eradicate sanitation backlogs.

4.4.2 The DWS has developed the Water and Sanitation Master Plan, which provides a 10-year roadmap for eradicating the bucket system, providing adequate sanitation, innovative solutions and generating economic opportunities.

4.4.3 DWS provides the Water Services Infrastructure Grant (WSIG), which is used to assist municipalities to procure intermediate water supply to ensure the provision of service infrastructure (e.g. spring protection, drilling, testing and equipping of boreholes). Through this grant, 802 projects were funded for construction nationally, with 142 of these projects completed.

4.5 Department of Sports, Arts and Culture (DSAC)

4.5.1 The ANC has an ongoing duty to help achieve social cohesion and accelerate nation building which will create a just and inclusive society that draws on South Africa's rich heritage. Chapter 15 of the National

Development Plan outlines a vision for transforming society and uniting South Africa, particularly by means of promoting social cohesion, developing an active citizenry and leadership, and fostering social compact. In this journey of creating a cohesive society, the ANC remains tasked with the duty of fighting and defeating racism in all its manifestations, through policy and practical implementation.

4.5.2 Nation Building

4.5.2.1The Department of Sports, Arts and Culture (DSAC) has initiated a number of programmes that promotes nation building and these includes the following:

- Instilling respect for the national flag and other national symbols, and the correct singing of the National Anthem.
- Promotion of the use of indigenous languages
- Promotion of African history
- Promotion of the literary works of African writers through the opening of access to public libraries.
- The identification, relocation, repositioning and curation of monuments and statues that are not in line with the values, letter and spirit of the Constitution into Regional Cultural National Building Parks
- Promotion of the cultural values of diverse communities, including in particular African cultural values, which advance togetherness and co-existence across the spectrum of human existence.
- The Department has particularly supported advocacy campaigns on the Charter of Positive Values, which is an expansive version of the founding values of the Constitution – but with African mores, forms or knowledge, and generally, ways of being, anchoring the Charter.
- DSAC collaborates with the Moral Regeneration Movement in popularizing the Charter of Positive Values.

4.5.3 Social Cohesion

4.5.3.1DSAC has appointed a total of 74 Social Cohesion Advocates distributed proportionally across the 9 provinces and divided into 12 work-streams to conduct advocacy work on social cohesion and nation building.

4.5.3.2A number of education, sport, recreation, arts, cultural and heritage programmes have been implemented to combat substance abuse, gangsterism, violence against women and children, and other social ills, as well as to achieve social cohesion and nation building.

4.5.3.3The changing of offensive colonial and apartheid names was effected through the South African Geographical Names Act 118 of 1998. This has led to the changing of a number of names of major towns.

4.5.3.4The Department has spearheaded the standardization of school sport through the implementation of the Club Development Programme, which ensures that 50% of the budget is favoured towards rural sport development. DSAC has introduced projects that deal with the placing of arts practitioners in schools and has used the national sporting school championships as outlets that steers youth away from substance abuse, gangsterism and committing violence against women. The standard school choirs' competition has also assisted.

4.5.3.5The Department implements Artists in Schools Programme in over 300 schools to enhance arts education and raise awareness of career opportunities in the creative industries.

4.5.3.6The Department has worked with the Department of Basic Education to fast track the promotion and

implementation of indigenous language programs through the Incremental Introduction of African Languages in Schools (IIAF), which mostly targets former Model C schools that historically may not have had African languages as part of the curriculum offering.

4.5.3.7The Department has been working with the Department of Justice, Constitutional Development and Correctional Services to introduce the Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill (Bill No.9 0f 2018) to Parliament.

4.5.3.8DSAC has promoted the values of non-racialism and non-sexism through the promotion of arts, culture, sports and interfaith activities. This has been enabled by the financial support DSAC provided to 27 of its entities.

4.5.3.9The Resistance and Liberation Movement Museum (RLMM) is part of the DSAC's investment in museums, archives, heritage and cultural projects. Other projects include the Tshwane Resistance and Liberation Heritage Route, the OR Tambo Garden of Remembrance, Sarah Bartmann Centre of Remembrance, Winnie Mandela's Home in Brandfort, etc. These projects have been introduced to salute men and women who have earned their titles as veterans of wars of liberation.

4.5.3.10The national days programme is a standard feature of the Government's commemorative programme and have been celebrated annually through the DSAC as the lead Department and assisted by the Presidency and the GCIS.

4.5.3.11 Although greatly affected by Covid-19, sports in South Africa has played a unifying role in creating what is called "the rainbow nation". It is mostly through sports that the sense of nationhood is manifested. Arts and culture has not only seen the increasing role of Africans, but continues to unearth excellent talent as depicted by the many achievements made at various awards events. This sub-sector has also assisted in making people work together across the racial divide. DSAC continues to drive social cohesion programmes through social dialogue and social compacts amongst others. Collaboration with civil society organizations has ensured that the latter remains active participant on governance matters. Continuous collaboration contributes to peace and fosters nationhood in the country.

4.5.3.12 The Department also drives social cohesion in Africa through the Africa Month Programme, which is used to gather Africans from South Africa, Africa and the diaspora.

4.5.3.13As a sector the sports, arts and culture portfolio contributes significantly to the country's GDP. In terms of 2020 statistics, the sector contributed R248 billion to the GDP constituting 5.6%.

4.6 Department of Women, Youth and People with Disabilities (DWYPD)

4.6.1 Women, youth and people with disability still face high levels of unequal treatment as well as discrimination. Gender-based violence and femicide against women and children continues unabated and became worse during Covid-19 lockdown. Implementation of women empowerment programmes happens at a snail's pace.

4.6.2 <u>Campaigns on Combating Violence against Women and Children</u>

4.6.2.1The Department of Women, Youth and People with Disability (DWYPD) has initiated programmes and campaigns to combat violence against women and children. These include:

- Adoption of the National Strategic Plan on Gender-based Violence and Femicide (GBVF).
- GBVF Private Sector Fund 1 was launched on 4 February 2021, with a

commitment of R118 Million to be used to support various initiatives by government and civil society

- Extending the 16 Days Campaign on No Violence against Women and Children to 365 Days Campaign
- Collaboration with the Department of Justice on the development of the Hate Crimes Bill and other bills such as Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters Amendment Bill, Domestic Violence Amendment Bill and the Criminal and Related Matters Bill), which seek to tighten bail and sentencing laws in GBVF related cases.
- The safety in School Transport policy seeks to protect girl learners
- Combating the abuse of religion for sexual predation by some religious leaders
- The DWYPD is monitoring the implementation of the NSP GVBF, which has indicators for improving availability, function and decentralization of victim empowerment centres across the country.
- DWYPD has been leading engagements with various stakeholders in civil society, sports, cultural, religious and traditional leadership, private sector, provinces and local government around issues affecting women, in particular, women's empowerment, GBVF, women's rights and issues of patriarchy. These engagements seeks to ensure the eradication of all forms of racism, crude and subtle, including tribalism, xenophobia and gender stereotyped socialization of boys and girls.

4.6.3 Gender Equality

4.6.3.1The Department has seen progress in women representation in key levers of power. The campaign for 50/50 representation of women has seen some steady progress. In 2019, the sixth Administration Cabinet attained 50% women ministers and 50% male ministers. National Parliament attained 46.1% women holding seats in the national assembly. Since 1994, Parliament has been appointing mainly women as National Speakers. Women have also been nominated into heading various committees in Parliament.

4.6.3.2At the public service level, women have significantly grown in numbers as both judges and magistrates in the judiciary and in 2019, there were 38.5% women judges on the bench, starting from just one women judge (white) in 1994.

4.6.3.3In Government, women have increased in senior management positions and in 2019, there were 41% women at these positions. Unfortunately, this growth has been 1 percentage point annually, which means that at this pace, gender parity at the SMS level in Government will only be attained in 2027. Furthermore, between 2012 and 2018/19 there were about 10 women Directors-General. In 2020, there was only one women DG. This is a cause for serious concern.

4.6.3.4In the private sector, the challenge of women representation is the greatest. While year on year there is an increasing number of women as CEOs and Chairs of Boards, this growth is only at approximately 5% women CEOs, about 17% women on Boards and women make up only 22% of senior managers in the corporate sector.

4.6.4 Women Empowerment Programmes

4.6.4.1DWYPD has been spearheading women empowerment programmes and these include amongst others:

- Collaboration with the private sector through Women Owned Business Empowerment Programme.

- Partnership with DARRD to expand access to and ownership of land by women.
- DWYPD has been working on broadening economic participation in the sanitary dignity value chain of manufacturing, storage, distribution and waste disposal, to include the empowerment of women, youth and persons with disabilities.
- DWYPD developed the Concept Document for Women's Financial and Economic Inclusion Strategy.
- The Department has embarked on research on women as beneficiaries of Government Incentive Schemes especially those in DTIC; Women and the Green Economy with UNIDO and DTIC
- DWYPD holds sectoral engagements (Izindaba) e.g. with women in business; the LGBTIQA+ sector; the Violence Against Women sector; rural women/women farmers; gender non-conforming persons, women in rural areas and informal settlements, women in informal economy, media, universities and women in traditional and religious leadership among others. This is focused on empowerment of women within these sectors.

4.6.5 Sanitary Dignity to Women and Girls

4.6.5.1With regard to the provision of sanitary towels to women and girls, DWYPD has ensured the adoption of the Sanitary Dignity Implementation Framework by Cabinet in October 2020. Minister of Finance announced the zero-rated vat on sanitary towels effective April 2019.

4.6.5.2Free sanitary towels have been distributed to indigent girls in quintile 1-3 schools. A sum of R157 million was also allocated in the 2019/20 budget to all nine provinces and the DWYPD is coordinating the process in collaboration with provinces.

4.6.6 Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination

4.6.6.1In order to promote equality and prevent unfair discrimination, the DWYPD has developed the framework on Gender Responsive Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Auditing (GRPBMEA) that promotes institutionalization of gender responsive planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation across government. The framework is being implemented government-wide and DWYPD has been supporting departments towards building capacity to mainstream its implementation.

4.6.6.2On the decriminalization of sex work, the Department has been engaging with SWEAT, the NGO advocating for the rights of sex workers in 2018/19. The Department has also been engaging with Embrace Dignity, an NGO also promoting the rights of sex workers. There is need for further discourse at a national level in this regard.

4.6.6.3DWYPD made detailed inputs into the Regulations on advertising using women and children developed by the Advertising Standards Authority of SA.

4.6.7 Building of Monuments in Remembrance of Women Struggle Heroines

4.6.7.1On the need to ensure that there is continuous building of national monuments to commemorate and remember our rich history and heritage, DWYPD spearheaded the launching of statues of the women leaders of the National Women's March of 1956 in Tshwane.

4.6.7.2This museum is intended to be a remembrance of the rich history and legacy of the struggles for women's emancipation, equality and rights.

4.6.8 Promotion of Youth

4.6.8.1The DWYPD and the National Youth Development Agency (NYDA) are stepping up efforts by developing a

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Framework as well as an Integrated Youth Development Strategy (IYDS) to track the implementation of the approved NYP2030.

4.6.8.2On professionalizing youth work, DWYPD has developed a draft framework for National Youth Machinery. The framework seeks to clarify roles and responsibilities, provide for professionalization of youth workers and promote standardization in service delivery.

5. NEW POLICY PROPOSALS

5.1 Department of Social Development

5.1.1 The Department of Social Development is making proposals to expand the current relief measures introduced during Covid-19 to cushion people who have no means of survival to create a permanent support mechanism for these individuals.

5.1.2 The Covid-19 pandemic has amplified the importance of comprehensive social security as a measure to address poverty, particularly in the context of long-term structural unemployment and inequality, which have plagued the country even before the advent of the pandemic. Since there are social grants in place for children, the elderly and persons with disabilities, the focus must be on the 18-59 age group who are unable to support themselves.

5.1.3 Access to basic income grant will help level the vulnerability of these individuals and cushion them against poverty and hunger.

5.2 Department of Human Settlements

5.2.1 The Department of Human Settlements is making the following policy and programme proposals:

Consolidation of Policy focused on	
(a) Improved targeted provision of housing	(i) Focused empowerment programme for designated groups
(b) Upscaling of Zenzeleni principles in housing development	(j) Programme innovative technology in development
(c) Focus On development and release of land and services	(k) Housing Voucher Programme
(d) Upgrading of informal settlements	(l) Spatial integration and consolidation
(e) Upscaling provision of affordable housing including employer assistance	(m) Human settlements observatory
(f) Upscaling provision of affordable rental to ensure integration and densification	(n) Digitisation of household waiting list and allocation management
(g) Fiscal and financing of bulk, link and socio-economic amenities	(o) Programme to eradicate inadequate and unsafe housing including removal of asbestos and mud houses
(h) Review of concurrency roles and responsibilities	(p) Programme to ensure all blocked and unfinished projects are completed and allocated to the people

5.2.2 Details on these proposed policy changes are contained in the main Report.

6. QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

6.1 Despite the ANC Government's rapid human settlements development programme, we have not been able to arrest the housing backlog and urbanization. Uncontrolled migration into and within villages, towns and cities is making it difficult to meet the obligation to adequately house our people –

a) What policy options should be considered and prioritised to address these challenges and ensure the implementation of our human settlements programme?

b) What are the proposals and policies to be considered to ensure national, provincial and municipal alignment, implementation and enforcement of national development priorities?

c) What measures should be considered to ensure required land is acquired and developed?

d) Should a national human settlements master plan be developed and adopted to ensure long-term human settlements planning, responds to environmental and climate change concerns while undoing the remnants of apartheid spatial planning?

e) What measures should be adopted to ensure that all of society assumes and takes responsibility for the provision and development of housing in the country and not only government and state?

f) What measures should be adopted to ensure national housing and human settlements priorities are funded and implemented at provincial and municipal spheres?

6.2 Some of our water resources are plagued by pollution while distribution of water to some communities is hamstrung by corruption at local government level. The vandalism of water infrastructure further poses a challenge in the reliability of water to several communities. The use of the tankering system, which is supposed to be an emergency intervention, becomes the fodder for corrupt practices in some municipalities. Are there policy gaps that need to be looked at to ensure that our people have access to clean and reliable drinking water and that there is no corruption in the provision of this basic resource?

6.3 Recent evidence depicts the fact that poor economic performance and increasing unemployment, especially for the young people are intrinsically associated with high incidents of poverty and inequality. Unemployment remains stubbornly high and unlikely to reduce to adequate levels in the short term. In the context of poor economic performance that struggles to create jobs, to what extent can the Basic Income Grant can contribute in smoothing consumption and thereby protecting the poor from falling deeper into poverty and inequality level. That is, is the basic income grant a solution to help address high levels of unemployment and poverty?

6.4 Gender-based violence and femicide has been declared as a pandemic in our country. Various response measures have been initiated including government programmes and civil society engagements. What measures can be strengthened or put in place to combat gender-based violence and femicide? What else is there that can be explored to ensure our women and children are and feel safe in our country?

6.5 The eradication of racism is enshrined in our Constitution. Policy, legislative and programmatic measures have been taken to address it. However, instances of racism continue to flare in the

country and undermine our project of nation building and social cohesion. Are there gaps that need plucking in addressing this matter?

6.6 Sport in South Africa has become the defining characteristic of our nation building. Apart from this, there is absence of visibility of races other than Africans in major national events. Is there anything else that could be done to make every South African feel proud to be South African, to be patriotic, to love the country, its history and the diversity of its cultures and traditions?

7

Peace and Stability

GLOBAL SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

The beginning of 2022 saw the continuation of COVID-19 and its negative impact on the economy and society, posing a critical threat to the world. Vaccine inequity coupled with uneven economic recovery and the outbreak of hostilities between Russian and Ukraine present more challenges to the world order and the geopolitical outlook. It is the poor and the downtrodden, especially from Africa, who continue to be most affected by the ongoing situation.

The implications of Covid-19 Pandemic will be felt beyond 2022 characterised by economic decline in most developing countries. However, given China's upward growth trajectory, it is expected that the PRC will not be as impacted. Other advanced economies like the United State of America, are also expected to continue growing, albeit not as fast as China. This situation will further widen the global income gap and exacerbate inequalities.

The Russia – Ukraine conflict and the US-led response typified by harsh sanctions against Russia further put a strain on the global supply chains, supply chains, especially the energy, food sectors and aspects of the tech industry like the critical shortage of microchips. This will further add to the already constrained global economic environment and delay the much needed recovery.

Other challenges that continue to face the globe include amongst other climate change, cybersecurity, global inequality as well as migration.

In this regard, an assessment of the global balance of forces and shifting power dynamics remains a critical pillar of any discussion pertaining to Strategy and Tactics. For it is through a deeper understanding of the global power configuration that the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) could be pursued in a more pragmatic manner. The reality is that the African National Congress (ANC) remains the only viable vehicle with which meaningful economic transformation and development of the South African society can be driven. Moreover, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the continent in general, require leadership that is grounded on a principle of mutual respect and responsibility for a multi-polar world rather than one dominated by a single hegemon as is the case currently.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE PANDEMIC

The advent of Covid-19 Pandemic forced countries to be innovative and resilient. It also exposed fault lines in the global approach of common challenges. While the Pandemic was a global phenomenon, Africa was not prioritised in the fight against the Pandemic. It is equally pivotal to note that the Pandemic exposed the global configuration that still maintains the ***Us vs Them*** analogy. Thus an opportunity for united action by Africans emerged. The leadership of South Africa in championing the matter of vaccine intellectual property within the context of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the subsequent

manufacturing of vaccines on our shores (thanks to Aspen) signalled the political clout of the country and its ability to take leadership on strategic matters of importance to the continent.

It could be observed that the Pandemic also brought opportunities for profit and diplomatic utilisation of soft power. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has emerged to be the beneficiary of the vaccine diplomacy owing to its external financing strategy. For instance, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey are among the top buyers of Chinese COVID-19 vaccines, and in 2020 net debt payments to China reportedly rose by 62%. It is expected that developing countries may increasingly look to China for financial, technological and scientific support to survive in the post-pandemic economy.

However, as previously observed, the Pandemic also challenged the innovative prowess of the global community. It hastened the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR), particularly in the vaccine development. This is a positive step in the human development sphere, as it provides opportunities to learn and understand as well as fight new viruses at an unprecedented speed.

GEOPOLITICAL TENSIONS

The current conflict between Russia and Ukraine has brought to the fore a central matter relating to *global security*. After the end of the Cold War, the US incorporated into its National Security Strategy what came to be called *the Wolfowitz Doctrine*. This Doctrine was originally proposed in a document written by Dr Paul Wolfowitz, who served as Under Secretary of Defence under President H.W. Bush.

The central policy proposal of the Wolfowitz Doctrine was stated in the following words:

> *"Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defence strategy and requires that we endeavour to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia.*
>
> *There are three additional aspects to this objective: First, the U.S must show the necessary leadership to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defence areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role."*

Though efforts were made to '*tone down*' this language, to make it sound more benign, its essence was incorporated into a regular US National Security Strategy. Because it remained a nuclear weapons superpower even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation became a focus of the Wolfowitz Doctrine. Thus, action was taken to ensure that it does not '*re-emerge as a new rival to the US.*'

The strategy adopted to achieve this objective was to:

- maintain NATO after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact;
- expand it by admitting into its ranks the erstwhile Warsaw Pact Member States as well as the former Republics of the USSR;
- Ensure that if possible it must include even countries immediately bordering Russia; and,

- thus intimidate the Russian Federation so that it understands that it cannot compete with the US as a rival power.

Of course, the Russian Federation responded to all this. It demanded that:

- NATO should stop its eastwards expansion;
- it should abandon all attempts to place itself on the very borders of Russia;
- there should be negotiated a new European Security Agreement to address the security concerns of all European countries, including Russia;
- all aspirations by anybody to maintain a unipolar world order should be abandoned and all countries must accept the reality of a multipolar international order; and,
- there must be entrenched a multilateral system of global governance based on such international law as the UN Charter and rejection of unilateralism.

It is equally important to remember that the Western countries, including those in NATO, rejected the demands of the Russian Federation and insisted that:

- it was the right of all countries, including the closest neighbours of Russia such as Ukraine and Georgia, to decide on how they wished to address their security concerns;
- it was therefore their right to apply to join NATO;
- the doors of NATO were open to admit any country which voluntarily sought to join the Organisation;

Clearly, Russia took this as an immediate threat that NATO would take steps to admit Ukraine into its ranks and thus bring the NATO forces to its borders. This would be a tipping point which would demonstrate, permanently, whether Russia accepted or not, the unilateral decision of the US that it should have no global competitors. Moreover, this development would also be a decisive moment at which the matter would be decided for all humanity, whether the global order is defined by uni-polarity or multi-polarity.

It was all the preceding with led to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, with the Russian Federation invading Ukraine to ensure that Ukraine would never serve as a NATO base directly threatening the Federation. Indeed, it could have been avoided if the US, supported by the European allies, had not sought to oblige Russia to accept the strictures of the Wolfowitz Doctrine, with the consequent creeping three-decade advance of NATO towards the Russian border.

The most fundamental considerations bearing on the current Russia/Ukraine conflict are that:

- the Russian Federation is fighting to ensure that it does not fall victim to US diktat; and,
- the US is engaged in a proxy war to ensure that Russia does not '*re-emerge as a new rival to the US*.'
- It is not easy to tell how the conflict will be resolved.

Lastly, it is very important to note that the '*pivot to the East'* targeting China, implemented by the US during the Obama Administration; and, the aggressive posture towards China adopted by the Trump Administration and sustained by the Biden Administration were both informed by the same determination to ensure that China does not '*emerge as a new rival to the US*.'

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

The global economic outlook remains bleak. Rising commodity prices, inflation, debt, Covid-19 Pandemic and the Ukraine – Russia clash are some of the major contributors to the weak economic global outlook. Analysts have observed that the economic fallout from the Pandemic is compounding with labour market imbalances, protectionism, and widening digital, education and skills gaps that risk splitting the world into divergent trajectories.

Conversely, in some countries, rapid vaccine rollout, successful digital transformations and new growth opportunities signify a return to pre-pandemic trends. Whereas in other countries the challenge of low rates of vaccination and distressed health systems contribute to slow recovery.

Divergences will complicate the international collaboration that is urgently required in order to address common challenges such as the impacts of climate change, migration and cybersecurity. Indeed, the ongoing short-term domestic pressures prove to be a stumbling block for governments' ability to focus on long-term priorities. According to the World Economic Forum, the challenge of social cohesion is a top short-term threat in 31 countries, including Argentina, France, Germany, Mexico and South Africa. In this respect it is projected that about 51 million more people will live in extreme poverty compared to the pre-pandemic trend. This situation presents a risk of increasing polarisation and resentment within societies.

CLIMATE CHANGE

Governments, businesses and societies are facing increasing pressure to thwart the worst consequences of climate change. The disunity of the global players in addressing the climate change challenges is concerning. The greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions continue to grow at a faster pace. Countries continue to rely on carbon-intensive sectors. However, the persistent dilemma is that shifting away from carbon-intense industries will trigger economic volatility, deepen unemployment and increase societal and geopolitical tensions. Adopting hasty environmental policies will also have unintended consequences for nature, especially in due consideration of the fact that there are unknown risks from deploying untested biotechnical and geoengineering technologies. Therefore, a transition that ignores societal implications will exacerbate inequalities within and between countries and also heighten geopolitical tensions.

CYBERSECURITY

The ongoing rapid digitalisation and the introduction of remote working are accompanied by unprecedented risks. Such risks are cybersecurity threats. For instance, malware and ransomware attacks have increased globally and thereby outpacing societies' ability to effectively respond. Attacks on large and strategic systems and or installations will carry cascading physical consequences across societies. The threats of disinformation as well fraud present societal vulnerabilities and diminish trust levels.

Cyber threats are already contributing to poor cooperation and mutual trust among states. This was evident between the US and Russia as well as the US and China.

MIGRATION

Persistent economic hardships, conflicts, impacts of climate change as well as political instability continue to force millions to leave their homes in search of a better future abroad. This involuntary migration is not only a contributor to displacement but a threat to social cohesion as well. Other implications include unemployment.

Humanitarian crises are projected to worsen as vulnerable groups embark on perilous journeys in search of a better life. Migration pressures will also exacerbate international tensions. Destination country governments are faced with the challenge of managing diplomatic relationships and immigrant scepticism and intolerances among their populations.

CONTINENTAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY

The Regional and Continental leadership void that was left by South Africa during the fourth and fifth Administrations has severely reversed the strides of development and unity. The infiltration of the AU by non-African states through their proxies has led to a change and also slowed the pace of continental development. The resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government and various insecurities such as terrorism,

inter and intrastate conflicts as well as various transnational organised crimes, amongst others, all point to a deteriorating situation in the continent.

So far the Continent has failed successfully to address the two goals of:

- silencing the guns; and,
- preventing the guns from opening fire.

Conflicts are going on in: the Sahel, Nigeria, Somalia and Moçambique involving jihadists; Libya, Chad, CAR, the DRC, Sudan and Ethiopia rooted in the challenge to manage diversity; and, SADR, because Morocco's refused to accept the right of the people of Western Sahara to independence.

Recently military coups have taken place ,especially in West Africa with the subversion of the democratic system increasing the possibility that people will take top arms to achieve their objectives. A document published by the AU Peace and Security Department says: "*The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) embraces a comprehensive agenda for peace and security in Africa that includes:*

- *early warning and conflict prevention;*
- *peace-making, peace support operations, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction and development;*
- *promotion of democratic practices, good governance and respect for human rights; and*
- *humanitarian action and disaster management.*"

All these APSA areas are governed by various Charters, Protocols and other documents accepted and ratified by the OAU and the AU and are binding on all AU Member States. These include the Constitutive Act, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, the Decision on the Establishment of an African Union Centre for Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (AUCPCRD), the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, etc.

However, the implementation of critical APSA documents remains very slow and in other areas non-existent.

Over the past two decades, most of the countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have been relatively peaceful and stable. A vast range of often interconnected issues can be identified as causes of insecurity or factors that contribute to insecurity in the region

Despite this, the situation in Mozambique, which is characterised by insurgency, has not only proved the southwards expansion of the threat but the regional division in the resolution of crisis within the region. The fact that a country from East or Central Africa has also decided to intervene in regional matters indicates a clear failure of a once powerful concept of *African standby force*, which we actively advocated when we still commanded the regional and continental influence.

The region and the continent will continue to grapple with the Covid-19 Pandemic and climate change problems triggering suffering to the inhabitants. Food security and water security are some of the challenges that already beset the region and the continent at large. It is therefore bestowed upon the drivers of the NDR to be cognisant of the daunting fact that Europe and the US are not prepared to help Africa unless their interests are at stake. Therefore, if South Africa wants to survive, it should lead the region and the continent's development to ensure mutual coexistence.

POVERTY, INEQUALITY, AND MARGINALIZATION-HUMAN SECURITY ISSUES

Overwhelming poverty, marginalization, and inequality within and between states, exacerbated in many cases by globalization, remain the bedrock of human

insecurity in southern Africa, as well as elsewhere in Africa.

Most states in the region are characterized by massive and often increasing poverty and inequality. Most are indebted and dependent on aid, trade, and investment flows from developed countries, resulting in a lack of horizontal integration, debt traps, and dependence.

While rates of economic growth have increased in many countries in recent years, this has been accompanied by deepening inequality.

Human Development Indexes (HDI) also tend to lag behind GDP indicators, reflecting that even where wealth exists, such as in South Africa, it has not been translated into human development. It is estimated that about 70 percent of the region's population lives on less than $2 per day and 40 percent lives on less than $1 per day.

Unemployment in most African countries is exceptionally high, even in the most developing economies such as South Africa (where it is over 34 percent according to government statistics), and most economies are dominated by the informal sector and by subsistence agriculture. This situation, compounded by low levels of education and literacy, makes for limited life chances.

Human development challenges have been exacerbated by the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which is worse in southern Africa than anywhere else. This situation of the burden of diseases has been exacerbated by the severe acute syndrome coronavirus type II (COVID-19).

The COVID-19 pandemic has placed additional pressures/ strain on states to meet the human security needs of citizens, particularly on their ability to deliver and meet the expectations of their citizens

GOVERNANCE ISSUES

Apart from poverty and underdevelopment, weaknesses and failures of governance probably constitute the single most important threat to the security of both citizens and states.

The vast majority of African states have embarked on democratic transitions, but these efforts have not necessarily culminated in consolidated democracies, or for that matter improvements in human security, at least when it comes to "freedom from want.

Some countries have been dominated by one party. In some instances party governance and authoritarianism run deep; old patterns of behaviour, where the party is supreme (above the constitution and the interest of citizens) are profoundly entrenched.

Former liberation movements because of their historic positions provide a nation-building binding effect, however, there is a danger of nepotism and corruption especially where checks and balances are weak. In some areas Executive and, particularly, parliamentary oversight often remains weak in practice and corruption, nepotism and informality remain rife.

The security sector and the actual practice of security sector governance often remain opaque and personalized. Related to this, there is in many countries a lack of military and security professionalism, with soldiers and other security personnel are allegedly violating human rights; carrying out abuses in support of particular political causes or self-interest; and extracting resources for their own selfish ends or self-enrichment.

CRIME, TERROR, RESOURCE SCARCITY

Environmental issues on their own constitute security challenges, they can certainly create security problems. Water has become a particular source of conflict in the many parts of the world. The current conflict on Nile River between neighbours like Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan requires a speedy resolution before any security escalations. The SADC region has demonstrated the importance of cooperation on shared rivers rather than competition and conflict.

Land is also a major source of conflict. In Southern Africa, much of the conflict revolves around efforts by postliberation governments to restore land taken by settler colonialists to the indigenous population and to redistribute land in the interests of agrarian reform. These conflicts have been particularly acute in Zimbabwe, but may also arise in South Africa and Namibia. The current process of addressing the historical injustice on the question of land is paramount.

Climate change is likely to exacerbate environmental threats to security considerably; there is strong evidence that floods and droughts over large parts of southern Africa are likely to intensify as global warming impacts the region. This will put considerable pressure on communities and governments.

Food security is a particularly tough challenge. Production of cereals in the region has stagnated over the years, while the population of the region has increased exponentially, putting huge pressure on food supplies. The number of undernourished people is increasing; per capita energy and protein intake are well below recommended levels; and imports of food and food aid have doubled over the last fifteen years.

Migration and urbanisation are on the rise in the region. This has resulted in a huge underclass of mostly unemployed urban or semi-urban residents, many of whom are youth.

The issue of triple oppression on basis of gender continues and ethnicity remain larger fault lines, however. The marginalization and oppression of women is certainly a major factor in human insecurity, including domestic violence, sexual exploitation, and exploitation of women in the work and home environments.

Transnational crime is on an increase. Local and international criminals have exploited the concomitant removal of social controls and the increase in cross-border movements. Migration and social change have also contributed to the proliferation of international criminal syndicates. Crime is now perceived as an immediate and pervasive security threat throughout the region and manifests itself in a wide range of activities including smuggling; car hijacking and theft; armed robbery; narcotics counterfeiting; human trafficking; and so on. Much of this is carried out by criminal syndicates that operate across borders and in many cases with international links,

Border issues also affect security. Many southern African countries have borders that are artificial and porous. In most cases the borders, which were drawn by the colonial powers, cut across ethnolinguistic identities. Most borders are not effectively monitored and controlled.

Some countries in the region possess boundaries that include coast or oceans and face a range of maritime security issues. These include smuggling, illegal exploitation of fishing stocks, and environmental degradation, including global warming, which could affect sea levels.

The fight against Terrorism and Violent extremism has been relatively low on the list of threats of most southern African countries, the developments in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province of insurgents linked to some terror organisation have suddenly increased the risk profile of the region. This situation has also encouraged some countries in the African continent to expand their geostrategic influence (Rwanda is a case in point).

The US response, particularly her posture on the war on terror, has created different challenges that have placed southern African states under enormous pressure leading to the diversion of scarce resources to this campaign. This approach is often accompanied by measures to combat money-laundering and other international threats, which in some cases have provoked domestic political opposition.

While the SADC region continues to experience isolated armed conflicts, and while lack of development poses a major long-term risk to regional stability, governance deficits are currently the most acute source of instability.

Although SADC has gradually established a peace and security infrastructure in line with the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), its institutions lack both material and political support, with member states reluctant to cede authority to supranational structures and to enforce SADC principles. In the long run the development of the Southern African region will be hindered, especially due to the emerging international encroachment

DOMESTIC SECURITY

PEACE AND STABILITY ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT

Our point of departure is that South Africa is relatively stable compared to many countries in the continent and globally. Despite our relative stability the security assessment identifies socio-economic issues as key threats to national security and national interest. In the main, the triple challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality remain entrenched despite the advances we have recorded over the last twenty seven years.

The situation is exacerbated by economic decline over the last few years and governance failure. The depth of governance could not be accurately measured in rand terms. Many institutions were deliberately weakened to nearly complete collapse, lost revenue through endemic corruption and malfeasance, service delivery failures resulting in a deficit of trust in government and policy uncertainty. The governing party has been weakened by divisions, factionalism and a lack of decisive leadership in advancing the National Democratic Revolution in pursuit of the noble objectives towards a truly united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous society.

The attempted insurrection affirms the extent to which South Africa suffers from debilitating political, social and economic pathologies. With high unemployment, inequality, poverty, xenophobia and racism, the country will face internal security problems for years to come.

The declining regional stability due to the insurgency in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province and events in eSwatini, and it's clear that South Africa's security system must urgently be repurposed for the tasks at hand.

Despite all these challenges our constitutional democracy remains, founded on the resilience and will of the citizens.

The future of South Africa is not merely a function of the governing party: the country also has a substantial and diversified private sector, a robust and independent media, strong institutions, including its judicial system, which is premised upon an active civil society, and an organised labour sector. Governing is not easy, and the choices that the government has to make involve complex trade- offs that inevitably leave many citizens feeling dissatisfied and even angry

Rising levels of crime have negatively affected the tourism, transport, retail and financial services sectors significantly in recent years and are likely to increase in the near term due to underlying socioeconomic factors paired with the deliberately weakened efficiency of the South African security sector.

Against the backdrop of low economic growth, start-stop lockdown conditions, political polarisation and wide structural inequality, security risks from political violence are likely to become more acute.

CYBER SECURITY AND ATTACKS ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

The country is no stranger to cyberattacks, and after Transnet, state utilities such as Eskom, as well as mining and manufacturing companies, are the next possible targets.

The disruption primarily affected operations in several container terminals, interrupting cargo movement.

Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of cyber-attacks has been increasing worldwide and in South Africa, inflicting financial losses across the manufacturing, banking and energy sectors. South Africa's critical infrastructure has been targeted before, with minor impact. The recent incident demonstrated for the first time the where operational integrity of the country's critical maritime infrastructure suffered a severe disruption.

Attacks on critical infrastructure, including maritime ports, are likely to increase in severity and quantity. The economic toll for African states will inevitably be high, which means that measures to boost cyber security and protect infrastructure are vital. Implementation also requires the enhanced coordination and a seamless approach by government, SOCs, private stakeholders and cyber experts to work together. South Africa's future National Maritime Security Strategy also needs to cover cyber security.

Ports are attractive targets that are vulnerable to cyber-attacks. We urgently need to improve our ports cyberinfrastructure security, economic disruptions of this sort may become the new normal.

Exporters and importers in the meantime were left counting the cost of unmoved goods, as the delays at the ports stranded thousands of cargo containers.

The cumulative impact of the attack will surely cause long-lasting damage to the economy, further undermining South Africa's economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet the actual severity of the incident is hard to estimate, leaving experts to speculate about its nature, scope and consequences.

Vandalism and theft in critical infrastructure areas of water, rail and electricity is on an increase causing a lot of disruptions in many communities and the economy.

These attacks have huge financial implications for both government, business and individuals. Costs are incurred for private security and insurance in order to protect assets and employees. We also remain vulnerable to sophisticated security risks stemming from financial crime, cybercrime and organised criminal activities. Additional risks include the fintech sector and cybersecurity environment due to the rapid rise in remote working and e-commerce as well as the country's large shadow economy.

VIOLENCE AND UNREST

The July 2021 violent unrest occurred in a period of increased socio-economic hardships brought on by the Covid-19 pandemic. These conditions were exacerbated and exploited by the subsequent imprisonment of former president Jacob Zuma. Calm was restored following the deployment of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in support the South African Police Services.

Though the initial response of the security services was inadequate to respond promptly, the SANDF has proved capable of deterring protests and quelling the unrest. Police were successful to contain isolated incidents of unrest in other areas besides the two provinces that was the epicentre.

Although a resurgence of unrest is unlikely, several factors could trigger renewed outbreaks. The outcome of President Zuma's rescinding application should be properly pre-empted through the application of precautionary measures to ensure no further exploitation by opportunist elements in inciting unrest.

The potential for an escalation in racial tensions and associated violence has been contained. The Phoenix clashes lead to a rise in racial tensions. The clashes led to condemnation and some calls for retaliation on social media, often mobilised around the hashtags #PhoenixMassacre and #IndiansMustFall. Acting swiftly to bring to book alleged perpetrators of the militia through our justice system has gone a long

way to stabilise the situation. The ongoing racial incidents in the USA and domestically have prompted the mobilisation against racism across the globe through the #BlackLivesMatter movement. We have to continue to pursue our ideals of building a truly united and non-racial society united in our diversity.

Precautionary measures are necessary to limit the security risk posed by certain elements within the white community who had started to form security militias in response to the unrest.

A high-profile incident or the spread of misinformation on social media could prompt further unrest. Violent protests continue to poses security due to service delivery failures, corruption and high citizens expectations. Areas of interest include local government, transport and higher education sectors.

FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

The call to take action against corruption has seen many positive developments in the form of the State Capture Commission, investigations by the Hawks and the SIU and prosecutions.

In 2020, the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International ranked our country at 69 out of 180 countries, with a slight improvement from 2019.

There is a need to retain momentum and strengthen anti-corruption measures.

Corruption remains a worldwide phenomenon and there are many lessons to be learnt on the successes and failures in tackling corruption. A critical element is the strength of institutions in the criminal justice system.

The ANC must ensure that whoever dares to try their hand at corruption and crime must pay. The ANC is like a fully grown tree, if the worms are eating the tree and are not treated, it will eventually wither away. This results in a trust deficit with the electorate because of our perceived inability to deal decisively and cure the cancer that has eroded our moral and ethical leadership role.

Our tough stance on corruption as resolved by a number of our conferences will never soften but has affirmed our grasp. No exception is made for any organisation or individual. We have to unequivocal in proclamation and deeds with zero tolerance. Our efforts should be intertwined with focus on political degeneration and corruption. Those officials involved in illegal activities and those in leadership positions who have been strongly suspected of wrongdoing, who have been repeatedly reported by the public for malpractice, and who are holding important offices (step aside policy to. Implemented without fail).

The ANC should make in depth analyses of typical cases in violation of organisational and party discipline and the law. We need to create a deterrence on corruption and political education should include educating our members on anti-corruption.

Greater efforts to hunt down corrupt individuals even those who have fled and recover the money stolen including illicit financial flows.

Will promote international cooperation under multilateral frameworks and the UN convention against corruption.

Enforce organisational discipline across all levels. Many ANC members are good but some are still prone to misconduct and corruption, the number has risen and in scale of their influence.

We must correct and punish those accused of corruption and the abuse of the justice system within our structures, safeguard the National Democratic Revolution, the people's expectations and interests and deliver concrete results in our efforts against corruption.

CAPACITY OF THE STATE

The Peace and Stability subcommittee commends the steps taken by President C Ramaphosa to strengthen the capacity of

the state by introducing the following measures :

- Establishment of the National Security Council
- Integrating State Security department into the Presidency
- Smooth transition in the appointment of a new director general for State Security, Commissioner of Police and Directorate of Investigations

Furthermore we continue to see a better managed South African Revenue Service (SARS), which has resulted in a significant improvement in revenue collection.

NATIONAL SECURITY DOMESTIC PRIORITIES

Our National Security key considerations namely:

TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY:

Border security and migration-related threats

Cyber-insecurity and unregulated cyberspace

AUTHORITY OF THE STATE

Perpetual violent protest action

Threats arising from activities of foreign intelligence services

Illegal and undesirable activities of the private security industry

Extreme intolerance between South Africans and foreign nationals

ECONOMIC SECURITY

Illicit financial flows

Corruption

Illicit Economy

Energy and Water insecurity

Economic sabotage (vandalism of critical infrastructure and theft of stock like fuel including theft of ferrous metals and non ferrous metals)

Illicit mining

SAFETY & WELL BEING OF SOUTH AFRICANS

Pandemics

Food security

Narcotics and gangsterism

Religious related crimes

Domestic extremism/terrorism

Proliferation of illegal firearms and ammunition

Human security (i.e water insecurity, food insecurity)

Violent syndicated and organised crime

Human trafficking

Threats to strategic installations including national key points

Religious extremism

Espionage

TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED CRIME

A trend of transnational nature in crimes over the years perpetuated by foreign nationals with some South African citizens as accomplices. The impact cuts across priorities of government, rendering the country unsafe, unsuitable for investment, unstable, degenerated social and moral fabric, and the extreme scenario, threatening collapse of law and order.

The security challenges dominating transnational organised crime scenery are as follows:-

Illicit mining;

Contraband and narcotics;

Infrastructure crimes (including non-ferrous and ferrous metals)

Cash In transit (CIT);

Illegal firearms and explosives;

Carjacking and theft of motor vehicle;

Human trafficking and smuggling;

Wildlife poaching and stock theft

Religious related crimes (including cult-like church)

CAPACITY CHALLENGES

The ANC should acknowledge its failure to transform and build a resilient security service equal to the task to mitigate national security and national interests imperatives. The situation has been worsened by internal political strife that has contaminated and politicized the security services.

The efforts made by the President and government of urgent interventions over the last three years to repurpose a failing security system is a step in the right direction that enjoys the support of the majority of citizens. We have to acknowledge that a capable functioning and effective security services is the bedrock of any constitutional democracy. The trust deficit between government and citizens is stemming from our failures in this area of work.

We require a coherent approach to national security. The re-establishment National Security Council Chaired by President is the right approach to create the necessary leadership and coherence.

The tasks should address perennial challenges like lack of vision, political interference and state capture, bad management, poor coordination, weak policy and insufficient accountability such as through Parliament. The recommendations of the High Level Review Panel led by Dr.Sydney Mufamadi as well as the Expert Panel of Prof Sandy Afrika should be implemented to enhance the capability of the intelligence services.

The SANDF requires support and investment because it has been in a state of neglect.

The reconfiguration policy framework on institutional arrangements in fighting against corruption should be concluded for consideration by the National Policy Conference and adoption by the 55th National Conference. We have to build a resilient, coordinated and independent institutional capability that can hunt down the foxes and tigers in a mode of Anti-Corruption Commission of PRC or FBI of USA. Dedicated courts capability have to be enhanced for speedy prosecution and recovery of assets.

Review and strengthen all anti-corruption related legislation like : **Prevention of Organized Crime Act (POCA)**, **Special Investigating Unit and Special Tribunals Act** (SIU does not have powers to conduct preliminary investigations and reporting processes.); New or amending legislation pertaining to unexplained wealth: unexplained wealth relates to a civil process to investigate income as against assets, and call upon those with unexplained wealth to show proof of income; **Extradition Act and Mutual Legal Assistance Act**: amendments to bring about improvements eliminate court delays, and to improve processes for greater efficiency.

Transparency and accountability is a fundamental step towards showing commitment in dealing with corruption. For the first time information related to procurement by both national and provincial departments was published on the National Treasury website.

Successful addressing of threats requires deliberate investment to the security services so as to ensure strengthened capacity and enough resources, Human, technological, financial

RECOMMENDATIONS

There are several obvious things to do, such as removing political interference in senior appointments, further strengthening the prosecuting authority and focusing on competence rather than factional loyalty.

Professionalise the security services by Leaving the running of specialist agencies to professionals, such as military and police officers who have risen through the ranks of

the capabilities of Home Affairs, the South African Revenue Service's customs and excise divisions, South African Police Service (SAPS) and South African National Defence Force (SANDF) should be strengthened regarding their border management and related functions.

The state security and police departments should provide intelligence on domestic matters.

Detective services and crime intelligence should be prioritised to enable early warning, detection and prosecution of complex crimes such as those committed by the planners of the recent insurgency and burgeoning organised crime. The ability to respond to public protests with sufficient police trained and equipped for the task is also key.

Tight central control must be maintained over procurement, conditions of service, training, standards, and specialised services such as forensics. Better security coordination mechanisms are needed at provincial and metropolitan levels, including military, private security and intelligence agencies.

The National Defence Department should be repurposed for peace support operations in Africa, border protection and support to the police with a modest additional budgetary allocation. Soldiers should be trained and prepared for these functions. Functioning provincial commands should be re-established. They should mirror constitutional and provincial police structures and support these structures where needed.

ARMSCOR and DENEL should be tasked to develop appropriate systems for peacekeeping, counter-terrorism and border control, rather than for conventional defence capabilities.

All security departments should focus on consequence management – holding managers accountable for value for money and clean procurement. The confidentiality requirements of these departments reinforce the need for robust internal auditing, on top of the oversight provided by the auditor-general.

Roll out a national campaign to rebuild respect for the rule of law. Leaders from across the spectrum need to support this, including from the religious and private sectors.

Ensure accountability by a clear demonstration of justice that holds those who instigated and incited the recent violence accountable. The same applies to those accused of state capture following the revelations made by the State Capture Commission on Corruption.

Develop and implement a national security policy document – that sets out its security architecture, roles and functions.

STRATEGIC POLICY INTERVENTIONS

DOMESTICALLY

As already indicated above, there are various threats to peace and stability in South Africa, which include inter alia; ordinary crime; counter revolutionary violence and subversion; a deteriorating socio-economic situation in conditions of stark inequality; bad governance, including corruption; and increasing disrespect for the law and resultant lawlessness. In this regard the following policy proposals are made:

1. We must move on the premise that SAPS is a pivotal player in terms of fighting against ordinary crimes. It is therefore necessary to:

    1.1 strengthen the Crime Intelligence Division;

    1.2 ensure that the ANC branches work on the strength and effectiveness of the CPFs, including by helping to ensure both their regular interaction with the people in their areas as well as proper liaison with the local SAPS and Metro Police where the latter exist;

    1.2.1 the ANC branches and the CPFs should also engage the locally based NGOs and CBOs, including the

churches and the other faiths in each community to get actively involved in fighting crime;

1.2.2 the CPFs should report any Police misbehaviour to the responsible MEC, who must act on the matter and file a Report with the National Ministry;

1.3 the SAPS units must improve their relations with the communities in which they are deployed: to facilitate this the SAPS must be reoriented to understand that its task is helping to *ensure the safety and security of the people* and not merely *maintenance of law and order*; and,

1.4 as an important part of this *the SAPS ranks must be demilitarised* without further delay and returned to what they were before they were arbitrarily changed during the 2009 Administration.

2. It is important that the ANC must familiarise itself and the nation as a whole with the reality of a counter revolution which is historically opposed to the Democratic Revolution/Transformation.

2.1 the Movement should use practical examples to achieve this, such as the attempt to destroy SARS as exposed by the Nugent and Zondo Judicial Commissions of Inquiry and the July 2021 counter revolutionary criminal destabilisation;

2.2 in reconstructing the Intelligence Services every effort must be made to ensure that they focus on the task to combat and defeat the counter revolution; and similarly,

2.3 in the process of its renewal, the ANC should do all it can to cleanse itself of negative elements within its ranks.

3. The Government must take the steps announced by President Ramaphosa when and since he presented to the nation in October 2020 the South African Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan;

3.1 these steps should result in the outcomes solemnly promised by the President of the sustained reduction of the levels of poverty, unemployment and inequality; and,

3.2 the Government must lead the Social Partners urgently to produce the Social Compact which would produce the results indicated under paragraph 3.1. above.

4. As part of its renewal process, and to ensure the creation of a capable, ethical and development State, the ANC as a Governing Party must focus on:

4.1 the restoration of the capacity of the State institutions which have been severely weakened over the last 12 years or more;

4.2 ensuring that each of these institutions works driven by the principles of Batho Pele and public accountability;

4.3 ensuring that in the process of its own renewal it rids itself of people who disrespect what is said in paragraph 4.2. above;

4.4 ensuring that existing State institutions set up to fight corruption and ensure public accountability work efficiently and effectively; and,

4.4.1 adding new such institutions if necessary.

5. It is vitally important to increase and entrench respect for the law by:

5.1 ensuring that the SAPS pays particular attention to arresting and prosecuting those involved in organised crime;

5.1.1 the SAPS must ensure that its units act firmly and successfully against those criminals who attack the Police to obstruct them in their work;

5.2 arresting and prosecuting all others who break the law;

5.2.1 this must include what are currently being treated as minor misdemeanours;

5.2.2 it must also result in speeding up the process of prosecuting the offenders;

5.3 speedily taking disciplinary action against offenders in the public service, avoiding long periods of suspension with full pay;

5.4 taking necessary action against offenders identified by the Auditor General;

5.5 . speedily implementing disciplinary and other processes recommended/decided by Parliament, the Public Protector and other Chapter 9 institutions, Judicial Commissions of Inquiry and similar official inquiries;

5.6 finding ways and means of publicly naming and shaming offenders especially within the communities that are familiar with the person concerned; and,

5.7 regenerating and reinvigorating the Moral Regeneration Movement.

CONTINENTALLY

6. As part of its contribution to the task to achieve peace, security and stability in Africa, the ANC should indicate what its foreign policy positions are to this important matter. Accordingly, it should:

6.1 indicate what should be done to achieve the objectives of the African Peace and Security Architecture APSA)

6.1.1 suggestions should be made which would help ensure that the early warning system results in actual engagements by the AU to stop impending violent conflicts, which has so far never happened;

6.1.2 suggestions should be made about how peace support must not only 'silence the guns', but should include a political intervention to address the root causes of the violent conflict; and

6.1.3 suggestions should be made to ensure that the all the relevant structures of the AU, including the AU Commission, actually intervene effectively to bring about the required peace and security;

6.2 indicate what should be done effectively to implement important documents such as the Constitutive Act, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, the Decision on the Establishment of an African Union Centre for Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (AUCPCRD), the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, etc, and other related decisions: this relates directly to paragraph 6.1.3. above;

6.3 indicate what should be done to ensure that non-African actors do not intervene in Africa in ways which worsen or complicate the peace and security situation; and,

6.4 indicate what steps should be taken to ensure the timely intervention of Heads of State/Government (Assembly) and/or Foreign Ministers (Council), as may be necessary, to accelerate the process to achieve the required peace and security.

GLOBALLY

7. Necessarily the ANC must also decide on its foreign policy positions about the global security matters. Taking into account its historical positions in this regard, it seems clear that the ANC would:

7.1 *support a multipolar world order* against any suggestion that there should be a unipolar one in which

one country has the right and power to decide the future of all humanity;

7.2 *support a multilateral system* of negotiating and determining the global international relations, based on a system of universally agreed international law, such as the UN Charter;

7.3 *support the negotiation and conclusion of a Security Architecture* which guarantees all countries from attack by any other, except in instances authorised by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter;

7.3.1 attacks against any country could be justifiable on the basis that:

- the offending country is acting in a manner that threatens international peace and security; and.
- the offending country is threatening another in violation of the agreed Security Architecture;

7.4 *support any determination* that in the light of existence of the agreed Security Architecture all *military alliances such as NATO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation* if it were to transform itself into a military alliance, *should be dissolved and cease to exist permanently;*

7.5 *support the determination that the UN* is the body through which to conduct multilateral negotiations and continue to insist on the *restructuring of the UN Security Council* to make it more representative of the world community of nations; and,

7.6 *continue to call on Russia and Ukraine* urgently to enter into negotiations to end the current conflict and address all matters which are the root cause of the conflict.

8

Legislature and Governance

1. INTRODUCTION

The year 2022 is themed ***The year of unity and renewal to defend and advance South Africa's Democratic gains.*** In reflecting on this theme, this discussion document on Legislature & Governance reviews what our overall policy goals are and how we have continued to refine them. It also outlines what remains to be done to ensure the overall strategy and tactics of the ANC advance the goals of the National Democratic revolution.

The discussion document is divided into three broad areas. First we reflect on our policy goals through defining the problem statement within which our policy discussions should be framed. The second section then provides both a review of the degree to which our existing resolutions have been implemented and also suggests new areas in which resolutions need to be framed. Included in this section is a resolution to ensure that the ongoing monitoring of the implementation, or revision of, existing resolutions is institutionalized. This is necessary given that many resolutions have either not been implemented or report backs provided on why they have not been implemented. The final section then raises some additional areas in which resolutions should be introduced to improve legislature and governance.

2. THE PROBLEM STATEMENT: BUILDING A DEVELOPMENTAL AND DEMOCRATIC STATE

The ANC has achieved substantial improvement in state transformation since 1994, with the establishment of strong democratic electoral systems, regular elections, and the ongoing transformation of the state into a people centred structure. At the same time, it must be recognised that there are policy proposals that have not been implemented to ensure that the life of the people are significantly improved.

The ANC resolved in Strategy and Tactics in 2007, "to strengthen the hold of the democratic movement on state power, and to transform the state machinery to serve the cause of social change". The transformation of state power is guided and shaped by strategy and tactics. In the context of the NDR the task of state transformation is that "in broad terms, the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) seeks to ensure that every South African, especially the poor, experience an improved quality of life. It seeks to build a Developmental State shaped by the history and socio-economic dynamics of South African society".

Most recently, the report of the 54th National Conference states "The ANC's approach to state power is informed by the Freedom Charter and the principle that **'The People Shall Govern'**. The attainment of power by the ANC is a means to fulfil the will of the people and ensure a better life for all."

Importantly, local government is the sphere of government closest to our people and which has the largest range of developmental powers and functions of direct relevance to people's lives.

Significant progress has been made in achieving our developmental goals. The

Millennium Development Goals (MDG) aimed to "halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without sustainable access to basic services". South Africa achieved this by 2011, four years ahead of the global target. Since then, much more has been achieved in this regard. Current statistics show that 90% of households had access to electricity in 2020 compared with 70% in 2001; 89,1% of households had adequate access to water in 2020 compared with 72% in 2001; 83,2% of households had access to flush, chemical or ventilated pit toilet compared with 64% in 2001; 60,5% of households had access to refuse removal in 2020 compared with 55% in 2001.

Despite these significant gains, the ANC is faced with several critical challenges. These have led to the erosion of electoral support and reduced confidence in the ANC as a leader of society. These include:

- Poor political will and leadership, and failure to implement the ANC's policies and programmes. This is largely due to political interference and patronage and has resulted in a loss of confidence in the ANC as a leader of society. The ANC lacks political maturity and visionary leadership that unites the elected collective and mobilizes all forces to ensure effective service delivery to build a better life for the people within the 52 districts and metropolitan areas where there is a lack of intergovernmental cooperation and coordination.
- Failure to respect the values of the ANC. Serving the community and addressing their concerns has been subordinated to factional interests that protect and reward loyalty despite incompetence and disruptive conduct.
- Violent protests and assassinations fueled by rival factions. Many municipalities are faced with ongoing infighting and factionalism resulting in dysfunctionality of council and administrations.
- Lack of accountability, accessibility, and transparency by ANC deployees. There is poor communication with communities, a lack of transparency, and weak or ineffective ward committees.
- Poor municipal financial management, including poor audit outcomes, revenue, and expenditure management.
- Declining levels and quality of service delivery.
- Increasing inequality, unemployment, and poverty.
- Declining support for the ANC in elections across all spheres of government.

A wide variety of resolutions of relevance in our discussions have been made at the ANC's national meetings, including:

1. The 52nd National Conference in Polokwane, Limpopo in December 2007.
2. The 53rd National Conference Mangaung, Free State in December 2012.
3. The 54th National Conference Johannesburg, Nasrec in December 2017.
4. The 3rd and 4th National General Council Resolutions.
5. The Annual NEC Makgotla Resolutions and Decisions.
6. The 2021 Election Manifesto.
7. The 2022 January 8th Statement.

Discussion Questions

1. What are the reasons for the increasing factionalism and failure to implement the ANC's policies?
2. How best should the ANC address the factionalism and failure to implement the ANC's policies?
3. How does the ANC strengthen the alliance through action at a local level including also other organs of civil society such as traditional councils, business and the like, religious organisations, etc?

The next section focusses on the major areas of previous and possible new areas of ANC policy resolution.

3. REVIEWING, AMENDING AND DEVELOPING NEW ANC POLICY RESOLUTIONS ON LEGISLATURE AND GOVERNANCE

The period of transition has seen the ANC needing to deal with a variety of realities. These began with the unbanning of the ANC as a liberation movement and includes the period of being the ruling party in government (except for the Western Cape province). This period has also seen an increasing number of legislatures where the ANC serves in opposition or in coalition with others.

3.1 PREVIOUS LEGISLATURE AND GOVERNANCE RESOLUTIONS

Over the past 20 years, the ANC has held a number of National Conferences, Bi-Annual Lekgotlas, Policy Conferences and other meetings, including local government summits, all of which have focused on addressing the wide variety of challenges facing legislatures and governance. In these meetings, because of the importance of local government, many local government policy issues have been discussed and resolved upon.

Given the fact that the ANC is a party in power nationally, the assessment and review of legislature and governance-related resolutions from primarily the ANC National Conferences, since 2007, has been undertaken in order to assess the degree to which these resolutions have been implemented.

Unfortunately, the resolutions of the bi-annual ANC lekgotlas, held before each cabinet strategic session, are not easily available and so have not been included in this analysis. The analysis therefore restricts itself to resolutions taken at ANC National conferences. However, it should be noted that a proper monitoring system should be established at the ANC national level, recording all official resolutions of the ANC structures. Progress in this regard should be regularly monitored.

Over the past 15 years at least 144 resolutions were made in these conferences dealing with legislature and governance-related matters, with the majority addressing local government challenges.

These resolutions fall into eight areas. Resolutions calling for a review of policy constitute over one-quarter of the resolutions, followed by those dealing with the reconfiguration of the state (16%), the need to improve cooperative governance (15%), service delivery (13%), ANC internal processes (10%), improving human resources (9%), addressing planning (7%) and finance (5%).

Area covered	**All resolutions researched**
ANC Processes	14(10%)
Macro Configuration of the state	23(16%)
Cooperative Governance	21(15%)
Reviewing state policies	38 (26%)
Address Apartheid Planning	10(7%)
Improving Human Resources	13(9%)
Service delivery	18(13%)
Finance	7(5%)
Total	**144**

There is a need for a review and thorough examination of what informed the percentage distribution and priorities, including why only 5% of resolutions addressed issues related to finance, given the importance of finance/budget allocation to improving governance and service delivery.

The next subsections provide a summary review of the state of these resolutions and

also raise additional areas which should be considered in the ANC's policy review.

3.2 IMPROVING THE ANC'S PROCESSES

3.2.1 ANC's Electoral System

Existing Resolutions

- "A clear Accountability Framework for cadres operating in the state must be implemented. The Accountability Framework must include provisions for enforcement and consequence management where cadres do not perform as expected[1]:"
- "ANC must professionalise its capacity as a modern political party to fight and win elections, and create dedicated capacity to undertake ongoing mass media mobilisation, regular polling, and electioneering[2]".
- "Where the ANC is in power, it should exercise that power in ways that anticipate future electoral contestation, including exposing divisions and moral bankruptcy of the opposition. It should also aim to build the state organs under its control with sufficient institutional resilience to continue under future electoral configurations[3]".
- "The ANC must establish an Electoral Commission in order to:
  - Ensure transparent selection and capacitation process to assume leadership and deployment.
  - Improve the quality, integrity, and sustainability of the selection and election of public representatives.
  - Institutionalise the selection process and make it transparent in order to reduce the possibility of current leadership organs from interfering with processes.
  - Have an independent capacity to manage these very demanding processes, but that are essential to organisational unity and legitimacy, and quality of the public representatives.
  - A policy paper must be developed, detailing the appointment and composition, the core mandate and task of the commission, as well as its accountability. This task must be completed before the national conference of 2017[4]".

Discussion Questions

1. The 2021 Local Elections introduced a new set of guidelines in the selection processes requiring our contestants to provide detailed information about issues including their interests and competencies. They also required contestants to pledge that they will not be involved in corrupt practices. Have these guidelines improved accountability and competence of ANC deployees? Should they be extended to all spheres of governance?
2. In terms of state policy on the electoral system for all spheres of government, should the electoral seat calculation methods be changed away from the inequities in the current formulae? Instead, could they be based on the highest average number of votes per seat already awarded?
3. How do we improve our approach to coalitions given the challenges in working with parties who do not have the same strategic objectives as the ANC?
4. There is a need to provide clarity on the status of the 'Direct Electoral Bill' that is before Parliament. This should be deliberated and the impacts of the Electoral Act amendments as per the Constitutional Court mandate on our policy. This includes reflection on the continued effects of independent candidates who are often defectors from the ANC.

3.2.2 Improving Accountability

[1] 2017 54th NC
[2] 2017 54th NC
[3] 2017 54th NC
[4] 2017 54th NC

Existing Resolutions

- "The ANC must also build its internal capacity to give policy direction to its elected representatives as well as creating a monitoring mechanism. In this regard, the ANC must ensure the creation of a Governance Support Team whose aim is to work with deployed cadres to ensure the ANC policies are monitored and implemented[5]".
- "ANC Public Representatives must assist to regain the confidence of our people in the run-up to the 2019 Elections. The ANC Caucus must be at the forefront of championing the needs of the people and building the trust and confidence in the ANC led Democratic State[6]".
- "The research capacity to assist ANC caucuses in the legislatures in the three spheres of government must be boosted, and young people should be employed to do research and provide support to committees[7]".

Progress

The ANC's Presidency has implemented a process of monitoring implementation of the 2019 and 2021 National/Provincial and Local Government manifestos respectively.

In the case of Local Government, a quarterly Barometer is being produced to monitor implementation. This needs to be an ongoing process and all structures of the ANC must display leadership in calling out all instances where ANC and/or government policy is being transgressed and actions must be taken where ANC deployees are operating outside the constitutions of the country and ANC.

The ANC must improve on our service delivery approach and aim to regain the voters' confidence by winning elections with an outright majority. Coalition arrangements risk compromising our policy values and governance. Instead, the ANC must build on strong opposition to sway the support of voters in our favor and work towards regaining power and control.

The Conference should resolve that the provisions of rule 25 of the amended ANC constitution should be invoked to restore discipline in the Municipal Caucus, to expel defiant councillors.

Discussion Questions

1. A key problem area is the inability of the ANC to track its policy proposals ensuring that they have been translated into policy, programmes, and legislation of government. What should the ANC do to develop its organizational capacity, skills, and resources to monitor the way in which these Conference decisions have been translated into government and ANC programmes of action?
2. In addition, what should the ANC do to develop the institutional capability to monitor each ANC member deployed to key institutions, such as legislatures?
3. Given the lack of monitoring of ANC resolutions and of Cdes deployed to legislatures and other structures, should there not be an institutionalized structure in the ANC reviewing on an annual basis all legislature and governance resolutions so as to allow for further development of such resolutions? How should this be done? What key issues should be covered in guidelines ensuring there are consequences for deployed Cdes not implementing ANC policy or acting in accordance with the ANC's constitution.

3.2.3 Addressing Corruption

In its 2019 manifesto, the ANC took a decisive decision to deal conclusively with corruption, especially in cases where members of the ANC are found to have been involved in the acts of impropriety. In intensifying this commitment, the ANC resolved that its members and with specific reference to those members deployed to positions of authority as MPs, Councillors

[5] 2017 54th NC
[6] 2017 54th NC
[7] 2017 54th NC

and/or office-bearers should step aside until they are cleared of their wrongdoing. This includes members who are facing serious criminal charges.

It is recognized that the failure to implement this resolution will threaten the legitimacy of the congress movement as a leader of society, and further increase the trust deficit that is emerging especially in metropolitan areas.

To give effect to the above decision, the ANC has strengthened the powers and functions of the integrity committee (IC). However there have been challenges regarding the status of the decision of the IC. In many instances the decisions of the IC have been ignored due to the fact that its decisions have to be ratified by a constitutional structure, with the ANC deployees defying the ANC decision by not stepping aside pending the finalization of cases proffered against them.

In addition, guidelines should also be developed to prevent opportunities for corruption. This is a critical issue and should include practical measures such as making the existing tender process significantly more transparent. This could be done through initiatives such as such as publishing all winning bids and prices in full; setting up a national appeals process to vet any appeals from losing tenderers; increasing consequences against violators; and speeding up legal processes. There is an urgent need to develop a Code for Ethical Governance for municipalities which will have a similar standing as the King Code on Corporate Governance (King IV) has in the private sector.

The reports of the Judicial Commission into allegations of State Capture, chaired by Justice Zondo make pointed proposals to improve accountability across the Public Service. The Lifestyle Audits Guideline Framework for the Public Service is already being implemented and results will start trickling in within the current financial year.

- The ANC's recent decision should be followed rather than opting for new policies.
- A diagnosis on the nature of corruption at all echelons of government including within the administration should be undertaken.
- Punishment for corruption must be enforced. A strong message must be sent to any potentially corrupt elements.
- Consistency in the application of penalties/sentencing of corrupt individuals.
- Managing unsanctioned newspaper/media sharing of crime news and reporting.

Existing Resolutions

- "The ANC needs to lead the moral regeneration of society, and this programme must be adequately funded and accounted for[8]".
- "The ANC needs to mobilise communities and society around issues of corruption, and position itself in a leadership role with respect to a culture of exposing corruption and rewarding whistle blowers[9]."
- "The ANC government and leadership must implement a programme to prevent irregular or fraudulent practices, including: ethics; monitoring; transparency in procurement decisions; checks and balances and oversight mechanisms; the disbarring of both public servants and public representatives at all levels from doing business with the state; and the introduction of probity and life style audits[10]".

Discussion Questions

1. What are the best ways to fight corruption and target individuals involved in it?

[8] 2017 54th NC
[9] 2017 54th NC
[10] 2017 54th NC

2. What clear directives to address corruption should be included in a framework aimed at streamlining disciplinary management and enforcing consistent application of discipline to all members of the ANC regardless of their standing in the party?
3. How best should the ANC lead communities in fighting against corruption?
4. What are some of the guidelines which could be used to ensure possible areas of corruption are exposed, such as enforcing transparency in all procurement processes and individuals involved in those processes, etc?

3.2.4 Ensuring Gender and Youth Representation

Existing Resolutions

1. "The ANC Constitution specifies 50% gender representation amongst public office bearers. Proposals for 40% youth representation and the current provision for 60% continuity should be debated further by branches prior to finalisation at National Conference[11]" and the 50/50 principle must be implemented in full in the ANC and in government[12].

The ANC has historically had the greatest number of women and youth represented in all three spheres of government, although the ward/PR system of local government has affected its ability to achieve these targets.

3.3 MACRO CONFIGURATION OF THE STATE

A number of resolutions refer to the need for a review of the distribution of powers and functions across the spheres. This includes the role of provinces, whether or not they are needed and, if needed, how many are required. Some of the larger Category A areas, for example, contain more people and far more poor people than some of the provinces and so the engagement on the macro configuration of the state is urgently required.

In addition, the National Development Plan (NDP) notes: 'South Africa has struggled to achieve constructive relations between the three spheres of government. A lack of clarity about the division and coordination of powers and responsibilities together with the lack of coherent and predictable mechanisms for delegating and assigning functions has created tensions and instability across the three spheres." (p.377).

The issues that are continually discussed but never finally resolved include those around the role of provinces and the powers and functions exercised by each sphere. A number of key documents relating to the reconfiguration of the provinces have been submitted to the ANC for processing, but no decisions have been made in this regard. In part, this is because some of these require changes to the Constitution.

3.3.1 Role of Parliament

Whilst the architecture of the state rests on three independent arms, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, recently the role of parliament has come under scrutiny. This has focussed on parliaments responsibility to hold the executive to account. The issue of determining its budget has surfaced without resolution, as there exists a sentiment that the executive holds unfettered power in its allocative function of revenue.

The effectiveness of the NA, NCOP and the relationship with organized local government in expediting seamless service delivery to our people has always come under serious criticism.

The Kader Asmal report on the layout of the Chapter 9 Institutions provided broad recommendations which were left to the 5th Parliament to implement.

It is important that we revisit this with the view to accelerating what remains acceptable in those proposals.

[11] 2017 54th NC

[12] 2015 NGC

1. The issues of regularizing roles and responsibilities of the Chief Whip need to be addressed.
2. Need for cadre development and needs analysis of cadre deployment in National Parliament/ legislatures/municipalities to ensure effect participation.
3. Effective strategy session as viable platforms to craft and drive strategic agenda and provide leadership in the Legislative sector.
4. Strengthening of Political Committee with a clear mandatory directive and consistency.
5. Influence meaningful 'public participation' and 'legacy imperatives' on societies that can be linked to the ANC interventions and modelling.
6. Clearly defined and implemented role between Executive Authority of Parliament in terms of governance, policy directives and administration of Parliament as an institution as opposed to driving the political agenda and participation of ANC Members of Parliament (There's largely an appreciation of roles and cooperation).

Discussion Questions

1. What guidance should be given to ensuring that the role of Parliament is effectively exercised?
2. What are some of the specific roles and responsibilities of the Chief Whip of Parliament distinguishing that role from the role of the Speaker?

3.3.2 Differentiated Local Government Model

It is necessary for government to have a regulated process for the assignment (authorization and adjustment), revocation, and re-assignment of municipal powers and functions.

LG reform proposals therefore focus on a range of proposals, namely:

- Determining options for improving the performance of district government in respect to their existing legislated roles and the Constitution.
- Defining the optimal roles to be performed by district government, in respect to their coordination and development facilitation roles
- Reviewing, developing, and amending legislation that can constrain effective district governance.
- There is a need to assign functions such as human settlements, transport and roads to municipality's who are able to effectively administer these Policy guidance on this is urgently required.

3.3.3 Municipal Demarcation

A number of resolutions have been made concerning the role and function of the Municipal Demarcation Board (MDB). Most of these have been incorporated into the Municipal Demarcation Bill which is currently before Parliament.

However, there are some critical areas where guidance should be provided in finalizing the Bill. These include:

- Guidance on the role of the Minister of DCoG in the rationalization of municipalities: In the current Municipal Demarcation Act the Minister has the power to set policy in the rationalization of municipalities. This would include, for example, where the Minister could set a minimum number of category A municipalities required, leaving the MDB's role to categorize and finalizing boundaries of at least the number of Category A municipalities specified.
- Given the concerns raised around wards, the Minister could specify ways in which wards are demarcated so to reduce the effect created currently where wards boundaries are primarily the result of ensuring each ward has an equal number of voters, rather than that it meets other criteria, including environmental, social, and other requirements.

Discussion Questions

1. Should the Minister be able to prescribe a rationalisation framework for municipalities within which the MDB would define inner and outer boundaries?
2. Should there be changes made to the definition of Category A municipalities and an increase in the number of Category A municipalities?
3. Should the demarcation criteria be simplified to only focus on key issues such as (i) interdependence of people, communities, and services, (ii) spatial and development planning, (iii) governance and functionality and (iv) financial and administrative factors), instead of the over 20 criteria as the greater number of criteria creates serious challenges?
4. Should there be changes to the maximum size of municipal councils given that ward councilors in places like Johannesburg have to serve a significantly great number of voters in their wards.

3.4 COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE AND THE DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT MODEL

3.4.1 Need for More Integrated Cooperative Governance:

The District Development Model (DDM) model requires all spheres of government to be actively involved in integrated planning, budgeting, and implementation in each of the 52 spaces (Metro's and Districts).

However, the consistent complaint is that national and provincial government departments are not integrating their work at this level. In line with the ANC's 5th national policy conference, COGTA has developed proposals and regulations to improve integrated cooperative governance; to ensure there is a differentiated Local Government Model; and to strengthen the role of District Municipalities. This also includes defining more clearly how the "Ministerial" functions (water, sanitation, electricity, and health) and the "MEC" functions (dealing with the remaining powers and functions of municipalities in category C/B municipalities) could be more effectively distributed.

In addition, the DDM as an approach towards ensuring improved intergovernmental coordination and cooperation is premised on utilizing enabling levers within existing legislation, policies, and programmes. It should also be noted, though, that DDM hubs should be established and ideally resourced in all 52 spaces.

Discussion Questions

1. What guidance should be given to ensure integrated governance in the 52 spaces (Category A/C areas) be strengthened to ensure the objectives of the DDM are met?

3.4.2 Traditional Leadership and Councils

The institution of traditional leadership is critical in the realization of the full emancipation of the South African people, especially the previously disadvantaged people residing in the rural and traditional communities. The importance of this institution finds expression in chapter 12 of the Constitution which gives recognition of the role played by the traditional leaders and communities in the growth and development in the country. To give effect to the constitutional provision, the ANC-led government has enacted various pieces of legislation with a specific focus on the recognition of the institution of traditional leadership, role of traditional leaders in development of their communities, dispute resolution of disputes within the institution, amongst others.

Recently, the ANC-led government has enacted legislation that recognizes the traditional institution of the Khoisan communities in order to resolve a long-standing dispute lodged by the Khoisan communities regarding their status. The coexistence of traditional and contemporary governance in South Africa will only be achieved once the role of the

institution of traditional leadership is clearly defined and finds expression in the daily livelihood of the South African people. The ANC subcommittee must develop a clear process to implement the 2017 Birchwood conference resolutions especially the provision of tools of trade, management of land located within Traditional communities (13%) and holding of a land summit for the 87 % unaccounted for.

It should be noted though that significant advances have been made in regularizing the role of traditional leaders in councils, particularly with amendments to amongst others Section 81 of the Structures Act addressing Code of Conduct for Traditional Leaders.

Discussion Questions

1. Given the urgent need to address the outstanding agreements made with traditional leaders and councils, the ANC must provide guidance on how the aims and objectives of local government as outlined in the Constitution could be strengthened through increasing participation of Traditional Councils in the work of ward committees, municipal councils, and that of the other spheres of government?

3.4.3 Strengthening Ward Committees as Part of Community Participation

All municipalities are currently in the process of finalizing ward committees and the ANC needs to pronounce on the model required (either fully elected or consisting of sectoral representatives, or a hybrid model). This is important as a hybrid model, for example, would allow constituencies such as traditional councils, business organisations, religious structures to be represented on ward committees and through this ensure more participatory democracy.

3.5 REVIEWING STATE POLICIES

Some of the areas in which further work is required include:

1. Improving Monitoring, Support and Interventions: There is an urgent need to develop policy that standardises the application of Sections 139 and 100 of the Constitution (amongst others). The implementation, for example, of the Intergovernmental Monitoring, Support, and Interventions (IMSI) Bill, which has been developed in compliance with sections 100(3) and 139(8) of the Constitution is one such area as this will regulate areas such as processes to follow in monitoring, support and intervention.
2. Improving the ability of all spheres of government to contribute towards disaster management. This should include the involvement of non-governmental actors in disaster management.
3. Recently, issues such as the Covid-19 pandemic and the increasing impact of climate change has led to a global reconsideration of the role of governments in addressing these types of issues. This goes beyond only providing relief, but also in addressing climate change and economic recovery. In the South African context, the pandemic has emphasised the importance of addressing poverty, inequality, and rising unemployment.
4. Ways in which climate change mitigation and adaptation can be addressed through the provision of more resilient infrastructure and ensuring that after any disaster we build back better - particularly in ways that reduce the apartheid spatial legacy.

Discussion Questions

1. What areas of state policy and legislation and regulations need further revision to improve legislatures and governance?

3.6 ADDRESSING APARTHEID PLANNING

One of the greatest challenges South Africa faces is changing the apartheid spatial reality which resulted in black South Africans being forcibly removed to places far from economic and other social opportunities. The need for spatial justice lies at the heart of the Integrated Development Planning

(IDP) processes. The implementation of DDM must ensure that all three spheres of government are focussed on integrating and synchronising their plans and implementation programmes to address spatial inequality.

The National Planning Commission identified a number of persisting weaknesses at the technical level in the planning regime. This includes the lack of alignment of plans in all spheres of government, and the lack of legislation that can institutionalise the planning system and formally clarify the roles and functions of different plans and planning bodies.

Whilst DPME largely coordinates the institutional planning process and National Treasury the financial management process, responsibilities for coordinating the spatial and developmental planning regime is split between DCOG and DALRRD.

SPLUMA responsibilities for spatial planning must be shifted to DCoG to allow for a more effective system of planning, where IDPs and spatial can be better aligned.

This is important too as the District Development Model (DDM) aims to ensure institutional coordination through a process of 'One Plan, One Budget, One Implementation' process. The ANC endorsed the DDM and agreed that all Departments across the three spheres of government should actively participate in ensuring the District/Metro processes contain plans of all spheres.

Discussion Questions

1. What specific strategies are required to improve the implementation of the DDM and in particular reduce apartheid spatial inequalities?

3.7 IMPROVING HUMAN RESOURCES

A number of previous resolutions have been implemented which impact on municipal management. These include the Municipal Systems Amendment Act which addressed some of the challenges with earlier Amendments, including the limitation of political rights for Municipal Managers (MM's) and managers reporting to the MM. This includes the question of whether managers reporting to MM's should be permanent or contract employees.

Far less progress has, however, been made on the development of, at least in principle, a single public service.

Competency levels in senior management varies significantly across municipalities. The National School of Government, DCoG, NT, SALGA, and relevant SETAs need to be strengthened to improve competency levels as well as rid municipalities of personnel appointed against the national guidelines on competency.

The decision to implement the Single Public Service was taken by the ANC more than 20 years ago with a number of reports to conferences being considered. The interpretation of the concept related to whether the initiative is about singleness of the public service or integrated structures, systems, processes as contemplated in the Constitution. This dilemma is still not resolved resulting in the promulgation of the Public Administration and Management Act, 2015, which was reduced to a framework legislation due to contestation regarding the approach being pursued on the matter.

Our policy resolution should provide clear guidance to our deployees, both in government and parliament, in ensuring that the outcome of the process achieves overwhelming buy-in and ownership from the alliance partners and the broader congress movement in order to obviate unintended consequences. Clear targets with measurable milestones should be set so that the project is completed without delay.

The January 2022 Lekgotla received a comprehensive progress report and took resolutions on activities that are aimed at building a capable, ethical, and developmental state.

In addition, there is a need to move beyond just the step aside requirements in addressing corrupt activities and to urgently to put preventative processes in place to

stop corrupt processes from happening. The ANC needs to implement powers of recall given its pre-elections pledges.

The Public Service age and gender profile shows that there is an aging population and a lack of adequate representation of females in the leadership cohort of the public service. The majority of public servants are within the 35-54 age cohort, whilst at the DDG and DG level the median age increases to 45-62 and largely male, showing an aging leadership cohort. A developmental Policy Framework and new approach should be adopted to increase youth and female representation across the public service.

There is also an urgent need for a Digital Strategy for the Public Service with an Implementation Plan and Digital Policy Framework to improve the following:

1. Management of Big Data.
2. Creating a single-entry point for the collection and sharing of citizen data for official purposes.
3. Improving the interoperability of systems across the Public Service.
4. Address the disjointed and fragmented approach to e-Government and digitization across the public service (i.e., The Presidency, DPSA, DCDT, SITA)

Finally, there is a need to introduce an automated HR system to improve the turnaround time for job applications. This will and save applicants money for printing, certification, and submission of hardcopies. This will also save the amount of effort spent by HR officials, freeing them up to spend more time on strategic HR to plan and provide greater value in the improvement of performance of both the officials and public institutions.

This automation should include the Performance Management and Development System (PMDS) to ensure alignment with HR Planning, and Organizational Performance.

Discussion Questions

1. What specific guidance could be provided to address the following key human resource areas:
    a. Professionalization of the public sector.
    b. Human Resource Framework for the Public Service.
    c. Municipal Capacity Interventions and Stabilising Local Government.
    d. Institutionalizing Ethics and Integrity.
    e. Institutional Development.
    f. Rolling out E-Government and improving the effective and efficient use of ICT tools and infrastructure and systems?
2. What are the views on a proposal that a national structure / commission be established to oversee the recruitment, contracting, performance management and termination processes for all senior managers, operating in a similar way to the Public Service Commission (PSC)?

3.8 SERVICE DELIVERY

Municipalities are tasked with the provision of basic infrastructure services such as: solid waste management, roads and stormwater, electricity provision, water, and sanitation and spend large amount of funds on infrastructure to provide these. All of these areas require focussed attention, given that there remain significant challenges in many households not having access to these services, whilst those who do have access, often have serious challenges in the reliability of these services due to failures to regularly repair, maintain and rehabilitate infrastructure.

The overall trend in local government infrastructure spend shows the growth in new capital and infrastructure investment until 2016, after which there was a declining amount of investment by municipalities in infrastructure. The decline post-2016 is a worrying trend which is being exacerbated due to the COVID-19 pandemic and more recently with the impact of climate change.

Whilst the number of households receiving basic services is increasing, municipalities in rapidly growing urban areas are finding it difficult to keep up with the population growth. This is particularly the case in unplanned informal settlements or areas with a growth of backyard dwellings where the bulk infrastructure cannot support the increase in the number of new households.

In remote rural areas with low densities, the cost of providing bulk infrastructure and connecting households to the grid is considerable. In these areas, off grid solutions are more viable, but are still relatively costly.

Municipal spatial planning is often inadequately linked to investment decisions around bulk infrastructure. This points to the need to improve the capabilities for spatial governance as well as to revitalize the municipal integrated development planning processes and transform it into a practical instrument to guide municipal investment.

Ongoing repairs and maintenance to infrastructure is critical to ensure ongoing service delivery and avoid interruptions to services. Municipalities are required to allocate at least 8% their property, plant and equipment (PPE) budget for repairs and maintenance, yet the latest State of Local Government Finances report shows that the vast majority of municipalities do not do this.[13] The lack of repairs and maintenance has a significant impact on the quality of service provision, as well as on a municipality's ability to generate own-revenue.

A major challenge too, is the significant reduction in the number and competencies of personnel in the built environment professional sectors of municipalities and other spheres of government. Urgent attention must be placed on improving competency levels in these areas

The free basic services system (FBS) and indigent support systems play a vital role in supporting households who cannot pay for municipal services. However, there is a lack of credible verification of the validity of indigent citizens who qualify for this service and there are many instances of non-indigent households receiving the subsidy and indigent households not receiving the subsidy.

The monitoring of free basic service provision is a COGTA mandate. In this regard, COGTA is working together with SARS to ensure that municipalities have credible indigent registers that will inform proper planning, decision-making and the allocation of resources, enabling the Government to measure the impact of free basic services on improvements to quality of life.[14]

There is also a need for COGTA to monitor the extent to which municipalities have used their equitable share funding for the provision of free basic services. The Accounting for Basic Services project has recommended that COGTA play a greater role in ensuring that municipalities use the equitable share funding for free basic services in addition to undertaking a policy review to consider universal access to FBS and how this could be achieved.

Discussion Questions

1. How can basic service delivery be improved?
2. How can we ensure that funded budgets are in place which promote maintenance and rehabilitation of existing infrastructure?
3. How can the competency levels of built environment professionals in municipalities be improved, including also ensuring that clear lines are drawn to reduce interference through confused responsibilities in the political-administrative interface.

[13] National Treasury. 2019. The State of Local Government Finances and financial management as at 30 June 2019.

[14] Department of Cooperative Governance. 2019. Programme performance monitoring: report on the mechanisms utilised for the provision of free basic services.

4. How can the delivery of FBS provisions to the poor be improved and how should the costs associated with this be met?

3.9 FINANCIAL RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT

A number of previous resolutions have focused on the need to ensure that the equitable share needs to be reformulated. Municipalities, as the major developmental wing of government, need to receive a greater share of the equitable share. Additional issues around other sources of revenue and the financial management system needs to be reviewed.

The system of intergovernmental grants should be restructured, taking account of changing settlement patterns, poverty, topography, capabilities, and other contexts. Local government's own revenues and revenue collection efforts must complement the proportion of the fiscus made available to municipalities in order to ensure there are no unfunded or underfunded mandates.

In addition, a major challenge is that the current funding model is premised on the notion of self-funding municipalities which is not the case for a majority of municipalities particularly in the less economically developed areas.

The way in which developmental objectives are measured using the financial auditing system must be reviewed.

There has been limited progress in this regard.

Discussion Questions

1. What strategies could be employed to increase funding to municipalities as well as to ensure increased service delivery?

4. POLICY FRAMEWORK

Each of the above areas requires discussion and deliberation to ensure concrete actions are outlined to implement existing and possible new resolutions, including where necessary the modification or repeal of resolutions.

Overall, the ANC policy framework requires us to explore at least the following issues, identifying how best to implement solutions which advance our developmental governance framework, including:

1. Macro organisation of the state and the legislative framework.
2. Elections and democratic accountability.
3. Fiscal framework.
4. Capacity and staffing.
5. Supporting and monitoring sub-national governments.
6. Service delivery.
7. Socio-economic environment.
8. Addressing apartheid spatial inequalities.
9. Improving safety and healthy environments.
10. Democratic and accountable governance.
11. Traditional leadership.
12. Addressing lack of accountability of local government deployees.

5. ORGANISATIONAL RENEWAL

As resolved by the 54th National Conference of the African National Congress, for the renewal of the organisation, that the party would fully implement the mandate of the National Conferences. The conference reaffirmed its stance against wrongdoing in both the party and society, the renewal in addressing areas that fuel divisions, and the restoration of the credibility of the ANC among South Africans.

The conference proposed accountability and management frameworks, an appropriate institutional arrangements such as the once proposed in the Organisational

Redesign document, which include, inter alia, operational and management structures. The ANC need to decisively attend and act to issues of corruption, ill-discipline, and misconduct across ANC membership. As this need to be considered a vehicle to improve electoral support base and strengthen the development of BRAND ANC.

The 2019 General Elections and the recent 2021 Local Government elections are indicators that we must Renew and rebuild the ANC. We should bring back the values and principles of building the organization as echoed by **Oliver Tambo "As the vanguard and epitome of unity".** He perfectly understood that the ANC's historical mission of destroying racial oppression could never be achieved by a divided, weak movement. It is our collective responsibility that we should work to achieve a Better Life for All and improve service delivery.

We should model the leaders and public representatives who serve, who are selflessness, who care and love their people, who sacrifice for others, and pursue the aspirations of our people.

9

Strengthening Economic Recovery and Reconstruction to Build an Inclusive Economy

1. CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVES

The ANC's vision for the South African economy is guided by the Freedom Charter, in particular, the injunction that: "The people shall share in the country's wealth". This informs the ANC's commitment to managing the South African economy not only in a manner that is growth-enhancing, but to ensure that the pace and pattern of growth is inclusive and transforms our society.

Since the 1994 democratic breakthrough, significant progress has been made in expanding access to employment, empowerment, and other economic opportunities. Social protection has also expanded, and the number of people with access to basic services has increased.

Despite these advances, the legacy of colonialism and apartheid remains deeply entrenched in the economy. Far too many South Africans are without jobs. Far too many still go to bed hungry, and far too many are experiencing service delivery backlogs. Low rates of economic growth over the past decade have made it harder to reduce inequality, but growth in itself will not diminish inequality unless the democratic state is able to put in place effective, sustainable interventions to change the underlying structures of the economy.

South Africa's fault lines have a distinct class, racial, gender, geographic and age dimension. They disproportionately affect black people, women, rural communities, youth and persons with disabilities. Most significantly, these fault lines represent the greatest threat to the process of thoroughgoing social and economic transformation. This brings to the fore the importance of the continuation of the strategic objective of the ANC to ensure the further advance of the National Development Revolution (NDR). The NDR, amongst other things, seeks to transform property relations such that the accumulation, allocation and ownership of capital is deracialised in a manner that benefits the poor.

In the past 28 years of freedom and democracy, we have made real progress toward ending race and gender discrimination in core services, in schools, healthcare and workplaces. We have also adopted policies that have reduced poverty, provided basic infrastructure for millions of our people.

Despite certain undeniable progress, we have not yet transformed the economy for the majority for the benefit of the majority our people, and have regressed, to an extent, over the past decade. Hence, there has been a loss of confidence by the masses of our people in the ANC's ability to deliver on economic transformation that improves the living standards of all South

Africans. Rising corruption in much of the past decade weakened the ability of the state to provide infrastructure and other services. Core challenges emerged around load shedding and hollowing out of the capacity in the state in critical areas. The reports on State Capture have also highlighted deliberate acts of destruction aimed at weakening certain state owned companies, including Eskom, Denel, Transnet and PRASA which had negative impact gross capital formation and the retardation of the pace of provision of access to basic services. In addition to the erosion of confidence on the capacity of the state and the ANC to achieve a better life for all, the disruption to services for both businesses and communities contributed to slower economic growth and rising public anger. Strengthening state capacity at local government level is a particular cause for concern requiring integrated strategies such as those outlined though the District Development Model.

The economic challenges have been worsened by a recent series of negative economic shocks including the COVID-19 pandemic, violence and looting in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, massive flooding and damage in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape and fraught geopolitics, including the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

The failure to deliver on the promise of a more equal and prosperous economy for most South Africans has led to widespread anger and disillusionment with democratic processes. It opens the door to authoritarian and populist politicians who promise easy solutions that range from mobilisation of the poor against foreign nationals to criminal looting of businesses. It has given rise to crime and violent protest at a considerable cost to the economy and society.

In these circumstances, the ANC needs to propose solutions fundamentally to reshape the economy and which are economically and socially sustainable. We have to discuss the risks and costs of change and how these will best be managed. We can no longer afford to underplay the risks and costs of failing to meet the demands of our people. In this regard, the social partners, led government, must urgently finalise the social compact so that sectoral plans can consists in implementable interventions to grow the economy and reduce and eradicate unemployment, poverty and inequality.

This Discussion Document aims to identify core policy choices and proposals for the ANC regarding the economy. It is based on the understanding that the ANC must adopt proposals that reflect the needs and aims of our constituency – the vast majority of South Africans who face the realities of inequality, poverty, and joblessness daily. At the same time, our policies must be economically sound, viable and sustainable, taking into account the realities of the national, regional and global economic system.

2. WHAT IS THE ANC'S ECONOMIC POLICY FRAMEWORK?

To build a new, more equal society, the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) must enter a second, more radical and effective phase of our ongoing transition from colonialism and apartheid to a National Democratic Society. During this phase, the ANC will forge ahead with interventions that seek to change the structure, systems, institutions and patterns of ownership, management and control of the economy in favour of all South Africans, especially the poor, the majority of whom are African and female.

Progress has been made in implementing a number of the economic policy resolutions adopted at the ANC's 54th National Conference. This includes progress made in fighting corruption and state capture including through the reconfiguration of the security cluster. It also includes ongoing interventions to restore energy security, interventions to stabilise state owned companies and strengthen state capacity, interventions to promote increased investment and infrastructure investment in particular, the implementation of a minimum wage system, the strengthening of competition policy, including strengthened

regulation of uncompetitive structures, as well as the pursuit of a balanced path of macroeconomic management. Due in part to the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, there has been closer co-operation and compacting among social partners – government, business, labour and communities – as mandated by the 54th National Conference. Still, significant scope exists to deepen the process of social compacting around a common programme to achieve agreed economic objectives.

In certain other areas, progress in implementing our resolutions has not been as adequate. For example, we have not been able to avoid further downgrades by credit rating agencies. We have not had sufficient support to amend the constitution to allow for land expropriation without compensation in certain circumstances, although there has been progress with the passing of expropriation legislation and strengthening of land redistribution processes. We have not corrected the historical anomaly that the SA Reserve Bank has private shareholders. This is partly due to concerns of possible negative unintended consequences of a move to public ownership. These include the undue enrichment of private speculators who have been lobbying for such an intervention as they hope to make massive financial gains from the process at the expense of South Africa and cost to the fiscus.

The objective of reducing huge pay gaps in the private sector has not been effectively advanced, although improved education and training outcomes should assist in expanding the pool of skills and structurally begin to reduce the gap. The resolution to advance tourism as a key growth and job creation sector was impacted negatively by the Covid-19 pandemic. Limited progress was made in considering new wealth taxes, although SARS did improve systems to reduce tax evasion and illicit financial flows. Discussions continue on strengthening the state-owned mining company and on establishing the Postbank as a state bank, but no decisive progress has been made in these areas.

As we approach Policy Conference and National Conference later this year, the ANC will have an opportunity to reflect on our economic policy resolutions and consider areas where our interventions should be strengthened, reconsidered and reviewed. This will allow the ANC to take into account the impact of subjective weaknesses as well the objective realities which are shaping the domestic and international terrain so that we can sharpen and improve the impact of our resolutions and programme of growth, job creation and economic transformation.

Overall, the ANC's strategy for structural transformation and accelerated and inclusive economic growth will be built on the following pillars:

- Structural reforms of network industries to facilitate expanded investment in sectors such as electricity, telecoms, water, rail, and road infrastructure;
- Strengthened industrial policy interventions using a range of instruments including development finance, public procurement, and linkages to key areas such as agriculture and energy;
- Macroeconomic stability to be achieved through policies to accelerate economic growth as well as through careful management of expenditure and taxation, as well as balanced and effective monetary policy;
- Closer coordination between government and social partners – to build both the private and public elements of our 'mixed economy' in a coordinated manner – with the aim of accelerating job creation by lifting investment levels from current levels of around 15% of GDP to the NDP's target of 25% to 30% of GDP; and
- Expanded regional trade with other countries on the African continent and the wider world through the development of well-connected and

cost-effective logistical, infrastructural and financial nodes.

3. WHAT ARE THE CURRENT ECONOMIC POLICY PRIORITIES FOR THE NDR?

Our main long-term targets have to reflect the needs of our people. Through democratic discussion we must identify priority goals which we wish to achieve during the current phase of the NDR. This could include achieving the following by 2035:

- An increase in the share of all household income for the poorest 80% of households which is currently around 30%;
- An increase in the employment ratio (the share of adults with employment) which was under 40% in 2021;
- A doubling in the number of small formal businesses, including farms, with black ownership of commercial farm land rising, and an increased share of black-owned formal businesses;
- An increase in the minimum wage in real terms per year, and an increase in union density of formal workers which was at around 35% in 2019;
- An increase in the share of young people aged 18 to 25 with matric so that we can increase their employability;
- Expanding access to electricity, water and sanitation to all households, from a household electrification ratio of 85%, an access to drinking water ratio of 89% and an access to sanitation ratio of 83% in 2018; and
- An increase in the share of women employed in the formal sector which, at 40% in 2019, is still disproportionate to the population of women.

These are the kind of objectives that we need to strive for to ensure that our programmes, are adequate to meet the demands, needs and aspirations of our core constituency. As we discuss the proposals and decisions framed in this Discussion Document, we need to ask if they are sufficiently ambitious and if the means identified to achieve these targets are sustainable and realistic. That is a critical step to winning back the trust of our people in the ANC.

4. SOCIAL COMPACTING: BUILDING SOCIETY-WIDE CONSENSUS ON WHAT IS TO BE DONE

To further consolidate and advance the progress made in implementing the Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan (ERRP), the ANC must play a leading role in deepening the processes of social compacting around economic policy interventions for long term and sustainable growth and job creation.

Such a process of social compacting should build on the foundation established among social partners in the development and implementation of the ERRP. Further, the process should be more explicit about the trade-offs, timeframes, contributions, and sacrifices to be made by specific constituencies towards rebuilding the economy. Mechanisms to ensure accountability for non-delivery on the commitments made must be established.

It is critical that any social compact be premised upon progressive principles. A social compact must seek to protect workers and provide meaningful solidarity with the poor. It should seek to reduce inequality and poverty and address the fundamental obstacles to economic growth.

The following specific contributions and commitments should be required by each of the social partners:

GOVERNMENT

The most important contributions government can make include:

- Reducing wasteful expenditure, tackling corruption and holding those guilty accountable;

- Utilising public procure as a tool for transformation and support for local procurement;
- Fixing all the SOCs that are critical to social development and efficient functioning of the economy
- Expediting the rebuilding of local government;
- Addressing network and other blockages to growth, in particular red tape;
- Modernising the state machinery, e.g. investing in the IT systems and personnel of key front-line service departments such as Home Affairs, Health, SAPS, Ports, Rail, Education, Correctional Services;
- Consolidating state functions and removing duplication in the state without undermining state capacity;
- Providing alternative jobs opportunities for SOE and other public sector workers whose jobs are at risk;
- Ensuring professional management of, and respecting collective bargaining and engaging with organised labour on conditions of service; and
- Providing social relief to workers (through the UIF and pension relief access) and the unemployed (through social security relief).
- Ensuring a hard-line approach to deal with organised crime and the destruction of South Africa's infrastructure and resource base
- Leading a just transition to a low carbon economy and climate-resilient society

BUSINESS

The vital contributions business can make include:

- Ramping up local investment;
- Making credit more affordable and accessible to consumers and SMMEs;
- Making credit more affordable for companies that save and create jobs;
- Supporting local procurement and SMME development;
- Blowing the whistle on corruption;
- A commitment to paying living wages to workers and reducing the massive wage gap between CEOs and entry level staff;
- Minimising retrenchments and finding alternative employment opportunities;
- A commitment to paying taxes and customs due to the state; and
- Respecting collective bargaining and engaging with organised labour on conditions of service.
- Supporting a just transition to a low carbon economy and climate resilient society

LABOUR

The most important contributions labour can make include:

- Identifying ways to improve productivity;
- Engaging with employers to address matters of collective bargaining, wage negotiations and improving labour market stability;
- Providing relief and solidarity to workers in need (through the release of UIF funds to workers to provide relief, prevent retrenchments and support job creation projects).
- Invest workers' funds (through the PIC which invests the GEPF, UIF and Compensation Fund as well as the Amendment of Regulation 28 of the Pension Funds Act) in investments that will spur economic growth, create jobs, boost manufacturing and build critical infrastructure;
- Blowing the whistle on corruption at all levels; and
- Supporting a just transition to a low carbon economy and climate resilient society

COMMUNITY ORGANISATIONS

The most important contributions community can make include:

- Paying for services provided by the state, e.g. electricity, water, sanitation, municipal rates and taxes (beyond free basic services provided for in policy);
- Blowing the whistle on criminal activities, in particular cable theft and corruption;
- Report service delivery failures to the state;
- Communities must be mobilised to do advocacy work for the protection of infrastructure projects around the country
- Initiate community relief projects for the poor and unemployed; and
- Supporting a just transition to a low carbon economy and climate resilient society

As we advance the process of social compacting it is vitally important that we understand that this is an ongoing process, rather than a once-off event. Trust will be built among social partners if bold and ambitious targets – such as reducing youth unemployment, lifting investment and implementing a just energy transition – are agreed to and then there is ongoing collaboration and joint work to achieve such targets. There should be flexibility in deciding which instruments and interventions best achieve the agreed targets and the process should be designed to including iterative policy making, building on successes and learning from failures.

5. MINERALS AND ENERGY POLICY

5.1 ENERGY POLICY

To accelerate growth, investment and employment creation in South Africa, electricity shortage, and load shedding must be addressed as a critical priority. Policies are required to increase investment in electricity generation capacity and the energy mix both by public and private entities. Such investments will create direct jobs for those involved in building new electricity plants and transmission networks, as well as indirect jobs for those in upstream and downstream manufacturing activities. The restoration of energy security for South Africa will create a platform for increased levels of investment and job creation and will boost confidence in the future.

South Africa's energy plan is outlined in the Integrated Resources Plan (IRP), which sets out that the country will continue to pursue a competitive, diversified energy mix that reduces reliance on a single or a few primary energy sources. The IRP envisages the usage of an optimal mix of energy sources such as coal, solar, gas, wind, nuclear, hydro and energy storage to maintain the security of electricity supply.

As we enhance our country's energy security we will be guided by the National Development Plan and our commitment to ensure we have a low carbon economy and a climate resilient society by mid-century. Central to our approach will be to ensure that this journey has just and fair outcomes for affected workers and communities and leaves no one behind.

The procurement of electricity in terms of the government's IRP instrument must be accelerated as current plans and the pace at which they are rolled out are not sufficient to overcome the country's electricity shortage and load shedding. To be an effective planning instrument the IRP needs to be regularly updated to keep abreast of changes in electricity availability from Eskom's aging power stations, as well as changes in cost structures and available technologies, such as battery storage. Alternative mechanisms should be considered with regard to risk-sharing for these investments and there should be a review of the extent to which government guarantees linked to long term purchase agreements are utilized in this context.

To improve the impact of government's reform to allow companies to invest in their own generation capacity without requiring a licence, the registration requirements for such projects need to be streamlined and red tape reduced. In addition, such projects should be designated as Strategic

Infrastructure Projects (SIPS) so that environmental authorisation regulated by the DFFE can be expedited. Investment in new electricity generation capacity would also be accelerated if it were to be clarified that such projects do not require power purchase agreements to go ahead.

The new Electricity Regulation Act (ERA) which is currently under consideration will facilitate increased investment in generation capacity by establishing a more dynamic and competitive electricity market. The ERA will advance a vision for a restructured electricity sector in South Africa and the transitional arrangements required to get there. The legislation will mandate the operation of a state-owned national grid transmission entity and will provide greater certainty to market participants regarding their roles and responsibilities. Consideration should be given to municipalities that rely on electricity revenue to fulfil their development mandates and plans should be put in place to ensure their financial sustainability.

Government must hold firm in the process of restructuring Eskom and a resolution must be found to resolve Eskom's unsustainable debt so that a restructured Eskom is able to play a strategic role in South Africa's just energy transition. Resources need to be mobilised for investment in new generation capacity and new grid infrastructure, as well as to provide new opportunities for workers and communities negatively impacted by the energy transition. In this regard, it is important that effective use be made of any grants and concessional finance in the context of discussions linked to the 2021 COP26 Summit, particularly with regard to mobilising finances to restore energy security and advance a just energy transition.

With respect to the transition to low carbon and the related global changes, it is important to ensure that the just transition is mobilised at scale, rather than being conceived simply as series of showcase projects. The energy transition and related mobility and industrial transitions are large, economy-wide undertakings that will touch and shape the lives of all South Africans for decades to come.

The pace of South Africa's energy transition must be sufficient to protect our global export position. Recognition of likely increased demand for goods produced in a low carbon economy and the potential risk of us not being able to access markets if we continue with high carbon energy inputs will require progressive changes in our energy system. These changes should also take account of the energy security and competitiveness issues, noting that some of the major trading partners do see a role for some hydrocarbons in the energy transition. In addition, this process must recognise that, as has been seen in the current sanctions proposed on Russian hydrocarbon exports, countries also need to manage any adjustment shocks to their economies, and that the transition to low carbon should not destabilise economies with related social stability impacts. The current context provides an opportunity to develop, and partner for the development of, other low carbon energy inputs including renewable fuels, as well as transition our automotive exports to increasingly include non-combustion engine products such as electric vehicles.

5.2 MINING POLICY

Mining remains a key contributor to the South African economy, providing employment opportunities, technological innovation, tax revenues, and export earnings. This is not a sunset industry as some typically believe. Therefore, we must create an enabling environment to encourage and stimulate new mining investment in the country.

It is through increased exploration activity that the South African mining sector will continue to grow in future years. It is also through mining exploration that South Africa and the wider region will be able to ascertain the strength of its participation in the production of energy minerals required to power the world's ongoing energy

transition, such as vanadium, copper, cobalt, nickel and platinum.

The ANC must continue to encourage increased minerals and gas exploration, for the current and future growth of our economy, and job creation, just as many other countries are doing. In doing this we must ensure that correct legal and consultation procedures are followed in order to avoid litigation (which undermines development) and investor uncertainty. Our policies with regard to climate change must be designed to ensure that we can best pursue our sovereign economic interest while participating actively in the global economy.

Efforts to promote minerals beneficiation must also be strengthened. In recent years, due in the main to the country's electricity shortage, minerals beneficiation has been on the decline as a number of energy-intensive smelters and mineral processing operations have closed down. Through achieving greater energy security in the medium run and the restoration of competitive electricity prices in the longer run, supportive policies – such as appropriately designed taxes to assist the ferrochrome industry – should be put in place to promote increased minerals beneficiation investment.

5.3 LIQUID FUELS

The South African economy and many other economies are faced with fuel prices that have reached unsustainable levels. Over time, our country fuel prices have been increasing. It is however important to appreciate that this is a global issue, and no country is being spared. Amongst other things geopolitical tensions and the management of the overall global production levels of crude oil contribute to higher prices.

High fuel prices are beginning to have a knock-on effect and are bound to lead to inflationary pressures. The cost of public and private transport has increased and is likely to increase further. The cost of producing food has been skyrocketing especially due to the high diesel prices. Disposable incomes of all citizens have be affected, and this is bound to lead to some level of discontent especially if this affects affordability of staple foods.

Proposed Interventions:

- Increased Exploration for Oil and Gas -- South Africa needs to find its own sources of crude oil through opening its offshore acreage to domestic and international oil companies for exploration for oil and gas. The growing opposition to oil and gas exploration needs to be confronted politically as it is clear that South Africa's endowments of oil and gas could be a source of wealth as well as increase our energy security options, also noting the role of gas in the energy transition.
- On Biofuels -- The biofuels programme will need to be kick-started through supporting a mechanism to reduce by at least 10% the use of crude oil for fuel requirements. This will create jobs in the sugar and sorghum industries, and improve the balance of payments.
- Refining Capacity -- There has recently been closure of refineries by some oil companies as they have chosen to import refined fuel products rather than invest in cleaner fuel refining technologies. A feasibility study should be undertaken to assess the business case for public investment in the oil refining sector, a detailed cost-benefit analysis should be undertaken to assess whether such an investment would be viable or would impose undue costs on South African tax payers and consumers. The analysis should include a study of the impact of reduced refining capacity on the security of supply and costs of associated petrochemical products, such as bitumen and lubricants. This should also include an investigation of options to look at more low carbon, including renewable, refining methods, with a critical role for South Africa research and development and science and technology institutions, as well as partner

with global technology leaders in such low carbon or renewable fuel products.

6. INFRASTRUCTURE AS A DRIVER OF RECOVERY

The ERRP identified massive infrastructure roll out programme that supports re-industrialization through localisation, transforms the structure of the economy, builds climate resilience, creates jobs, and enhances productivity as the cornerstone of accelerating economic recovery and building a new fast growing, inclusive economy. Interventions outlined in the ERRP to support aggressive infrastructure investment constitute are a major component of government's efforts, in line with the NDP, to ensure that national gross fixed capital formation increases significantly from 14% of GDP currently. Such an investment will help address the urban/rural divide. However, since the adoption of the ERRP the pace of infrastructure investment by both the public and private sectors has not been at the desired levels.

The renewable energy programme of government has set a gold-standard on the financing and delivery of strategic projects in the country. The introduction of the Independent Power Producer Procurement Office has had the effect of bringing credibility to the programme and attracting much needed skills in the packaging, assessment and delivery of the programme. More importantly, the programme has played a critical role in crowding in private sector capital in the electricity generation sector.

The haemorrhaging of technical and financial engineering skills in the country, collapse of institutions and state capture have all conspired to degrade the quality of the infrastructure offering in the country. Therefore, the degree to which infrastructure can perform the role of being the flywheel for reconstruction and recovery is a function of state capacity. Professionalization and merit should underpin the macro organisation of the state redesign.

As reflected in the '*Ready to Govern'* (R2G) and the '*Reconstruction and Development Programme'* (RDP) documents, the Movement has said that ours is and should continue to be a '*mixed economy'*, meaning that it would have both a public/State and a private sector. Our economy is such that, as is the case globally, the private sector is the largest investor and will continue to do so. Consistent with this reality, it is critical for us to encourage private sector investments so that we can be able to mobilise sufficient resources to achieve our developmental objectives. In this regard there are lessons to be drawn from the People's Republic of China which by encouraging private sector investment, by 2018, the private sector accounted for 87% of urban employment, 88% of exports and 65% of fixed asset investment.

To unlock infrastructure investments, we need to forge a Social Compact which would ensure the availability, on a sustained basis, of the required volumes of capital. Accordingly, meaningful and effective partnerships for development are thus critical in ensuring that big capital eschew export of capital and increase domestic investment. To crowd-in the private sector and development finance institutions (DFIs) and multilateral development banks (MDBs), government must build a capable state and improve intergovernmental co-ordination. The compact should ensure that each partner makes tangible commitments towards the delivery of infrastructure including the quantification of the volumes of capital each partner will make available.

The following interventions are proposed:

- Significant fiscal resources to be directed at financing project preparation;
- Infrastructure South Africa to be positioned to provide a centre of infrastructure excellence in the country;
- Government should operationalise the Infrastructure Fund;

- Position the District Development Model as a platform to aggregate technical and financial engineering skills to support local municipalities within their jurisdictions.
- Government working with the pension funds, and other financing institutions, should urgently institutionalise innovative social infrastructure financing and delivery mechanisms; and
- Government should conclude the revision of the Procurement Bill and PPP Framework.

7. MANUFACTURING AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY

7.1 INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE

Throughout its democratic history, South Africa has struggled to achieve sustained long-term growth. Instead, the growth has occurred in fits and starts, which suggests that the economy suffers from structural weaknesses. The economy grew by an average 4% a year between 1994 and 2008, and by an average of 1.2% a year between 2010 and 2019.

When compared with its upper-middle-income counterparts, South Africa has recorded poorer levels of growth. South Africa's average GDP growth between 1994 and 2019 was 2.6% compared with the 5% average for upper middle-income countries.

This is because South Africa has continued de-industrializing - in 1994 manufacturing accounted for 21% of GDP but by 2019 this had declined to 12.3% in favour of services. Employment in manufacturing has also declined over time.

7.2 SOUTH AFRICA'S TRACK RECORD ON MANUFACTURING AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY

The characterization of the challenges faced by the manufacturing sector in the early 1990s was not entirely accurate. This led to policies that failed to address the actual underlying challenges. At the time, research had concluded that South Africa was unusually diversified and recommended that the focus of industrial policy should focus on specialization. Though there was a need to upgrade the quality of production this did not mean that the country should not have continued to pursue strategies to develop new products. This is part of the reason South Africa has not been able to transform its economic structure. By focusing on upgrading existing production meant that the existing industries which were highly concentrated with high degrees of market power continued to receive support from the government. And even though it was recognized that government support needed to be accompanied by performance criteria, these conditionalities were either not implemented or implemented poorly.

On realizing this, the National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) was developed and launched in 2007 to support diversification and structural transformation of the economy. The NIPF was the first overarching industrial policy document in post democratic South Africa and the annual Industrial Policy Action Plans (IPAP) were the implementation plans of the NIPF.

The NIPF's growth path for South Africa prioritized industrial upgrading in more labour absorptive sectors. The primary objective of the NIPF was to improve competitiveness, where the important factors for competitiveness were identified as prices of inputs, infrastructure price and provision, technology and innovation skills, effective regulation and integration with the international economy. The vision for the NIPF included diversification beyond the traditional reliance on minerals and mineral processing towards increased value-added per capita. The NIPF acknowledged that incentive administration in South Africa needed to be strengthened to improve conditionality, monitoring and to ensure a more targeted focus.

7.3 POLICY PRIORITIES GOING FORWARD

Key priorities for industrial policy going forward include:

- Arresting and reversing South Africa's premature deindustrialization.
- Supporting the development of clusters of firms with effective links to public institutions.
- A focus on more inclusive industrialization, which depends on achieving structural change, and dismantling barriers to entry and expansion to support inclusion.
- Coordinated industrial policies, as well as coordination between industrial policy and other relevant policy domains such as digital, technology, energy, minerals policies.

Skills development: Taking up opportunities created by the digital economy requires investment in skills and closing the digital skills gap. A key part of this is through combining design software, additive manufacturing (3D printing) and advances in materials science.

Localisation and public procurement instruments: How do we balance transformation vs localization in interventions? Given the employment crisis in the country, if the choice is between a transformed entity that does not have production capabilities locally and a non-transformed firm that can expand capabilities and jobs then the latter should be the appropriate choice. Do existing frameworks support such a decision? If not, what can be done to facilitate this? Where localisation is used – to what extent is this matched with a strategy for capability upgrading or addressing bottlenecks. The mere need for a localisation intervention suggests that the local industry is not internationally competitive. For localization to be a temporary measure – it must be complemented with a plan to address the blockages undermining competitiveness, such as, skills. The continuous renewals of tariffs in some of the industries also suggests that the firms are not engaged in complementary processes of upgrading to get to the point of no longer needing the tariff support.

Finance: Finance in the form of development funding (loans and equity), and grants have been an important industrial policy tool in South Africa, however, it is not clear that it is funding investments that would not otherwise take place. Reviews of development funding institutions and various government grants highlight some successes and failures, which need to be considered in a review of the approach to development finance and its alignment to the developmental agenda and economic transformation.

Low Carbon Transition: Pertinent for the manufacturing sector is the need to transition the sector to low carbon emissions, especially in energy usage. Failure to do this may undermine our ability to export. For example, the EU has introduced a new policy, "Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism" (CBAM), which states that carbon emissions should have a price. This penalty would make SA exports into the EU less competitive relative to countries that have already started reducing carbon emissions in production processes.

7.4 INDUSTRIES WITH POTENTIAL FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO GROW MANUFACTURING CAPABILITIES

The key principles that should be used to assess which industries are prioritized for industrial policy should be as follows:

- The more diversified industries that South Africa has existing capabilities in but which have been hollowed out over time. This includes industries such as mining machinery and equipment.
- Sectors with well-designed masterplans.
- New and growing industries where South Africa has opportunities to become internationally competitive. This includes green manufacturing linked to green hydrogen and electric vehicles.

8. THE DIGITAL ECONOMY AND THE 4TH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

The global digital economy is developing rapidly, at an estimated rate of twice the speed of global GDP growth, with over 50% of global GDP expected to be digitalized in 2022.

Information and communications technologies (ICT) have become a foundation tool for increasing efficiency and productivity in every sector of the economy. Investment in ICT infrastructure can contribute to economic growth and employment creation. Socially, ICT is a fundamental element of facilitating social inclusion by bridging the digital divide and increasing the digital skills of young people in rural areas.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the accompanying restrictions, socially and economically, led to unprecedented levels of digital innovation. The pandemic has also highlighted how lack of access to broadband and internet has created a vicious circle of social and economic exclusion for the majority of South Africans especially in the rural parts of the country.

The ANC's mission in the ICT sector must be to make internet accessibility a basic commodity. Amongst other things, the 54th National Conference resolved that: "The ANC must further encourage efforts by Government and the private sector to deploy broadband infrastructure and services and also ensure accessibility of free Wi-Fi as part of the development of economic inclusion. Free Wi-Fi must also be provided in rural areas as well as Metros and in all public schools, clinics, libraries, etc." This is still a necessary intervention however, to achieve universal access to broadband and internet, our interventions must also focus on providing access for households.

The release of the spectrum has created a launching pad for the digital revolution in South Africa. The competitive spectrum allocation programme must in the end support the realisation of universal access to affordable and quality high-speed infrastructure and services. It must also have sufficient scope for socio-economic development.

There are a number of areas that will be unlocked as a result of this long-awaited reform in the ICT sector. These include:

- Rapid increase in broadband and internet access and connectivity for the country;
- Increased investments in communication infrastructure;
- Faster data speeds which are necessary for innovation and the gig economy;
- A faster shift to data services; and
- An enabling environment for the rapid development of 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR) technologies especially the widespread utilization of internet of things.

The 4IR technologies, which include artificial intelligence, internet of things, virtual reality, and robotics, have permeated every sphere of our lives. These technologies will have an impact on the labour market, industrial productivity and efficiency, social interactions and political systems. Greater usage of automation technology in industries will result in efficiency and increased economic competitiveness which leads to higher economic growth levels.

On the downside, automation will also result in job losses. Overall, 4IR technologies will lead to the creation of new industries and new type of jobs. This means that the current workforce that may be rendered obsolete by the new technologies can be trained and empowered with new skills to facilitate their continued participation in a modernized economy.

There are a number of things that require attention for us to reap the rewards of the 4IR and the ICT sector in general. These include:

- Strengthening the regulatory bodies to cope with the fast-changing technological landscape and the 4IR;
- Utilizing the spectrum release as leverage for widening broadband and internet coverage and access;

- Utilizing state-owned broadband assets to connect rural areas, schools, clinics and other social amenities;
- Providing free basic data for every household to bridge the digital divide and create an inclusive society;
- Ensuring that cybersecurity is strengthened to protect data, personal information and government data bases, and also safeguard our data sovereignty which is foundational for the development of the 4IR technologies;
- Facilitating the creation of an innovation ecosystem that brings together entrepreneurs, investors and funding institutions, research institutions, community and government so that new start-ups can emerge with solutions (e.g., apps, tools, gaming etc) for societal problems;
- Intensifying the efforts to lower the cost of communication through regulation (ICASA) and the Competition Commission.
- An enabling environment for new entrants in the ICT sector must be created so that there is dilution of the dominance of a few players and also ensure increased participation of black industrialists.
- Creating an enabling environment for the creation of local industries that produce ICT equipment and tools.

A strategic policy framework for long term digital policy planning should be developed under the leadership of the Department of Communications and Digital Technologies which will enable South Africa to overcome its digital divide by extending services to all corners of the county, which will enable e-government and improved government services, and which will position the South African economy as a competitive and strong participant in the global 4IR.

9. GREEN ECONOMY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND JOB CREATION

In the past decade, the climate crisis has also emerged as a central challenge for the South African economy, with rising risks of both droughts and floods in different parts of the country.

As the world is transitioning to a carbon neutral economy in an effort to combat climate change, there is a need to maximally exploit the green economy for the benefit of all South Africans. The NDP points out that "The green economy agenda will be leveraged to promote deeper industrialisation, energy efficiency and employment."

South Africa's green economy interventions should focus on expanding the programme to retrofit public and private buildings with measures to improve energy and water efficiency. The extension of this programme to schools, clinics and other public buildings has the potential to build a local industry that is labour intensive and anchored in a sustainable value chain that supports SMME participation and skills development for unemployed youth.

The transition in the automotive sector will entail the shift from manufacturing of internal combustion engine cars to other alternatives such as battery electric vehicles and fuel cell electric vehicles. Training workers to prepare for this shift will be relatively easier than in other sectors. With the growth of the global EV market our country has the opportunity to expand the automotive industry and create more jobs.

The wild-life, or biodiversity, economy currently employs more than 400 000 people. This sector has been hard hit by the COVID-19 pandemic. Recovery in the sector should include infrastructure development such as creating fire breaks, fencing, tourism facility upgrades, road building and maintenance, all of which are labour intensive activities.

Another sector which directly emits significant quantities of greenhouse gases is the automotive sub-sector within the transport sector. The transition in this sector will entail the shift in manufacturing of

internal combustion engine cars to other alternatives such as battery-electric and fuel cell-electric vehicles. Although the automotive value chain will be affected (e.g.\ catalytic converters), training workers to prepare for this shift will be relatively easier than in other sectors. With the growth of the global EV market our country has the opportunity to expand the automotive industry and create more jobs. In this regard, the Auto Green Paper on the advancement of new energy vehicles in South Africa that is under development at the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition must address itself to the growth of the sector and the Just transition.

Waste recycling and the transition to a circular economy is another area where South Africa can dramatically upscale its interventions to create jobs, formalise informal micro enterprises, divert waste from landfills and the environment and improve the overall system of waste management. The development of compliant landfills in every municipality as well as appropriate recycling facilities will assist in ensuring that South Africa is able to more effectively deliver waste management services and achieve targets on waste diversion and reuse.

The transition to a low carbon economy and a climate resilient society will be costly. The Paris agreement puts an obligation on developed countries to contribute financially to the just transitions in developing countries. From our perspective we must ensure these funds include both grant and concessional funding. This is necessary to ensure justice for workers and communities in affected industries.

10. REBUILDING THE TOURISM SECTOR

Before the COVID-19 pandemic started, the tourism sector was one of the fastest-growing sectors globally and locally. By 2019, tourism had grown to a notable contributor to the South African economy. The sector has an extensive value chain and labour absorption capacity that places it at the centre of the effort to combat unemployment, poverty and inequality. Tourism can employ individuals of varying skills levels, from unskilled to highly skilled individuals, including women in rural localities and small towns, thus ensuring an equitable geographic spread of tourism benefits.

To place the tourism sector on a faster path to recovery, the following recommendations are proposed:

- Intensify the campaign to get more South Africans vaccinated;
- Expansion of the roll out of e-VISAs, and increasing the processing capacity in the rollout of e-VISA applications;
- Finalization of the aviation strategy, given the aviation industry's strong linkages with tourism;
- Development of "new-normal" supply-side capabilities and capacity aimed at driving economic transformation in the supply side of the tourism sector;
- Increase the number of VISA-free countries that will be targeted for purposes of boosting tourism;
- Develop a tourism infrastructure project pipeline to unlock South Africa's diverse product offering to both domestic and international tourists;
- Increase SMME funding in the tourism sector in a manner that deepens the spatial tourism subsector product offerings in villages and small towns;
- Prioritise the development of tourism infrastructure projects through DFI funding in a manner that de-risks investment in tourism projects and allows for increased blended funding to foster transformation and drive employment creation;
- Increase spending on the maintenance of strategic national parks, world heritage sites and other strategic tourist attractions; and
- Develop and implement a marketing strategy for both domestic and international tourism markets.

- Prioritise the improvement of rural roads and infrastructure.
- Improve the processing timelines for permits for tour operators in the Department of Transport and investigate the feasibility transferring this responsibility the Tourism department

11. LAND REFORM, AGRICULTURAL POLICY, FOOD SECURITY AND THE RURAL ECONOMY

Our approach to the land question is guided by the proposition in the Freedom Charter – *The Land shall be shared among those who work it!* Accordingly, the ANC must continue to drive policies that will ensure that land is made available especially to land-hungry black persons, including women and the youth, who genuinely want to engage in productive agricultural activity.

The rapidly increasing rate of urbanisation has also rapidly increased the demand, among the (black) African majority, for urban land for purposes of human settlement. Government must therefore attend to this urgent demand. In this regard, the land release programme for human settlements development which includes among others the release of state-owned urban land, held by the Department of Public works and Infrastructure (DPWI) and other state organs, must be intensified.

The progress made towards the passing of expropriation legislation and strengthening of land redistribution processes will add impetus to the land reform programme. This will also be bolstered by the establishment of a specialist Land Court as well as a Land Court of Appeal, as contained in the Land Court Bill, aimed at accelerating the country's land reform programme as well as resolving backlogs and disputes around land claims.

11.1 SUPPORTING THE GROWTH OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

Agriculture remains an essential sector of the South African economy. It holds the potential to uplift many poor South Africans out of poverty through increased food production, vibrant economic activity, and job creation. Since the 1994 democratic breakthrough, agricultural land reform has been central to South Africa's agricultural policy, anchored on the three pillars of land reform, which are land restitution, redistribution, and tenure. Land reform is fundamental to our transformation agenda and can yield higher near-term spin-offs in the agricultural and rural economy.

On average, growth in agriculture is more poverty reducing than an equivalent amount of growth outside agriculture. Therefore, investing in the growth of agriculture should become one of the key priorities of economic policy. The provision of land alone is unlikely to achieve the growth anticipated through land reform for agricultural purposes. For this reason, the ANC-led government has proposed the establishment of the Land Reform and Agricultural Development Agency.

However, there are a few critical preconditions that need to be in place to advance transformation and support growth in the agricultural sector, which the ANC will prioritise.

These include:

- A stable and conducive policy and investment environment;
- Comprehensive, sufficient, and well-maintained infrastructure, including electricity, water, roads, rail and ports;
- Well-functioning local municipalities with reliable service delivery;
- Effective farmer support services and administrative support, expanded access to finance; and
- Well-functioning state services such as veterinary services, agricultural research, biosecurity measures, trade negotiations and support.

11.2 ACCELERATING LAND REFORM

To accelerate land reform, the Land Reform and Agricultural Development Agency should have five broad tasks:

- Enabling policy and bureaucratic processes to facilitate land donations;
- Creating and managing a recognition mechanism given to farmers donating land and/or who also provide financial and other support to beneficiary farmers;
- Developing programmes to assist new entrant farmers with market access, to develop skills across the entire agricultural value chain;
- Establishing and managing the Land Reform Fund (This could be done collaboratively with the IDC and Land Bank, and later transition to the Land Bank when it has been stabilized from its current challenges.); and
- Recording and monitoring progress on land transactions.

The Agency will manage government land under the Agricultural Land Holdings Account (ALHA) and activate contributions from the private sector. Most importantly, the Agency will monitor progress with land reform and, in the process, advise on partnerships between farmers and beneficiaries.

In addition to the initial endowment of state land owned by various Departments and State-Owned Enterprises, the State also has, over the last decade, acquired a total of 2.46 million hectares of productive farmland through the Pro-Active Land Acquisition (PLAS) programme for redistribution to beneficiaries. Currently, these farms are only rented out to specific farmers on short term contracts and as a result many of these farms are unproductive or producing sub-optimally. The inability to access finance due to the insecurity of tenure is one of the primary reasons for this.

Accordingly, it is proposed that the DALRRD should work in collaboration with agribusinesses to bring these farms into full production. The Agricultural Research Council has already conducted an agricultural potential and suitability assessment of all these farms. Anecdotal evidence suggests that if the recommendations are implemented, there should be a dramatic expansion of production (especially production by Black farmers).

For this to take place, there need to be three critical steps:

1. Land ownership (title deeds) should be transferred to qualifying beneficiaries who are selected according to the approved beneficiary selection policy. Strict selection based on merit and skills, as well as means-testing, should be applied.
2. Production finance is secured by the title deed. CASP funding (which must be redesigned) for improvements in immovable assets and farm infrastructure.
3. Establish links with commercial value chains, agribusinesses, and government procurement schemes.

11.3 BOOSTING THE VIBRANCY OF THE RURAL ECONOMY

Rural development is multi-dimensional, encompassing the improved provision of services and opportunities, better infrastructure; social cohesion; and adequate government provision for the vulnerable groups in society. Therefore, the key role-players that will improve the lives of rural people are better functioning municipalities, provincial roads departments, provincial health departments, provincial education departments, water and sanitation, police, and social development.

South Africa's rural economy depends on a few key industries, typically resource-based, such as agriculture, mining, fishing, tourism and forestry. In the current economic climate, agriculture is one of the critical sectors that requires minimal investment to unlock the growth potential to generate

livelihoods and employment in rural South Africa. This means the constraints to the sector highlighted above and the need for investment in network industries should be a priority.

12. STATE OWNED COMPANIES AND DEVELOPMENT

State-owned Companies (SOCs) can play a critical role in providing a social, economic or infrastructure need that the private sector is not able to deliver. SOCs can also provide an essential public good at a rate that is affordable to society, in particular the poor, and the economy. They can be a source of revenue for the state and thus help fund other societal needs.

On the downside, SOCs can also be a target for repurposing through capture, which manifests though corruption, wastage, inefficiency, negative monopoly conduct and a drain on the fiscus. They can divert badly needed revenue from the state at the expense of more important needs. They can suffocate the economy and block a more efficient private sector fulfilling the same need at a more affordable price.

Many of these SOCs have become dependent on bailouts. The decade of state capture destroyed many of them, as have structural changes in some of their sectors. Our SOCs are struggling because poor corporate governance has left them vulnerable to corruption and mismanagement. But they are also struggling because of structural shifts in their sectors.

In engaging on the future of our SOCs the following questions must be asked and answered:

- Which SOCs are strategic and must be retained and supported?
- Which can be consolidated?
- Which need to be repositioned?
- Which sectors of the economy should the state be involved in and in which is it not necessary?
- Which new sectors of the economy should the state seek to enter?
- Is there a need for a new, or hybrid, SOE model including the creation of a holding entity to improve governance and accountability?

What is clear is that the current model is dying. If we want to save SOCs and workers' jobs, then we need concrete plans that are based on the realities of the economy and the needs of workers. The era of bailouts for SOCs is over. It is not sustainable. Workers whose jobs are at risk must be reskilled and redeployed to where vacancies exist. Workers should be assisted with seed capital and support to establish their own SMMEs. We should not be sending workers to the unemployment queue.

The ANC will continue to be guided by the vision outlined in our Ready to Govern policy document, that the balance of the evidence should guide our structuring and restructuring of state owned enterprises, and our decisions on which services we need to fund as public utilities, or in which areas we need to increase or reduce public ownership in order to advance our economic programme.

13. EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMES AND A FAIRER LABOUR MARKET

Public employment programmes should continue to be funded and expanded, such as, programmes to mobilise young people to provide services to schools, as well as public works programmes aimed at maintaining infrastructure and strengthening resilience to climate change.

Labour legislation is often incorrectly blamed for economic stagnation. This is often done for ideological not economic reasons. Instead of focusing only on labour legislation, there is a need to address obstacles to growth such as inadequate skills development, mismanagement and corruption, rising crime, deteriorating municipalities and structural shifts in the economy.

Ways must be found to make compliance with labour legislation easier for employers and to make it more accessible to workers. This includes modernising the CCMA so cases can be heard within a few days, not a few months, and fixing the UIF so workers and companies can receive their funds in a matter of days, not months. Similar investments are needed for the Labour Courts, Compensation Fund, Sector Education and Training Authorities and other key labour market institutions.

There are some gaps in the labour laws that need to be fixed, such as ensuring that all workers are registered with the UIF and similar institutions. Protections from retrenchment and outsourcing also need to be strengthened. Currently, many atypical, e-platform, gig-economy, SMME and self-employed workers fall through the cracks as the nature of work evolves. Increased support measures and eased regulations are also required for those working in the informal economy.

Workers are our most important economic asset. We need to invest in them so that they have the skills for companies to grow, pay them a living wage so they can take care of their families and buy the goods we produce, provide reliable and affordable public transport so they can arrive at work on time, invest in the social wage so we can reduce the worst forms of poverty, and protect the rights of workers so they can focus on work and not need to spend time defending themselves from abusive and exploitative behaviour.

14. SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING

The 54th National Conference resolutions on skills development framed skills with more of a focus on the youth and were almost silent about other age categories. This is in contrast with framing skills development from a comprehensive lifelong learning perspective that considers the skills needs of people of all age categories.

While the focus on the youth is essential, given the high rate of youth unemployment and the high number of young people who are not in employment, education or training (NEET), it is equally important to be comprehensive.

To that end, the resolutions tasked the ANC to ensure that the government established specialised ICT institutions of higher learning and Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) colleges to prepare for a massification of e-skills (digital skills) and create opportunities for SMMEs, and presumably, co-operatives. This is based on the need to transform ownership patterns, broaden empowerment, reduce both wealth and income inequality, and roll back concentration and monopoly in our economy.

Immediate to medium-term considerations

The majority of the unemployed population is consistently constituted by those who do not have a National Senior Certificate or did not complete matric or schooling. In the fourth quarter of 2021, for example, their unemployment rate was 39.8% in terms of the official definition that excludes discouraged work-seekers.

However, it will be incorrect to suggest that those who have completed schooling and have matric, and those who have post-school certificates or qualifications do not experience unemployment. For instance, at 37.7% in the fourth quarter of 2021, the unemployment rate of those who have matric was not far from the unemployment rate of those who do not have matric. It is equally critical to note that South Africa does not have full graduate employment. In the fourth quarter of 2021, for example, the unemployment rate of those who have some form of a post-school certificate or qualification was 23.7%.

The question, then, is why do we have unemployed graduates? Is the problem merely with the choice of their study programmes, certificates or qualifications—"skills mismatch"? Or do we have a systemic or structural economic problem? Or does a combination of the two underpin the unemployment crisis?

These questions underline the immediate task that we are faced with - the necessity to advance both structural transformation of the economy and a skills revolution simultaneously. In addition, the situation points to the need to consider a nationally directed career guidance effort and an education and training funding programme which attaches great importance to pivotal, scarce and critical skills.

What else is to be done?

The National Skills Development Plan has identified key institutions in need of adequate support to drive the skills development agenda. These include the strengthening of the TVET and Community Education and Training (CET) colleges. However, the TVET college sector has been impacted by reprioritisation of resources and has not seen the adequate support required for the skills revolution that South Africa should be driving.

In addition, we need to address the problem of the high rate of school dropouts, to ensure that all South Africans complete schooling. To this end, the Department of Basic Education needs to strengthen its efforts as part of its immediate intervention to eliminate barriers of access, learning and success in the basic education system.

The Department of Higher Education and Training can intensify the provision of skills training through the CET colleges, over and above TVET colleges and Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs), as well as universities of technology and universities. The importance of adequately resourcing CET colleges, as with TVET colleges, to expand the provision of skills training, cannot be overemphasised.

We have been driving a correct emphasis on trades, for example, on producing more artisans in different trades, more technicians, and more engineers. This is absolutely necessary, including to achieve employment equity, broad-based empowerment, and the development of thriving co-operatives and SMMEs sectors. However, alone this will not be enough to address our national unemployment challenge or crisis. The government's establishment of the Quality Council for Trades and Occupations in 2010 drew attention to another critical skills development area, namely, occupations. Ramping up skills development in occupations over and above that in trades can play a crucial role in our skills revolution. Related to this, the Centres of Specialisation Programme can play a critical role in driving occupational skills development, if adequately supported.

During apartheid, education for the oppressed straight-jacketed the majority to be jobseekers. Post-apartheid, there has to be redressed, including through greater emphasis on producing not just jobseekers but also employment creators. The 54th National Conference resolution regarding the necessity to review the curriculum in schools to include a strong component of skills development for all learners remains essential. This should, however, not be limited to preparing the youth for the world of work, but should be extended to building an enabling environment for new venture creation, such as co-operatives and SMMEs, and support for these ventures to thrive.

It is imperative for the skills revolution that South Africa should be combined with and supported by structural economic transformation to build, diversify and expand national production, to resolve the crisis of unemployment and eradicate poverty and radically reduce inequality. the crisis of unemployment and eradicate poverty and radically reduce inequality. Finally, it is critical, therefore, to set skills development objectives and increase our trades and occupations training targets, including trade and occupation testing. We should build capacity to achieve our strengthened skills development objectives and targets, including through prioritising Recognition of Prior Learning interventions

15. SMMES, CO-OPERATIVES, INFORMAL TRADERS, TOWNSHIP AND VILLAGE ECONOMIES

As a means of fostering economic development, inclusive growth and employment creation, small, micro, and medium-sized enterprises (SMMEs), co-operatives, as well as township and villages economies (TVEs) all have a role to play. In an economy with high unemployment, SMMEs, co-operatives, TVEs can contribute considerably to economic growth and reduce poverty and inequality.

The revitalisation of TVEs and the establishment and support of existing SMMEs and cooperatives are at the heart of the socio-economic development. SMMEs, co-operatives, and TVEs can mobilise communities and act as agents to facilitate local and regional economic development.

The small business Act of 1996 was intended enable the development of Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs). However, the Act took on board all three business categories without recognising that Micro Enterprises operate mainly in the informal sector while small and Medium businesses operate in the formal sector.

For micro-entrepreneurs to become a reliable pipeline for growth of small business in the formal sector, they need to be welcomed and assisted to occupy designated places, and guided to register through a simpler, easier and affordable instruments at the municipal level and not subjected to onerous administrative processes such as registration with SARS, CIPC or FICA which are often not accessible to rural areas. The administrative constraints have been at the centre of perpetuating financial exclusion of Micro businesses and micro-entrepreneurs. This category of businesses can be greatly assisted by creating an enabling policy framework that allows for the increased participation non-banking microfinance institutions.

To enable SMMEs, co-operatives, informal traders and TVEs to thrive, we must:

- Scale-up efforts to expand access to tailored financial and non-financial products;
- Employ financial instruments, fiscal policy and incentives to attract investment;
- Remove micro-enterprises which operate best in the informal sector out of the Small Business regime to remove the red tape
- Develop a National Strategy for Micro-enterprise which will include the development of microfinance Act.
- Tap into innovative approaches to sources of funding; and establish funds in collaboration with the private sector to mitigate capital deficiencies and transfer skills and knowledge;
- Facilitate access to markets and integration in local, regional and global value chains; and
- Cut red-tape, streamline processes, strengthen the regulatory and administrative environment.
- Municipalities to remove the requirements for payment of permits by informal traders and provide necessary support all the levels.

We need to expand access to opportunities and combat spatial inequality: (I) Amending the regulation governing townships and villages to enable redesignation into economic zones with broad, job-creating commercial activity. This will be accomplished by implementing targeted measures designed to encourage new investment; (ii) Strengthening procurement processes so that the government and its principal contractors may purchase from township and village-based businesses working alone or in co-operation; (iii) Creating an SME fund to offer wholesale, blended credit to intermediaries lending to township- and village-based businesses, including community banks; and (iv) Providing legal frameworks for the Township backyard real estate initiative, including measures for the development of township commercial precincts and township high streets.

16. SUPPORTING CREATIVE INDUSTRIES

The 54th Conference "recognised the potential of the creative industries as a socially transformative sector that provides jobs, drives economic growth, innovation and allows many young people to make a living from their talent". The Conference therefore resolved "that the ANC must upscale interventions to support the creative industries. We must ensure the protection of artists, including the development of a strategy to promote trade, fight piracy and map the value chains of this sector".

There is a need for measures that could be implemented to localize significant parts of the value chain, protect artists and their copyrights, and ensure that the sector is well supported and structured so that it is a source of decent work.

Our experience from the COVID-19 era is that: (1) creative Industries play a key role in the incubation and the transfer of technology; (2) given the global nature of consumption of creative products, the size of the domestic market is not a limitation; (3) trade in creative goods and services is rising at a fast rate and so are the related export earnings; (4) creative industries can foster income generation while promoting social inclusion.

South Africa needs to strengthen its programme to promote creative industries, develop audiences and broaden access to markets, as well address underlying issues of transformation in the sector.

17. AFRICAN TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement signed in 2018 promises to create the largest free trade area in the world in terms of the number of member countries. The pact connects 1.3 billion people across the continent with a combined gross domestic product valued at US$3.4 trillion.

The AfCFTA seeks to adopt an "development integration" approach that leaves no country behind. In this regard, the design of regional integration is "asymmetrical" in favour of the "Small, Vulnerable Economies and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)". It further seeks to ensure inclusive "participation of all African state members in regional productive value chains" to industrialise the continent. Lastly, the cross-border critical infrastructure is one of the pillars that is essential for "developmental integration" to be a success.

The R2G advocated for a free trade regime with "a differentiated approach" towards the adjusted trade barriers that seek to prevent harm to both domestic and regional producers. In this regard, the trade policy was to be anchored on South Africa being an active participant in the international and multilateral trading arrangements.

The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) called on South Africa to deepen its trade relationships with its neighbouring African countries, particularly within the Southern African region. In this regard, the RDP called for the government to develop "procedures for revising tariffs and export incentives".

The ANC's position must be to use the AfCFTA as an instrument to advance the developmental integration of African economies. Through increased trade and investment, the aim should be to accelerate the movement of African production into higher value added activities. The ANC should seek to maximize the opportunities to be ushered in by the AfCFTA, including infrastructure development, global value chains initiatives, and skills development.

18. WAY FORWARD

As the ANC approaches mid-year Policy Conference and National Conference later this year, it is imperative that ANC members, ANC structures, Alliance structures, and South African society more broadly engage in detailed discussion on the interventions required to accelerate the rate of economic growth, transformation and employment creation.

The intention of this Discussion Document is to outline a number of the most important economic challenges and policy debates currently facing South Africa so as to assist in facilitating a deepened process of democratic discussion on these important matters.

QUESTIONS FOR BRANCH DISCUSSION

1. What progress has been made in uplifting the economic conditions of the ANC's core constituencies since 1994?
2. How should we respond to those that say that the ANC has failed to build and transform the economy?
3. How should we address the poor delivery at many municipalities across the country?
4. How should we improve the work and professionalism of civil servants?
5. How should we shield our society against climate change?
6. How could land redistribution be accelerated? And what strategies will help to boost the success of this programme in a sustainable manner that is not disruptive to food security and the economy?
7. How should we approach the just energy transition to ensure restored energy security, as well as to assist those workers and communities involved in coal production?
8. How best can we advance wider access to data and telecommunications services?
9. What role do co-operatives and small businesses have in the growth and transformation of our economy?
10. What policies are needed to restructure our State Owned Companies so that they are effective and sustainable?
11. What policies are needed to promote important labour-intensive sectors, such as, tourism, agriculture, manufacturing and creative industries?
12. Overall, how could the ANC's strategies for inclusive growth be enhanced?

10

Education, Health, Science and Technology

1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND.

1.1 This document represents the official account of the work that has been done by the ANC Subcommittee and members who are deployed to lead various sectors of the ANC NEC Subcommittee on Education, Health, Science and Technology and those deployed as political leaders of the Basic Education, Higher Education & Training, Health and Science, Technology and Innovation in government.

1.2 It is presented to assist members and supporters of the ANC, stakeholders and various communities to assess objectively the performance of the ANC against goals set by the 54th ANC National Conference and emerge with proposals on how the ANC must serve South Africa best henceforth.

1.3 The African National Congress (ANC) is trusted by its members, supporters and most South Africans, as the organisation that provided leadership in the struggle against apartheid and colonialism and the political party that has faithfully served the country since the fall of apartheid.

1.4 From the time of its founding in 1912, until the democratic breakthrough of 1994, the ANC was the only hope for most of our people. It was always at the forefront as the primary, most effective and trusted liberation movement. It has been the leader of government in South Africa since 1994 to date. It has performed well in transforming South Africa from apartheid to democracy.

1.5 The mission of the ANC is to construct a united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous South Africa. Its main goals are expressed in strategic documents such as the Freedom Charter, Ready to Govern, Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), the Strategy and Tactics of the African National Congress and resolutions of its conferences.

1.6 All programmes implemented and pursued by the education, health, science and technology sectors are derived from the relevant resolutions of conference. These resolutions are translated into ANC and government policies.

1.7 This report is structured in line with directives of the ANC NEC Policy Subcommittee, which pertain to preparations by constitutional structures of the ANC and political discussions towards conference.

1.8 The overarching priorities that guide the preparation of this discussion paper are Organisational Renewal and Unity; and Radical Socio-Economic Transformation. These priorities were set by 54th National Conference for the 2017-2022 ANC term of governance. Please note the following:

1.8.1 The Policy Conference, which will be held in the run up to National Conference, will serve as a platform to assess performance against goals set at the 54th ANC National Conference.

1.8.2 In the Governance and Transformation Policy Areas, the Subcommittees has proposed policies that must be retained or changed or proposed new policy positions. These proposals are based on the review and assessment of the implementation of programmes and envisaged plans. Emphasis is placed on the acceleration of implementation and the maximisation of the impact.

1.9 Discussions of policy are aimed at stimulating debates in the ANC, in communities and beyond, for example in village makgotla and amongst the academia.

1.10 All discussions of assessment of progress made against resolutions start with an intensive examination of the work of the ANC and the Subcommittee at national, provincial, regional and branch level. This is important. It emphasises the centrality of the ANC and its leadership of society. This assessment of the ANC is done before the assessment of the work of the ANC in government. The ANC must therefore lead its members, society and government in the implementation of its own resolutions.

1.11 The ANC is, for ANC members and supporters, the centre of reality of a South Africa and the citizenry that is served without any conditions.

1.12 An ANC patriot is the one whose heart is with the Congress Movement and whose loyalty is firmly to the Republic.

1.13 A strong ANC is a sure guarantee of a strong government and a strong South Africa.

1.14 Discussions are accompanied by concrete proposals to improve the quality of lives of South Africans. These include corrective measures that must be implemented, new ideas and policies that are designed to assist the ANC and the country to assess the impact of the work of the ANC on individuals, communities and the country since the dawn of democracy.

2. PROPOSED QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSIONS.

2.1 These are questions that are recommended for use as a guide for discussions by all stakeholders, especially members of the ANC at branch level and members of the community:

- What progress has been made in the education, health, science, technology and innovation sectors in your community and province since the 2017 NASREC, Johannesburg 54th ANC National Conference?
- What is your experience and those of your community about whether schools, colleges, clinics and hospitals are accessible and serve your community?
- Have you found that ANC policies in these sectors support efficient and speedy delivery of services?
- Are there any policy gaps in these sectors that you have identified and policies that you would propose for adoption by the ANC?
- What should the ANC, government and communities do to improve and strengthen all our sectors to implement policies and programmes effectively?
- As a member of the ANC, are you playing a role in the implementation of programmes in these sectors?
- Please propose one action or policy change that the ANC should do or adopt in each sector, namely education; health; science, technology and innovation, to get the country closer to radical socio-economic transformation?

3. SCOPE OF THE DISCUSSION PAPER.

3.1 This discussion paper of the 6th National Policy Conference covers sectors already mentioned. It has ensured that there is continuity of political thought and analysis between discussions of the 5th National Policy Conference and those of the 6th National Policy Conference. It aims to revive the revolutionary spirit in members. It proposes what members of the Subcommittee believe are ingredients necessary for the invigouration of the National Democratic Revolution.

3.2 The discussion document responds positively to all directives of the National Executive Committee (NEC) that policy papers must be guided by and focus mainly on the critical issues. It includes a review of decisions that have been taken since the 53rd and the 54th ANC National Conferences, an assessment of implementation of ANC resolutions, decisions and the adequacy of current ANC policies per sector. It proposes steps to close identified policy gaps and weaknesses of programmes.

4. ASSESSMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE AND SECTORS.

This is an evaluation of the work of the ANC from the NASREC-Johannesburg 54th ANC National Conference to date. It articulates the ANC resolutions and policy goals. It clarifies what has been achieved or not by the Sub committee and sectors. It lists challenges that were met and/or still exist.

4.1 **CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES**:

4.1.1 *ANC Policy context*.

4.1.1.1 Education and health remain the top most priorities of the ANC, the government and the country. Science, Technology and Innovation is an abler that cuts across all sectors.

4.1.1.2 Our assessment of the work of subcommittee and its sectors considered every success and failure in context. It provides members a good understanding of why and how the ANC and the ANC-led government succeeded. It provides reasons and factors that contributed to the evidence of such success or failure. It uses that to elevate the development trajectory of our country through evidence-based planning.

4.1.1.3 Despite difficulties and failures in some instances, the ANC and the ANC-led government have succeeded in moving the country forward. This is supported by the evidence from many well-researched studies and publications, including the 2019 official report entitled *Towards a 25-year Review*.

4.1.1.3.1 The President of Republic of South Africa, Comrade Cyril Ramaphosa, states the following in the 25-year review of South Africa's progress from apartheid to democracy: "… *For the past 25 years, as part of restoring human dignity, government has worked to provide all South Africans with basic services, water and sanitation, housing, electricity, social support, education and health care. It has sought to build an economy that provides work and opportunity to all in pursuit of the dream of a new and equal society*".

4.1.1.3.2 The late Minister in the Presidency, Comrade Jackson Mthembu confirmed the fact that a lot of progress has been made from 1994 to 2019 by stating that: "… *Access to opportunities has been significantly expanded for previously disadvantaged South Africans. These include access to basic education for 10 million learners in 20,000 No-Fee Schools. Near universal coverage was achieved. Enrolment increased from 97.8% in 2005 to 99% in 2015. Pro-poor policies implemented include the National School Nutrition Programme, which has benefitted 9 million learners (out of 12 million). Access to Primary Health Care (PHC) services has been*

expanded, with PHC Headcounts increased from 68 million in 1998 to almost 120 million in 2019".

4.1.1.4 We must note that the quality of lives of our people in rural and urban areas is better than it were yesterday. This must move us all to work harder to do better.

4.1.2 *Government policy context*.

4.1.2.1 Most of the resolutions of the ANC have been translated into government policy, plans and programmes.

4.1.2.2 The Subcommittee has noted with concerns that some resolutions of conference do not find expression in plans and programmes of government.

4.1.3 *Policy gaps*:

4.1.3.1 The ANC and government continue to display deficiencies in areas such as leadership and management, human resources planning, development and management, procurement and supply chain systems, financial management, infrastructure and technology. These areas need a review of performance, policies and programmes.

4.1.4 All sectors of the Subcommittee have heeded the call for urgency of implementation that was made by Conference. However, effective monitoring and evaluation of implementation of conference resolutions is still weak.

4.1.5 ANC branch activism, leadership and campaigns in communities on issues of education, health, science, technology and innovation need strengthening.

4.1.6 The ANC must rekindle the spirit and practice of collaboration and accountability in members and leaders of the ANC and the Alliance. It must do the same to deployees and implementers of programmes of the ANC in the organisation, legislatures and the public service. Deployees must appreciate and use the support provided by the ANC outside of government and the support of communities.

4.1.7 The Subcommittee convened meetings, as directed by the resolution of conference, to deal with several issues such as the NHI and programs designed to address challenges facing the health sector.

4.1.8 The Subcommittee dealt continuously with the most important causes of failure of delivery in government.

4.1.9 All sectors of the Subcommittee mobilised necessary resources to achieve the goals and priorities set out in the National Development Plan (NDP) 2030. However, sectors did not continuously identify gaps in the NDP for purposes of closing those to improve planning and the implementation of policy.

4.1.10 The Subcommittee regularly communicated its achievements to its members and the public.

4.1.11 The Subcommittee ensured that the ANC adopts programmes to commit local government to play a critical role of supporting education; health; science, technology and innovation, including Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in line with the District Development Model (DDM).

4.1.12 The Leagues of the ANC, ANC PEC Subcommittees on Education, Health, Science and Technology and members of the Congress Alliance including youths and students participated actively in the activities of the Subcommittee.

4.2 **ANC SUBCOMMITTEE**:

4.2.1 *The ANC policy review cycle*: The proposal that the ANC policy review cycle should be increased from five (5) years to at least ten (10) years was not processed and therefore not implemented.

4.3 **SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION**:

4.3.1 *To increase investment in Research and Development*: The Gross Domestic Expenditure on Research and Development (GERD) has persisted in its decline over the years. It has been worsened by the persistent decline in business investment and inadequate government investment in R&D, especially at provincial and local government level. The decrease in R&D expenditure by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) added to this.

4.3.2 *On the use and increase of uptake of locally produced technologies*: Despite good progress that is being made in implementing this resolution, government, labour and business are not demonstrating any material increase in their uptake of locally produced technologies. The Technology Acquisition and Deployment Fund is being piloted to support the uptake of locally developed technologies. There are at least fifteen (15) technologies are either in use or in their evaluation stage. A few locally developed and government-funded technologies, have been introduced into the market as part of government's response to the local COVID-19 epidemic and the global COVID-19 pandemic. *The Innovator Programme*, the *Through the Living Labs Programme* and the *Strategic Industrial Bioinnovation Partnership* are being used to support over 100 beneficiaries and to develop sustainable bio-enterprises in support of economic growth and development.

4.3.3 *On the coordination and harmonisation of policies and incentives related to STI*: There are a range of policies, incentives, and initiatives sponsored by various Departments in support of STI. Some of these are not always well coordinated. This results in the implementation achieving less impact than desired.

4.3.4 *On the use of STI within and across the public sector as an enabler of service delivery*: The take up and utilisation of STI by the public sector is not always recognised as providing possible solutions to improved delivery of services to communities by potential users in provinces and local government.

4.3.5 *On the promotion of new innovations and invention of new technologies*:

4.3.5.1 South Africans are innovative, although grassroots innovation is not taking place in South Africa at a scale of other countries such as China, India and Brazil.

4.3.5.2 Progress is being made and learners are experiencing first-hand the benefits of programmes such as the hydrogen fuel cell technology (HFCT), Students in the Data Science for Impact and Decision Enablement (DSIDE) programme. Formalised partnerships between colleges and the National Intellectual Property Management Office (NIPMO) is used to create awareness of available IP, the value of IP and its utility for an entrepreneur.

4.3.5.3 Insufficient progress has been made to cultivate a culture of inventing new technologies and products amongst learners in schools, students at colleges and universities and workers in every sector, viz. growing the *Made in South Africa* movement. South Africans do not have yet, like some nations do, a wide-spread culture of buying, using, dismantling, copying and manufacturing technological equipment to meet their daily needs. The type of entrepreneurship that is being promoted across society is not consciously linked to value-add to tradeable commodities, research and development, innovation and technology.

4.3.6 *Programmes that are designed for rural areas, townships and poor towns and city suburbs*: The DSI has programmes that are designed for rural

areas such as the Cofimvaba School District Technology Project, contribute to the improvement of education in the rural area through technological innovation including improved connectivity. The ST sector has not tabled in this reporting period the addition of similar programmes to promote science literacy and the creation of Wi-Fi spots, as directed by conference.

4.4 **BASIC EDUCATION**:

4.4.1 *A comprehensive review of the education and training system*: The Basic Education sector working with the Higher Education and Training sector and the National Treasury have not submitted a comprehensive review to the ANC by April 2019.

4.4.2 *Strategic alignment and repositioning of the basic education sector*: Good progress is being made in the implementation of policies and programmes that are relevant to this resolution towards achieving good quality teaching and learning outcomes. The Induction Programme for newly qualified teachers on the Professional Teaching Standards, programmes on the establishment and strengthening of Professional Learning Communities (PLC`s) and the induction of principals, the vetting of new teachers and the repeal of the Collective Agreement No. 2 of 2014 and its replacement with Collective Agreement No. 2 of 2020 on the Quality Management System (QMS) for school-based educators are some of the work done. The sector identified the need for policy change to promote the recognition of teachers as professionals.

4.4.3 *Operation Phakisa in education*: Good progress is being made in the speeding up implementation of this Presidential Programme on ICT in schools. Partnerships contributed to the progress made. The greatest challenges are in rural areas where many areas do not have connectivity because of lack of ICT infrastructure and systems.

4.4.4 *Protecting public facilities*: Schools continue to be vandalised. The ANC and its Subcommittees have not implemented plans or programmes systematically to lead society to take ownership of all public facilities and properties. It does not have a formal national plan to protect these from damage and destruction, especially in times of social upheavals. The BE sector in government is dealing systematically and regularly with acts of vandalism and disruptions.

4.4.5 *Skilling and educating the youth who are neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET)*: Progress is being made in the creation of employment opportunities for the youth that are NEET. However, the skilling and education of these youth has to be priotitised as the main goal. Collaboration with other sectors on this matter are weak.

4.4.6 *Relocation of Early Childhood Development to the Department of Basic Education*: A lot of work was done, including putting systems in place to ensure that policies, laws and regulations are in place. The transfer of the ECD from the Department of Social Development to the Department of Basic Education took place on 01 April 2022.

4.4.7 *Optimisation of Early Childhood Development for all children, with special emphasis on children with special needs*: Poor progress has been made by Basic Education, Departments of Social Development and Health to optimise Early Childhood Development with great emphasis on children with special needs.

4.4.8 *Dealing with inequities that exist between rural and urban education*: Poor progress has been made to comprehensively eradicate inequities that exist between rural and urban communities in the education sector. Focus is mainly on providing teachers or educators to rural schools. Resources that must be prioritised include physical infrastructure, education-specific

technologies including those used in laboratories and libraries, ICT and furniture, organisational development and human resources and quality assurance bodies. The provision of services such as school transport and basic services such as water, sanitation, electricity and ICT connectivity remains a challenge in rural areas.

4.4.9 *Setting aside the resolution of the 52nd conference on making education an essential service*: The ANC set aside the resolution of the 52nd ANC National Conference on making education an essential service. The Subcommittee has not convened meeting of the ANC and its alliance partners to pursue a sustainable programme aimed at maintaining and sustaining good labour relations and reducing conflicts within the Basic Education sector.The COVID-19 local epidemic has thrown back the challenge of "education as an essential service" to all South Africans, as teachers are amongst essential services workers that are prioritized.

4.4.10 *Adoption of the legislative framework to guide in addressing administrative lapses that result in interventions in terms of section 100 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996*: No progress has been made by the sector to put in place the legislative framework to guide in addressing administrative lapses in the basic education sector that result in interventions in terms of section 100 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Earlier reports from the said sector indicate that it believes that this is the mandate of COGTA. The ANC has not received a formal report on this matter.

4.4.11 *Implementation of sport, arts and culture programmes*: Various local, regional, provincial, national programmes are being implemented in sport, arts and culture. These include school sport, athletics, music, debates, school moot courts, reading and spelling. There are no reports on programmes designed to institutionalise indigenous and traditional African music to promote Afrocentric values, culture and tradition.

4.4.12 *The Presidential Remuneration Review Commission on remuneration and conditions of service for all employees in the Public Service and Public Entities*: No progress was made as the report of the Commission was not released in the first half of 2018, as directed by conference. This is because the Commission did not complete its work. Problems that are related to the remuneration and conditions of service in government remain.

4.4.13 *Improving literacy and numeracy*: A lot of progress has been made in the area of literacy and numeracy since 1994. However, the ANC has not received during this reporting period accounts with data that indicates progress made to improving literacy and numeracy amongst learners.

4.4.14 *Boarding schools, technical schools, academies and schools of excellence*: 12 out of 24 boarding schools were completed thus far in the expansion of numbers of boarding schools. The sector still has to report to the ANC on progress made in response to directives on the estaclishment of technical schools, academies and Schools of Excellence.

4.4.15 *Languages in the school curriculum*: The ANC has not received any progress report from the BE sector on the introduction in all schools, public and private, of a minimum of 3 languages into the curriculum wherein one is the indigenous African language of South Africa. Good progress is being made by implementing the Incremental Introduction to African Languages (IIAL) programme. The challenges of teacher capacity and the provision of LTSM for the project need to be resolved urgently.

4.4.16 *The establishment of a single and inclusive examination board for the NSC examinations*: Plans have been made and a draft concept document is being

worked on towards the establishment of a single and inclusive National Examinations and Assessment Board for the entire school system. The Board has not been established as yet. Challenges faced by the sector include the absence of the supporting legal framework and an integrated framework for assessments.

4.4.17 *Audit of mobile schools and clinics by branches*: No progress has been made in the audit of mobile schools and clinics by branches of the ANC. The DBE has the lists of mobile schools.

4.4.18 *Resourcing of village and township schools*: As stated above under "*Dealing with inequities that exist between rural and urban education*", poor progress has been made in the resourcing of village and township schools. Inequities are expressed in the lack of or the poor state of basic services, libraries, laboratories, infrastructure, technology, sports facilities, goods and services in these areas. The sector has not submitted comprehensive plans and a detailed report on current deficits and required resources by schools in disadvantaged areas. 42 libraries and 63 laboratories were built from 2018 to 30 April 2022. All newly built schools have libraries and laboratories as part of the Norms and Standards.

4.4.19 *Second chance opportunity programme for matriculants*: Learners who were upgrading their matric qualification have received good support. The Framework for the Second Chance Matric Programme (SCMP) was finalised. The SCMP is being offered.Provincial coordinators were appointed in all the nine (9) provinces. Eighty (80) face-to-face centres were established and online and paper-based learner materials were distributed. Top-performing teachers have been appointed to teach after hours and over weekends. The DBE is reconfiguring SCMP to cater for the NEET Group.

4.4.20 *Strengthening of school health services*: Good progress has been made in strengthening school health services. These are delivered through the Integrated School Health Programme (ISHP). There is good collaboration between DBE, DoH and DSD. However, nurses have not been deployed to schools to implement health plans as directed by conference.

4.4.21 *School infrastructure*: This resolution was a directive to the health sector, but the BE sector provided the ANC with information that relate to ASIDI. The infrastructure programme is not performing at its best. The BE sector has not provided the ANC with details of delivery of infrastructure against targets. On the average, 27 schools are delivered per annum through the Accelerated Schools Infrastructure Delivery Initiative (ASIDI). The poor performance of infrastructure programmes and recurrent low expenditure have led to the decrease in budgetary allocations to provinces. At the current pace of infrastructure delivery maintenance, the current backlog of school infrastructure will not be eradicated.

Increasing the safety net through pro-poor policies to cover learners who are deserving such as ECD, and learners with special education needs.

4.4.22 *Learner transport provided to all learners who qualify*: The sector has not submitted to the ANC a detailed account on the state of learner transport including data on whether all qualifying learners are provided with reliable learner transport. The Subcommittee noted the report of 2021 where it was stated that 616 726 out of 749 478 learners were transported to schools in the 3rd Quarter of 2020/21. The sector prioritises learners with special education needs.

4.4.23 *National School Nutrition Programme*: Progress is being made in providing nutritious meals to all learners in targeted schools. The Department of Basic Education provides meals to 9 675 366 learners through the National School

Nutrition Programme (NSNP). Improved menu options on the NSNP include a breakfast for learners in targeted priority districts in poor and disadvantaged communities.

4.4.24 *Schools for learners with special educational to be declared "No-Fee Schools"*: All schools for learners with special educational needs have been declared No-Fee Schools. The challenge of inequity is expressed in the funding of No-Fee Schools below the nationally-determined target amount, as is the case with Mpumalanga, KwaZulu-Natal and the Northern Cape.

4.5 **HIGHER EDUCATION AND TRAINING**:

4.5.1 *The College sector in the Post-School Education and Training System*:

4.5.1.1 *The provision of additional academic and psycho-social support to bursary holders and recipients of financial assistance from the state to increase their chances of success*: In 2019, the DHET established *Higher Health* to implement a comprehensive and integrated programme to students across all universities and colleges. The programme promotes the health and wellbeing of students, on-going campus support to PSET institutions. It also supports institutions in providing youth friendly services and training. There is a dedicated 24/7/365 toll-free crisis help-line. This is staffed by mental health professionals who provide psychological support to students. Students are referred to specialised clinical services where necessary. Some institutions have mobile clinics.

4.5.1.2 *Adoption of a framework for regulating higher education fees in colleges and universities*: The higher education and training sector has not adopted the framework for regulating higher education fees in colleges and universities, despite the intense contestations by stakeholders and the need for meaningful consultations. A draft Regulation Framework has been developed, but yet to be consulted.

4.5.1.3 *The redesign of the funding formula for colleges and universities*: The resolution on the redesigning of the funding formula for colleges and universities has not been fully implemented. The revised National Norms and Standards for Funding Technical and Vocational Education and Training Colleges (NNSF-TVET) has been published in the Government Gazette with effective retrospective implementation date of 1 April 2021. The NNSF-TVET includes changes in new programme types. It also changes the funding mechanism for TVET colleges.

4.5.1.4 *Expansion of digital programmes*: Progress has been made by the PSET sector in its use of technology in learning and teaching. The sector has not highlighted any challenges in the expansion of digital programmes in its offerings. The Department has, with external assistance, recently completed a digital readiness assessment of TVET colleges.

4.5.1.5 *Support for increased student accommodation*: The Department of Human Settlements is reported to be having funds allocated for student accommodation. However, the ANC has not received a report on the HET sector's efforts to build relations and to collaborate with the Department of Human Settlements to allocate funds towards student accommodation. The HESI is collaborating with the National Treasury, the DBSA and other state agencies on the Student Housing Infrastructure Programme (SHIP) to fast track issues of student accommodation.

4.5.1.6 *Fast tracking the implementation of the Central Application Service (CAS)*: There is work that is being done on the Central Application Service (CAS). However, the HET sector has not implemented the CAS in universities by March 2018 and full implementation

across the PSET system by 2022 as directed by conference. The CAS pilot was launched on 1 March 2022. The urgent need for the CAS remains.

4.5.2 *Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs)*: The main purpose of the SETAs is not to train students, but to facilitate training through the funding of training programmes run by training institutions and various industries. Progress was made in the SETA sector in that the National Skills Development Plan (NSDP) and the Changing SETA Landscape were approved. Their implementation improved the work of under-performing SETAs and the re-establishment of the Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs) within a new SETA Landscape from 1 April 2020 to 31 March 2030. The Mining Qualifications Authority (MQA) was re-established for a period of two (2) years from 1 April 2020 to 31 March 2022. Collaboration between the SETAs, the public sector and the private sector has not resulted in making all graduates from the PSET system work-ready at the time of completion of their studies. Qualified students, even from colleges, are required to produce proof of experience before employment.

4.5.3 *Promotion of technical and vocational education and training as the first career choice*: Poor progress has been made towards the making vocational and technical training the most attractive career option for the majority of learners in our country. Most learners at schools aspire to enrol at universities by obtaining a Bachelor's Pass in their National Senior Certificate (NSC) examinations. The general approach of the DHET is to do away with diplomas as qualifications and to promote degrees as an indicator of professional qualifications. Industry contributes through its employment practices to the everted triangle of skills provision where the norm for engineers: technicians and artisans is no longer 1:4:16 on the average. A considerable number of college-educated graduates are unemployed because having not received Work Integrated Learning (WIL) during their years of education and training and thereafter because of lack of opportunities to do practical training post-qualification. The challenge that remains is how to eradicate the national myth that promotes university education as the first and best choice. Making vocational and technical training attractive would be possible if the ANC HET and BE sector could review and confirm the correctness of the scale of achievement for the National Curriculum Statement Grades 10-12 in line with the approved Policy for the National Senior Certificate (NSC) and together work out solutions.

4.5.4 *Making sufficient resources available to increase infrastructure, lecturer training, bursaries, access and curriculum transformation in the college sector*: Progress has not been made to increase infrastructure, lecturer training, bursaries, access and curriculum transformation in the college sector. The HET continues to exclude all other types of colleges such as Emergency Medical Service, nursing, teacher training and agricultural colleges in its plans and work. Despite the R2.991 Billion additional funding through the TVET Capital Infrastructure Efficiency Grant from 2018/19 to 31 March 2022, funding is insufficient for the sector to expand the college sector as directed by this resolution. This additional funding was for infrastructure repairs of core teaching and learning facilities.

4.5.5 *Alignment by the HET and BE sectors of technical and vocational offerings in schools and colleges*: Little progress has been made by the HET and BE sectors to align technical and vocational offerings in schools and colleges. There appears to be no sense of urgency amongst senior civil servants as chief implementers to attain the goals of this resolution.

4.5.6 *Articulation within the PSET sector*: Good progress is being made. The HET sector has evaluated the implementation

of National Qualification Framework to determine how TVET colleges and universities are articulating students within and between programmes and institutions. There is a challenge of different practices and approaches by individual institutions.

4.5.7 *Offering in colleges qualifications for post-Grade 12 entrants on Levels 5 and 6*: Some TVET colleges are offering Level 5 Higher Certificates in partnership with universities.

4.5.8 *The College sector in the Post-School Education and Training System*: The reports of the HET sector in the ANC and government do not provide any information on progress made to clarify the nature and role of the entire college sector. This sector comprises of Community Education and Training (CET) colleges, Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) colleges and other colleges for specialised purposes such as agriculture, nursing, emergency care, policing and teaching.

4.5.9 *Conducting the cost-effectiveness and appropriateness of offering students mid-level courses at universities instead of colleges*: The sector has not provided the ANC with the assessment of progress made in doing research on this matter. It has not reported on whether it has determined where such courses would best be delivered.

4.5.10 *Conducting an audit of skills in colleges to determine competencies of educators and support staff*: The audit of skills in colleges to determine competencies of educators and support staff has not been done. The said audit is still in its planning phase.

4.5.11 *Expansion of and resources for the college sector*: The ANC has not received any report or plans on the expansion and adequate funding of the college sector. The ANC has noted that the expansion by 610 000 instead of 2.5 million new admission by 2013 is due to factors such as inadequate funding.

4.5.12 *The programmes of TVET colleges must respond to skills needs and unemployment*: The ANC has not received a comprehensive review of all programmes of public and private colleges to ensure that they respond to the skills needs of our economy and our country. The DHET has not provided details of its collaboration with industry associations to respond to skills needs and unemployment.

4.5.13 *Colleges must foster partnerships with universities of technology and various industries for work experience for both lecturers and students*: Little progress was made to ensure that Work Integrated Learning (WIL) is compulsory in undergraduate education and training, as directed. The HET sector has not institutionalised systematic attachments and active placement of students in companies in various industries from first year to the last year of training. However, Work Integrated Learning (WIL) in colleges has gained traction through support from the National Skills Fund (NSF). The placement of students for work experience is now tracked as a key output in colleges.

4.5.14 *Greater focus on education and training in social sciences*: Progress is being made in prioritizing education and training in humanities and social sciences. The HET established the National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIHSS) which is playing a critical role in supporting the development of the humanities and social sciences within the university sector and the national system of innovation.

4.5.15 *Institutional autonomy*: The ANC has not received any report from the HET sector on its enforcement of legislation on institutional autonomy for universities.

4.5.16 *On People's Education for People's Power*: No progress has been made to

position the ANC as a thought leader on the broader ideological and political issue of decolonisation of education and training.

4.5.17 *Increasing the retirement age of professionals and academics*: The retirement age of workers with scarce skills, professionals across all sectors and academics has not been increased as directed. The ANC has not received a report on whether this resolution has been translated into government policy and what progress has been made in its implementation across government.

4.5.18 *Improving the alignment between college and university programmes to the requirements for employment*: There is substantial work being done on this through the University Capacity Development Programme (UCDP). The HET has not reported to the ANC on its implementation of the resolution of conference which makes it compulsory for colleges and universities to obtain concurrence and approval from relevant ministries to offer any course, especially in the health sector.

4.5.19 *Work-readiness of diplomates and graduates*: No progress has been made in ensuring that graduates from colleges and universities are work-ready on the day of their graduation. No data was provided on the enforcement by colleges and Universities of Technology of Work Integrated Learning (WIL) from the first year of studies. The Entrepreneurship Development in Higher Education Programme (EDHE) is being implemented to cultivate the entrepreneurial mind-set and promote self-employment after graduation.

4.5.20 *The establishment of specialized colleges and universities in metropolitan municipalities*: No progress has been made in the establishment of specialized colleges and universities in metropolitan municipalities. The ANC has noted the announcement made of plans to establish a university of science and innovation in Ekurhuleni and a crime detection university in Hammanskraal. The ANC awaits a report that is due in July 2022 on this matter.

4.5.21 *Ensuring adequate supply and replacement of teachers*: No progress has been made in the auditing of teachers for the purpose of workforce or human capital planning and development to guarantee adequate supply and replacement. The ANC has not received the Teacher Supply and Demand Study that has been completed and was due for submission in May 2021.

4.5.22 *Holding members of college and university councils accountable*: Progress has been made in holding members of college and university councils accountable. The DHET monitors the compliance of college governance quarterly.

4.6 **HEALTH**:

4.6.1 *On the National Health Insurance and Health Financing*: Progress is being made in the law-making process towards the NHI Act. The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in an 18-month delay in the processing of the Bill.

4.6.2 *On health budget allocations and population movements*: The government has not implemented the resolution of conference on providing solutions that ensure that the health budget allocation takes account of population movements. This includes reducing the financial burden on the National Health System that is caused by undocumented and illegal migrants from other countries.

4.6.3 *Improving the management of the National Health System*: The public health sector continues to be plagued by five (5) major issues namely management, human resources, procurement and supply chain systems, financial management and infrastructure maintenance. A number of steps have been undertaken to address all these

challenges. The main challenges are leadership, management and the underfunding of the health sector. Underfunding was exacerbated by budget cuts over the MTEF period ending 2022/23. However, there have been continuous engagements with National Treasury on budget shortfalls.

4.6.4 *The Nelson Mandela-Fidel Castro Health Collaboration and the expansion of the health professionals training platforms in South Africa*: The *South Africa-Cuba Cooperation in the fields of Public Health and Medical Sciences*, also known as the Nelson Mandela-Fidel Castro (NMFC) Health Collaboration, is an programme of cooperation in four (4) areas. These areas are the recruitment of medical doctors and lecturers from the Republic of Cuba; the training of South African medical students and postgraduates in the Republic of Cuba; the exploration of possible mutual interests in the fields of biotechnology production and the development of pharmaceuticals and any other field of scientific research; and any other program or activity that may be mutually agreed upon between South Africa and Cuba. The resolution, which directed the Subcommittee and the ANC and government health sectors to assess the NMFC Health Collaboration in the light of the expansion of the health professionals training platforms in South Africa, has not been implemented. However, the government has been assessing this programme on a continuous basis. The ANC has neither assessed independently nor received from government a report on the NMFC Health Collaboration and the expansion of the health professionals training platforms in South Africa.

4.6.5 *School health services*: This programme is being implemented by the DBE in collaboration with the Department of Health.

4.6.6 *Accelerated Infrastructure delivery for health*: This resolution on Accelerated Infrastructure delivery has been prioritised by the Ministry. The sector is currently using the Infrastructure Unit System Support (IUSS) Gazetted Guidelines whose processes are aligned with those of ASIDI and one of the initiatives of the DOH and CSIR. One of the challenges is the lack of capacity of the Department of Public Works and Infrastructure to deliver and maintain health infrastructure.

4.6.7 *State pharmaceutical company*: Ketlaphela Pharmaceutical State-Owned Company Limited was established in response to the directive of the Cabinet of the Republic of South Africa. One of the challenges facing this programme is that some stakeholders and government officials regard Ketlaphela as a threat to the private pharmaceutical sector, particularly manufacturers of generic pharmaceutical products. This project is not implemented by the Health sector, but by the Department of Science and Innovation.

4.6.8 *Elimination of all vaccine-preventable diseases*: The health sector has not submitted a plan and a report to the ANC on its programmes to eliminate all vaccine-preventable diseases which have existing vaccines with proven efficacy on or before 2027. However, the health sector has made progress on its programmes to eliminate all vaccine-preventable diseases which have existing vaccines with proven efficacy on or before 2027. It continues to focus on reducing the burden of vaccine preventable diseases. Several public and private sector partners are collaborating to develop and build the World Health Organisation (WHO's) global mRNA vaccine technology transfer hub. A South African company which is collaborating with a China State-Owned Company, the SAIMR and the WHO and is building a vaccine manufacturing plant for Africa in Saldanha Bay, Western Cape, is a participant in the BRICS Vaccine Research and Development Centre, which was launched in March 2022.

4.6.9 *Revitalisation of military health facilities*: This resolution which addresses matters falling under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defence (DoD) and not under the Ministry and Department of Health has not been implemented. The Subcommittee has not followed up these matters with the ANC NEC Subcommittee on Peace and Stability in line with the resolutions of the 54th National Conference and previous conferences.

5. DRAFT POLICY PROPOSALS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OR DRAFT RESOLUTIONS.

As we discuss the work, renewal and the strengthening of the ANC, let us ensure that policy proposals and recommendations that we are making are not a repetition of past resolutions. Policy gaps must be identified. These must inform our proposals of new policy options. Proposed policy and programme re-endorsements and changes must focus mainly on improving implementation in the ANC and in government. Emphasis must be placed on improving the quality of lives of all South Africans through effective implementation and good services. Members of the ANC and those who will contribute positively to the festival of ideas on ANC policy must focus on having the ANC and ANC-led government emerging out of the Policy Conference confident that its capacity to implement is strengthened substantially.

5.1 **CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES**:

5.1.1 *The local COVID-19 epidemic*: Having learnt lessons from the COVID-19 local epidemic and the COVID-19 global pandemic, it is recommended that all sectors:

5.1.1.1 Especially the Basic Education sector, build on the curriculum and assessment tools and practices utilized during the pandemic.

5.1.1.2 Strengthen the forced leap into the digital space and acknowledge that as much as classrooms and working spaces in all sectors remain important, the digital space is very important.

5.1.1.3 Continue to work towards increasing access to the digital space, digitized learning materials, assistive technologies and other resources.

5.1.1.4 Build a resilient system ready to face future disasters such as deadly epidemics and crises caused by the damage to the environment.

5.1.2 *On the commitment to integrate alternative forms of education into the South African education system*: Noting the imperative for South Africa to include in its approach the increased use of on-line and web-based education and training; therefore, recommend that access and use of knowledge and information that is available in abundance through digital means be integrated into the method and practice of teaching and subjects of our education system; and that digitisation using the most advanced of tools, be compulsory at all levels of education, with special focus on rural as well as all disadvantaged communities.

5.1.3 *Deepened monitoring and enhanced partnership with private education*: Noting that there is a need for systematic monitoring of the private education sector and enhanced partnership with private education institutions; it is therefore recommended that government review policies, laws and regulations that pertain to private education to ensure maximum gains for the entire citizenry; and that a broadened consultative platform be established between government, private education practitioners as well as all education stakeholders such as organised civil society to maintain good country standards and promote synergy.

5.1.4 *On Gender-Based Violence and Femicide (GBVF)*: Noting that South Africa has a very high rate of gender-based violence; that the ANC and

government has taken resolutions and has policies on GBVF; that there are serious concerns about the DNA backlog at Forensic Laboratory Services; therefore, recommend that the ANC reviews and re-endorse its resolutions on Gender-Based Violence and Femicide (GBVF); and that conference directs the Cabinet to ensure that relevant departments collaborate and presents a costed plan and programme that will ensure that the country standard for processing forensic pathology specimens especially DNA tests is within three months of receipt; that conference directs the ANC NEC Subcommittee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs to lead a process of creating a victim-friendly criminal justice system through a constitutional amendment. That must consider the rights of victims of crimes to balance the rights of the accused, as enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic to make the system victim-centric.

5.1.5 *On matters environment in the context of education, health, science and technology*: Noting that in South Africa environmental education is poor; that matters environment include, amongst others, protection of the environment from damage, environmental sustainability, reforestation, pollution, global warming, greenhouse effect and global warming, climate change and waste disposal; that there is a needed to integrate in all sectors environmental policy and decision making to position the workforce as important stakeholder in matters environment; therefore, recommend that the ANC prioritize and strengthen the capacity of education and health systems to engage in environmental action; that the ANC environmental education, health, science and technology strategy be based on science and orientated to environmental activism and not only on climate change; that environmental education and actions take an intersectional approach;and that the programmes on matters environment also focus on environmental justice.

5.2 **ANC SUBCOMMITTEE**:

It is recommended that:

5.2.1 *Increasing the ANC policy review cycle to ten (10) years*: The proposal that the ANC policy review cycle should be increased from five (5) years to at least ten (10) years be re-endorsed and implemented by the ANC NEC; that the ANC policy system be strengthened; and that a move be taken towards transforming the policy system to work continuously and sustainably and not just before policy conferences.

5.2.2 *The funding of education*: The education sector be directed to urgently study the funding of education, including early childhood development, basic education, higher education and training and relevant state academic institutions, and report to the ANC; and that the ANC revisit or re-discuss the principles of universal access to education for all, as expressed in the ideals of the 1943 African Claims, the 1955 Freedom Charter, the 1963 South African Communist Party Programme: Road to South African Freedom and the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme in the context of today's realities.

5.3 **SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION**: It is recommended:

5.3.1 *To increase investment in Research and Development and attract adequate funding of R&D across all sectors and throughout the country*: That the ANC cultivates the culture of research, development, innovation, the increased use of technology in provincial governments, the business sector especially the SMMEs, the financial sector and the manufacturing sector; that South Africans must be convinced that research and development linked to

manufacturing for self-sufficiency through local consumption first and later for export, is a good norm especially if facilitated through collaboration in R&D by every business with local colleges, universities and other academic institutions such as the CSIR and relevant industries; that budget coordination be implemented by setting aside or ring-fenced R&D funding at local and provincial government level; that all stakeholders should be urged to increase significantly their contribution to the development and employment of R&D personnel; and urge stakeholders to contribute positively to an increase in R&D in medical and health sciences and engineering.

5.3.2 *On the use and increase of uptake of locally produced technologies*:

5.3.2.1 That a law be drafted to compel government and private companies to use and increase their uptake of locally produced technologies; that the ANC and government encourage students, youth and working masses to copy and make new equipment to meet local societal needs; and that the ANC and government embark on a campaign of "*Buy South Africa! Local is lekker! Local is best!*".

5.3.3 *On the coordination and harmonisation of policies and incentives related to STI*:

5.3.3.1 That a focused process, namely Budget Coordination, be set up to coordinate and harmonise policies and incentives, especially those related to STI.

5.3.4 *On the use of STI within and across the public sector as an enabler of service delivery*:

5.3.4.1 That a coordinating mechanism, namely the STI Presidential Plenary and Inter-Ministerial Committee and the New Management Model, be considered and implemented to improve the use of STI within and across the public sector and as an enabler of service delivery.

5.3.5 *On the promotion of new innovations and invention of new technologies*:

5.3.5.1 *Policies be adopted to promote the recognition of the prevalence of STI in daily life and that these serve to encourage learners in schools, students at colleges and universities and workers in every sector to invent new technologies and products by analysing and learning from those imported and used daily in their lives*: That conference note the good progress that has been made; and that this resolution of conference be re-endorsed.

5.3.5.2 *Public engagement on and promotion of science, technology and innovation be intensified*: That conference note the good progress that has been made; and that this resolution of conference be re-endorsed.

5.3.5.3 *The ANC leads society to think more positively about ourselves and our innovation capabilities; and publicises advances that have been made by South African scientists and innovators*: That conference note the good progress that has been made; and that this resolution of conference be re-endorsed.

5.3.6 *Programmes that are designed for rural areas, townships and poor towns and city suburbs*: That the Science, Technology and Innovation sector be directed to urgently present by July 2022 a funded and implementable plan and programmes that are designed for rural areas, townships and poor towns and city suburbs to promote science literacy programmes and the creation of Wi-Fi spots to attain the objectives of this resolution.

5.4 **BASIC EDUCATION**:

It is recommended:

5.4.1 *A comprehensive review of the education and training system*: That the ANC directs the BE sector to urgently convene a meeting with the Higher Education and Training sector and the National Treasury and start with a comprehensive review of the education and training system as directed by conference; that the Subcommittee submit quarterly reports to the NEC on this matter.

5.4.2 *Strategic alignment and repositioning of the basic education sector*: That the ANC note good progress that has been made towards the strategic alignment and repositioning of the basic education sector; that the subcommittee discuss and recommend the requested policy change to promote the professional recognition of teachers; that conference directs the sector to establish and maintain a common approach throughout the sector and provinces; and that conference directs the sector to continue guaranteeing the consistency of approach in the implementation of the Quality Management System (QMS).

5.4.3 *Operation Phakisa in education*: That the ANC notes progress made in the implementation of Operation Phakisa in education; that the sector will work through the Cabinet to secure funding for this priority project; that the sector continue to explore alternative technologies; and that the sector advocate for a review of regulations plus pursue the zero-rating of data to ensure that the e-rate policy is implemented.

5.4.4 *Protecting public facilities*: That the resolution of conference be re-endorsed; that conference note persistent acts of vandalism and destruction of public facilities; and that the ANC leads society to take ownership of all public facilities and properties and to protect these from deliberate damage or destruction at all times.

5.4.5 *Skilling and educating the youth who are neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET)*: That the ANC directs the sector to focus more on skills development, education and training of the youth that are NEET.

5.4.6 *Relocation of Early Childhood Development to the Department of Basic Education*: That ECD be recognised as a national priority; that the resolution of conference be considered as fully implemented; and that the ANC Basic Education and Social Development sectors submit a combined report and activity plan to a joint sitting of relevant ANC NEC Subcommittees led by the EHST and the Social Transformation Committee (STC) for processing and forward submission to the ANC NEC with a view to urgent implementation and continuous monitoring and evaluation.

5.4.7 *Optimisation of Early Childhood Development for all children, with special emphasis on children with special needs*: That the resolution of conference be re-endorsed; that a combined programme be agreed upon by the ANC Basic Education, Health and Social Development sectors for processing and forward submission to the ANC; that the BE sector presents to a joint sitting of relevant ANC NEC Subcommittees led by the EHST and STC the said combined plan, programme with special focus on the coordination and integration of services focusing on children with special needs such as autism and other disabilities.

5.4.8 *Dealing with inequities that exist between rural and urban education and the resourcing of village and township schools*: That the resolutions of conference be re-endorsed; that the sector deal with this matter beyond the provision and retention of educators in rural communities; that the sector makes a deeper analysis of inequities between rural and urban education and review its plans and resources; that the sector submit to the ANC its plans, programmes and progress reports on the accelerated resourcing of schools, with special focus

on village and township schools to deal comprehensively with inequities in the education sector; and that the programme include greater focus on using various technologies (4IR and beyond) to bridge the urban-rural divide without moving or recruiting teachers from urban areas to work in rural communities.

5.4.9 *Setting aside the resolution of the 52nd conference on making education an essential service*: That the Subcommittee convene meetings urgently and lead the process of working with the ANC Alliance partners to ensure that there is labour peace in the education sector; that this matter be revisited and/or clarified objectively by the ANC and all stakeholders; and that a report on this matter be submitted to the ANC NEC on or before 31 July 2022.

5.4.10 *Adoption of the legislative framework to guide in addressing administrative lapses that result in interventions in terms of section 100 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996*: That the resolution of conference be re-endorsed; that the sector urgently commence with the legislative process directed by the resolution of conference; and that a report on progress made be submitted to the ANC before 15 July 2022.

5.4.11 *Implementation of sport, arts and culture programmes*: That the resolution of conference be re-endorsed; that the sector resolves the impasse between Athletics South Africa (ASA) and South African Schools Athletics (SASA); and that the sector establish school-based or local research groups to involve learners and teachers in the documentation, preservation and promotion of local arts and cultural history, goods and services in school libraries and museums; and that the BE-DSAC submit to the ANC joint plans on its work to establish systems aimed at the promotion and institutionalisation of indigenous African values, Ubuntu-Botho, music, culture, tradition and social cohesion.

5.4.12 *The Presidential Remuneration Review Commission on remuneration and conditions of service for all employees in the Public Service and Public Entities*: That the resolution of conference be rescinded, as it is not implementable; and that the Subcommittee follow up this matter and table a report to the ANC with recommendations of what is to be done to resolve problems related to remuneration and conditions of service; and that Cabinet be directed to hold to account relevant government departments that were responsible for overseeing the work of the Commission which was not completed.

5.4.13 *Improving literacy and numeracy*: That the resolution of conference be re-endorsed; that numeracy and literacy amongst learners and communities be translated into a Ministerial Priority Programme; that the Minister of Basic Education ensures that government officials who are responsible for implementation of programmes designed to improve literacy and numeracy across the country implement the sector's short-term and long-term plans with a greater sense of urgency to improve the literacy and numeracy levels of all learners using all resources including ICT and other education-specific technologies; that the sector improve teacher capacity and the resourcing of the programme with relevant Learner Teacher Support Material (LTSM) and the capacity of the School Management Team and District Curriculum Leadership to intensify this programme; and that the Subcommittee submit a report to the NEC before 16 December 2022 on progress made in the implementation of this resolution.

5.4.14 *Boarding schools, technical schools, academies and Schools of Excellence*: That the resolution of conference be re-endorsed; that the Subcommittee facilitate a study and interaction with fraternal political parties and governments to learn and compare the structures, roles and functions of

academies and Schools of Excellence for our country's benefit; that the ANC note with appreciation the introduction in 2019 of Marine Sciences as one of the subjects offered by the sector, ongoing work on the draft Aviation Curriculum and the framework for Vocational and Occupational disciplines; that the sector be directed to present to the ANC costed plans and programmes for the establishment of public schools for talented and specially-gifted learners and technical high schools in every district; and that the BE sector build more boarding schools plus urgently establish academies and Schools of Excellence as directed, with a report being tabled with recommendations for a proposed resolutions of the coming December national conference.

5.4.15 *Languages in the school curriculum*: That the resolution of conference be re-endorsed; that the BE sector submit to the ANC plans and progress reports on the introduction in all schools, public and private, of a minimum of 3 languages into the curriculum wherein one is the indigenous African language of South Africa.

5.4.16 *The establishment of a single and inclusive examination board for the NSC examinations*: That the resolution of conference be re-endorsed; and that the Subcommittee follow up on the commitment made by the sector to urgently resume its work of establishing a single and all-inclusive examination board for the entire school system spanning the public and private sector; and the receive progress reports before 15 July 2022.

5.4.17 *Audit of mobile schools and clinics by branches*: That the resolution of conference be re-endorsed; and that the ANC receive the list of mobile schools and prioritize the implementation of this resolution by ANC BECs, RECs and PECs and report to the NEC.

5.4.18 *Second chance opportunity programme for matriculants*: That the resolution of conference be re-endorsed; and that the sector manage, monitor and evaluate this project regularly and report to the ANC.

5.4.19 *Strengthening of school health services*: That the resolution of conference be re-endorsed; and that the sector submit to the ANC costed plans and a progress report on the provision of necessary human and other resources to strengthen school health services; that the report includes a reviewed service delivery model, funding and mechanisms to track outcomes of referrals; that the ANC receive a detailed progress report from the ANC BE sector on the implementation by the DBE, DoH and DSD of the recommendations of the *2009 Teenage pregnancy in South Africa: with a specific focus on school-going learners* and current interventions in the context of COVID-19; and that the ANC to support government programs on care and support for teachers and learners such as school patrols to protect children going to and from school; that Comprehensive Sexuality Education in partnership with the Department of Health be strengthened; and that health screening programmes with special focus on eye health and hearing barriers be expanded and sustained.

5.4.20 *School infrastructure*: That the ANC directs the BE sector to deal with all infrastructure delivery and maintenance backlogs swiftly and urgently; and that the Subcommittee submit recommendations to the NEC about building the capacity of the state and the DPWI to plan, deliver and maintain schools and other public infrastructure.

Increasing the safety net through pro-poor policies to cover learners who are deserving such as ECD, and learners with special education needs.

5.4.21 *Learner transport provided to all learners who qualify*: That the resolution

of conference be re-endorsed; that the ANC continue prioritizing scholar transport in its deliberations and actions to ensure that the service is improved continuously; and the the BE sector submit regular reports to the NEC on this matter.

5.4.22 *National School Nutrition Programme*: That the resolution of conference be re-endorsed; and that the ANC Subcommittee and BE sector monitor the implementation and review of the National Food and Security Plan 2017–2022 and the extension of breakfast in 32 priority areas as identified by Cabinet.

5.4.23 *Schools for learners with special educational to be declared "No-Fee Schools"*: It is therefore recommended that the resolution of conference be re-endorsed; that the ANC regularly monitor and evaluate the implementation of this resolution and research results on the study of current funding models to determine financial implications.

5.4.24 *Promoting teaching as a profession*: Noting that teaching is a profession that lies at the heart of both the teaching and learning of children and youth and their social, cultural and economic development; that the attractiveness of the teaching profession needs to be urgently improved; that the current generation of teachers is ageing and alarming numbers of new teachers are leaving the profession within the first years of employment; that the professional commitment of teachers and academics to the education and welfare of their students should be recognized and respected; that the status of young teachers, academic staff, researchers and education employees deserves particular attention; therefore, recommend that the resolutions of the ANC on teacher training and the re-establishment of teacher training colleges be re-endorsed; that teacher education should be offered in teacher training colleges and universities up to the highest post-graduate levels of study; and that the state and teachers' unions collaborate in the development of strategies, plans and programmes for the development of the teaching profession.

5.5 **HIGHER EDUCATION AND TRAINING**:

It is recommended:

5.5.1 *Public funding of higher education (HE)*: That the ANC studies the cost-effectiveness of the NSFAS; reviews and clarifies the meaning of "a comprehensive student funding model"; reviews the appropriateness of giving financial assistance to students beyond their first undergraduate qualification, namely the first diploma or degree; and that the ANC reviews its current policy of "*Free higher education for the poor and 'missing middle'!*" in the context of the ideal of "Free education for all!" as enshrined in the 1943 African Claims, the 1955 Freedom Charter and the 1962 SACP Programme of Action: the Road to South African Freedom.

5.5.2 *The provision of additional academic and psycho-social support to bursary holders and recipients of financial assistance from the state to increase their chances of success*: That conference notes progress made; that the resolution of conference be re-endorsed, and that all bursary holders and recipients of financial assistance from the state for tertiary education undergo a compulsory needs analysis to identify those who need support and to ensure that additional academic ad psycho-social support is given to only those who need it.

5.5.3 *Adoption of a framework for regulating higher education fees in colleges and universities*: That this matter be finalised as a matter of urgency before 31 December 2023.

5.5.4 *The redesign of the funding formula for colleges and universities*: That the resolution of conference be re-endorsed; that the funding formula for the college sector, including the CET, TVET, Nursing,

Agricultural and similar colleges be finalised urgently on or before 31 December 2024; and that the redesign of the funding formula for universities be reviewed and presented to the 55th ANC National Conference for decision and resolution.

5.5.5 *Expansion of digital programmes*: That the PSET sector focuses on improving its offering of digital programmes by colleges, universities, other academic institutions and various industries.

5.5.6 *Support for increased student accommodation*: That the resolution of conference be re-endorsed; that the ANC directs the HET to urgently engage the Department of Human Settlements (DHS) and the National Treasury on this matter; and that the DHET and DHS ensure that student villages are integrated into sustainable human settlements in villages, towns and cities.

5.5.7 *Fast tracking the implementation of the Central Application Service (CAS)*: That the resolution on the Central Application Service (CAS) be reindorsed; and that the ANC directs the ANC HET sector to ensure that this project is prioritised for completion in colleges and universities by 31 December 2023.

5.5.8 *Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs)*: That conference note good progress made; that the HET sector develop a system with goals and targets to place students, especially all college students, in Work Integrated Learning (WIL) programmes throughout their period of studies to improve employability with productivity in relevant industries at the time of graduation.

5.5.9 *Promotion of technical and vocational education and training as the first career choice*: That BE sector in collaboration with the HET sector seriously consider the nomenclature it uses to describe its passes at NSC; that the HET sector uses Work Integrated Learning to improve the collaboration of colleges and industry plus improve the employability of learners throughout their years of training; that the sector embarks on programmes that promote the active collaboration of the PSET sector, industry, schools and communities to realise the value of technicians, artisans and tradesmen-tradeswomen in production and manufacturing; and that exchange programmes be embarked upon with Germany and BRICS countries to bring back skills and lessons to South Africa.

5.5.10 *Making sufficient resources available to increase infrastructure, lecturer training, bursaries, access and curriculum transformation in the college sector*: That the resolution of conference including the target of 1 million enrolments in TVET colleges by 2030 be re-endorsed; and that HET and the national Cabinet prioritise the provision of adequate resources and the introduction of appropriate curricula in the college sector to enable it to achieve its objective of growth to its 2030 goals and target to support the economy of our country.

5.5.11 *Alignment by the HET and BE sectors of technical and vocational offerings in schools and colleges*: That the resolution of conference be re-endorsed; that the Ministers in charge of this sector makes this matter a priority; report to the ANC regularly on this matter as one of ministerial programmes.

5.5.12 *Articulation within the PSET sector*: That the HET report regularly on progress being made in its implementation of the model to standardise programme articulation of college programmes into university programmes in the context of clear career paths in various industries and professions.

5.5.13 *Offering in colleges qualifications for post-Grade 12 entrants on Levels 5 and 6*: That this matter be clarified with the view to accepting this resolution as having been achieved.

5.5.14 *The College sector in the Post-School Education and Training System*: That the resolution of the 54th national conference be re-endorsed; that the NCV (Primary Health) course and qualification be terminated; and that the sector provide the ANC with report that has a clear articulation of the structure and function of the HET skills development platform and articulations between schools, colleges and universities by 30 September 2023.

5.5.15 *Conducting the cost-effectiveness and appropriateness of offering students mid-level courses at universities instead of colleges*: That the resolution of the 54th national conference be re-endorses and that the sector submit a report to this effect by 16 December 2022.

5.5.16 *Conducting an audit of skills in colleges to determine competencies of educators and support staff*: That the resolution of conference be re-endorsed, and that the skills audit be commenced in the entire PSET sector on or before 16 December 2022.

5.5.17 *Expansion of and resources for the college sector*: That the resolution be re-endorsed; that new targets and dates be determined; and a plan with cost estimates on the expansion of the comprehensive college sector excluding those in the military and law enforcement agencies be presented to the ANC, adopted and implemented in government.

5.5.18 *The programmes of TVET colleges must respond to skills needs and unemployment*: That that that the resolution of the 54th national conference be re-endorsed; that the ANC receive a comprehensive report that covers all programmes of the private and public sector in the context of this resolution with the view of increasing the employability of all college graduates.

5.5.19 *Colleges must foster partnerships with universities of technology and various industries for work experience for both lecturers and students*: That the resolution of conference be re-endorsed; that conference directs the DHET to ensure that it changes from the current practice of "*Practical work and gaining experience after graduation*" to "*Work Integrated Learning (WIL) during years of education and training*"; and that lecturers in colleges benefit from structured constant exposure to work in relevant industries.

5.5.20 *Greater focus on education and training in social sciences*: That conference notes progress made in the pursuit of education and training in social sciences and humanities; that the ANC re-endorses the resolution of conference; directs the HET sector submits plans, programmes and progress report to the ANC on the work that is being done to make the education and training of students in humanities and social sciences a priority; and that the HET sector submit a progress report to the ANC on initiatives that are being pursued to improve lecturer competencies and capacity to drive improvement programmes in these areas by 16 December 2022.

5.5.21 *Institutional autonomy*: That the ANC re-endorses the resolution of conference; and that the ANC directs the DHET to immediately submit a report on the implementation of current legislation on institutional autonomy and the enforcement thereof.

5.5.22 *On People's Education for People's Power*: That the ANC re-endorses the resolution of conference; and that the ANC directs the DHET to submit to the ANC by 16 December 2022 concrete plans, programmes and a progress report on the decolonization of education and training in South Africa.

5.5.23 *Increasing the retirement age of professionals and academics*: That the ANC re-endorses the resolution of conference; and that the ANC directs

that the national Cabinet formally translate this into government policy and implement it throughout government departments, statutory bodies and State-Owned Companies.

5.5.24 *Improving the alignment between college and university programmes to the requirements for employment*: That the ANC re-endorses the resolution of conference; and that the ANC directs the HET sector to immediately implement this resolution and submits plans, programmes and a progress report on the work that is being done in the college sector to improve the alignment between college and university programmes to the meet the needs of society and requirements for employment, with special focus on agricultural, nursing, teacher training and emergency medical care colleges; and that and that the ANC directs the HET sector and the BE sector collaborate to identify and terminate courses, offerings and qualifications such as the NCV(Health) that disadvantage trainees and leave them at the level of NSC after three (3) years of further education and training post-NSC.

5.5.25 *Work-readiness of diplomates and graduates*: That the ANC re-endorses the resolution of conference; and that the ANC directs the HET to submit a report on progress that is being made to ensure that graduates from South African colleges and universities are work-ready, fully proficient, competent and productive on graduation day with no need for employers to require that they get additional work experience before being offered full-time employment on probation.

5.5.26 *The establishment of specialized colleges and universities in metropolitan municipalities*: That the ANC re-endorses the resolution of conference; and that the ANC directs the HET to submit a copy of policies, plans, programmes that have been put into action and a progress report to ensure that specialised colleges and universities are established in specific metropolitan municipalities as per this resolution and directives.

5.5.27 *Ensuring adequate supply and replacement of teachers*: That the ANC re-endorses the resolution of conference; and that the ANC directs the Subcommittee to receive and evaluate the report and submit recommendations to the NEC by 15 July 2022.

5.5.28 *Holding members of college and university councils accountable*: That the ANC re-endorses the resolution of conference; and that the ANC directs the HET to finalise and adopt the draft Governance Standard Regulation designed for monitoring and evaluation of councils and report quarterly to the ANC on the monitoring and evaluation of college and university councils.

5.5.29 *Reviewal and intensification of transformation of tertiary education*: Noting that the South African colleges and universities continue to struggle with matters of transformation; and that the Africa Wealth Report 2022 states that the top universities for producing High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs) are the University of Cape Town, the University of Witwatersrand, Rhodes University, the University of South Africa, Stellenbosch University and the University of Pretoria; and that a similar picture exists in the college sector; therefore, recommend that the national transformation programme focusing on colleges and universities be reviewed and intensified; that such effort include unequivocal resonance with overall transformation agenda of our country; that the concept and practice of "*academic independence*" be reviewed and refined to ensure that government is able to productively invest in and facilitate the transformation of tertiary education or the higher education and training sector; and that tri-annual assessment summits be held by stakeholders to ensure consistency in progress without fail.

5.6 **HEALTH**:

It is recommended:

5.6.1 *On the National Health Insurance and Health Financing*: That conference re-indorses the resolution on the NHI which states that the implementation of the NHI remains a priority of government; and that conference directs all branches, regions, RECs, PECs and the relevant PEC and NEC Subcommittees to embark on mass education and mobilisation to support the passage of the bill into law.

5.6.2 *On health budget allocations and population movements*: That conference directs Cabinet to ensure that this problem is completely resolved by 31 December 2023 through the work of relevant government departments and in collaboration with multilateral bodies responsible for the welfare of refugees and immigrants.

5.6.3 *Improving the management of the National Health System*: That the problems of management, human resources, procurement and supply chain systems, financial management and infrastructure maintenance in the health sector be prioritised immediately for resolution at every level of the National Health System; and that the ANC receive quarterly reports from the Minister of Health on these critical matters.

5.6.4 *Medical insurance and litigation against medical malpractice*: That the health sector continuously strengthen measures to improve the quality of care delivered by health practitioners in the public and private sector; and that the health sector report regularly to the ANC on progress being made to curb high costs of medical insurance and litigation against medical malpractice.

5.6.5 *The Nelson Mandela-Fidel Castro Health Collaboration and the expansion of the health professionals training platforms in South Africa*: That the conference re-endorses the resolution on the NMFC Health Collaboration in the context of the Skills Revolution, the establishment of a sustainable internal skills development platform and a fully-fledged external skills incubator under the Department of Higher Education, Science and Innovation in collaboration with the Department of Health; that all areas of the South Africa-Cuba Collaboration be further explored; and that the element of solidarity between the ANC and Cuba, and South Africa with Cuba be maintained in the human resources development plan.

5.6.6 *Coordinating and promoting research and development in Traditional Medicine products and practices*: That conference re-endorses the resolution; that conference resolve that the state must, on behalf of the traditional medicine sector, be the custodian of the Intellectual Property (IP) related to African Traditional medicines; that the IP of traditional medicines be protected from interested parties such as the international pharmaceutical giants; that a study be undertaken for South Africa to learn from other countries such as China, India and other BRICS members, on how these countries have protected and developed their traditional medicines, pharmaceuticals and practices and implement that for the benefit of South Africans.

5.6.7 *Strengthening school health services*: That the health sector implement together with relevant sectors the resolution that deals with school health services.

5.6.8 *Accelerated Infrastructure delivery for health*: That the health sector submit to the ANC the Accelerated Health Facilities Infrastructure Delivery Initiative (AHFIDI) or equivalent; that the health sector resolve, at the operational level and through discussions with the National Treasury, the issue of centralization of funding of infrastructure projects in the Infrastructure Fund; that the capacity and role of and collaboration with the

Department of Public Works and Infrastructure be reviewed; and that conference directs Cabinet to direct relevant law enforcement agencies to identify, arrest and eliminate criminals and criminal syndicates and their civil service enablers that operate in the public sector where some demand and award contracts that are corrupt.

5.6.9 *State pharmaceutical company*: That the ANC, particularly the Subcommittee, review the conduct and performance of and benefits of the state from all state-owned pharmaceutical companies; that the ANC develop a policy that ensure majority share ownership of these companies is by the state to guarantee that the intellectual property that accrues from these companies belong to the state; and that the Health, Higher Education and Training, Science and Innovation implement this resolution urgently in collaboration with relevant department of government.

5.6.10 *Elimination of all vaccine-preventable diseases*: That conference directs the Subcommittee to regularly update the ANC NEC on the implementation of policy, programmes and progress on this matter, the BRICS collaborations and local efforts and outputs on vaccine research and development and self-sufficiency with pharmaceuticals, therapeutics and vaccines.

5.6.11 *Reviewing the nature of the South African health system and the appropriateness of its front line care providers*: That conference mandates the ANC health sector to review the South African health system and recommend whether South Africa should return or not return to the situation where the first tier in the health system is the front line care provided by family doctors.

5.6.12 *Revitalisation of military health facilities*: That the ANC re-endorses this resolution and directs the military and civilian health services to prioritise this matter, in the context of the 2017 conference resolution and resolutions of conferences that preceded this, in a well-coordinated fashion and without compromising the combat-readiness of the SAMHS; and that the Subcommitte together with the ANC NEC Subcommittee on Peace and Stability report quarterly to the NEC on progress made.

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GLOSSARY

ABET	Adult Basic Education and Training
ANA	Annual National Assessments
CAPS	Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statements
CEM	Council of Education Ministers
DBE	Department of Basic Education
DDM	District Development Model
DHEST	Department of Higher Education, Science and Innovation
DHET	Department of Higher Education and Training
DoH	Department of Health
DST	Department of Science and Technology
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
ECD	Early Childhood Development
ELRC	Education Labour Relations Council
EPWP	Expanded Public Works Program
FET	Further Education and Training
HEI	Higher Education Institution
ISFAP	Ikusasa Student Financial Aid Programme
IQMS	Integrated Qualifications Management System
LTSM	Learning and Teaching Support Material
NEEDU	National Education Evaluation and Development Unit
NHI	National Health Insurance
NHIF	National Health Insurance Fund
OHSC	Office of Health Standards and Compliance
PSETA	Public Sector Education and Training Authority
QLTC	Quality of Learning and Teaching Campaign
SETA	Sector Education and Training Authority
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training